Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank Clerk\u27s Record v. 4 Dckt. 34765 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-4-2008
Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank Clerk's Record v. 4
Dckt. 34765
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank Clerk's Record v. 4 Dckt. 34765" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1957.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1957

Miriam G. Carroll, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs . SUPREME COURT 
NO. 34765 
MBNA America Bank, 
Defendant/Respondent 
MBNA America Bank, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
David F. Capps, 
Defendant/Appellant 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Idaho. 
HONORABLE John Bradbury 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
PO BOX 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC 11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Complaint; Demand for Trial by Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Amended Complaint; Demand for Trial by Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Memorandum Decision and Order 20 
Affidavit in Support of brief in Support of opposition to Confirmation of 
Award Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 
Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Award Letter . . . . . .  39 
Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate.55 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on 
Agreement to Arbitrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary on Agreement to 
Arbitrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76 
Post Hearing Memorandum Rebuttal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79 
Defendant's Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Arbitration 
Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Memorandum Decision and Order 100 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Amended Motion for Reconsideration 110 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 129 
Rebuttal of Post-Hearing Memorandum by MBNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  161 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Post-Hearing Memorandum 168 
Notice of Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  193 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Plaintiff's Brief on Applicability of 5 Del . Code $956 195 
Brief on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho Credit Code201 
Addendum to the Brief on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Credit Code 242 
Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Memorandum by MBNA America Bank in Opposition to 
Continuing Motion for Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  276 
Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing 285 
Memorandum in Court Jurisdiction Covering Discovery on Standing Issue 289 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Motion to Vacate Void Judgment 296 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Supplemental Affidavit 311 
Supplemental Affidavit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  314 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Memorandum Decision and Order 317 
Amended Memorandum Decision and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  338 
Notice of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  359 
Order for Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  367 
Amended Notice of Interlocutory Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  368 
Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  376 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Register of Actions 378 
Clerk's Certificate Re: Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  383 
Clerk's Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  384 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Application for Confirmation of Arbitration Award 386 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Order Consolidating Case No 36827 into Case No . 36747 390 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Order Consolidating 392 
Post Hearing Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  394 
Application for Confirmation Arbitration Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  398 
Opposition to Confirmation of Award Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  400 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . 1 
Memorandum of MBNA America Bank. N.A. in Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  402 
Memorandum by MBNA America Bank. N.A. in Opposition to Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  412 
Post-Hearing Memorandum by Plaintiff in Opposition to Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  427 
Plaintiff's Memorandum on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho 
Credit Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  434 
Notice of Joinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  441 
Memorandum by MBNA America Bank in Opposition to Continuing Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  443 
Response by MBNA America Bank to Latest Supplemental Memorandum from 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Carroll/~apps 452 
Opposition to Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery on the Issue 
of Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  458 
Opposition to Supplemental Affidavits of Miriam G . Carroll and David F . 
Capps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  461 
Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  464 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . 2 
INDEX 
Addendum to the Brief on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho 
Credit Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  242 
Affidavit in Support of brief in Support of opposition to Confirmation of 
Award Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  129 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on 
Agreement to Arbitrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary on Agreement to 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Arbitrate 76 
Amended Complaint; Demand for Trial by Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Amended Memorandum Decision and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  338 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Amended Motion for Reconsideration 110 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Amended Notice of Interlocutory Appeal 368 
Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
Application for Confirmation Arbitration Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  398 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Application for Confirmation of Arbitration Award 386 
Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Award Letter . . . . . .  39 
Brief on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho Credit Code201 
Clerk's Certificate Re: Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  383 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Clerk's Certificate 384 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Complaint; Demand for Trial by Jury 1 
Defendant's Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Arbitration 
Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  464 
Memorandum by MBNA America Bank in Opposition to Continuing Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  443 
Memorandum by MBNA America Bank. N.A. in Opposition to Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  412 
Memorandum Decision and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100 
Memorandum Decision and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Memorandum Decision and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  317 
Memorandum in Court Jurisdiction Covering Discovery on Standing Issue 289 
Memorandum of MBNA America Bank. N.A. in Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  402 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Motion to Vacate Void Judgment 296 
Notice of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  359 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Notice of Hearing 193 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Notice of Joinder 441 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Notice 376 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Opposition to Confirmation of Award Letter 400 
Opposition to Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery on the Issue 
of Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  458 
Opposition to Supplemental Affidavits of Miriam G . Carroll and David F . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Capps 461 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Order Consolidating Case No 36827 into Case No . 36747 390 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Order Consolidating 392 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Order for Consolidation 367 
Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate.55 
Plaintiff's Brief on Applicability of 5 Del . Code S956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  195 
Plaintiff's Memorandum on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho 
Credit Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  434 
Post Hearing Memorandum Rebuttal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79 
Post Hearing Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  394 
Post-Hearing Memorandum by Plaintiff in Opposition to Amended Motion for 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Reconsideration 427 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Post-Hearing Memorandum 168 
Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing 285 
Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Memorandum by MBNA America Bank in Opposition to 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Continuing Motion for Reconsideration 276 
Rebuttal of Post-Hearing Memorandum by MBNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  161 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Register of Actions 378 
Response by MBNA America Bank to Latest Supplemental Memorandum from 
Carroll/Capps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  452 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Supplemental Affidavit 311 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Supplemental Affidavit 314 
Miriam G, Carroll 
HC-I I BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
Plaintiff, in propria persona 
AT O'CLOCK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 
Hc-I I BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
Plaintiff, 
COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR 
) TRIAL BY JURY. 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A. 1 
C/O Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two lrvington Centre 
702 King Farm Bivd. 
Rockville, MD 20850 
1-800-830-2793 1 1 
COMES NOW, Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff and for causes of actions against 
Defendant(s) alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION -STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AND DAMAGES 
1. That Plaintiff is a natural person and a resident in Kamiah, in the 
County of Idaho, the State of Idaho. 
2. That Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (previously AAA 
Financial Services), is a Corporation organized in the State of Delaware with its 
principal business location at P.O. Box 15026, Wilmington, DE 19850-5026. 
3. That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a consumer contract on 
and about the 15" of March, 1980. 
4. That the contract provided for Plaintiff to obtain a revolving open- 
ended account with Defendant. 
5. That the original contract was governed in part by the Truth In 
Lending Act. 15 USC section 1601 etseq [TILA] by Plaintiff. 
6. That the original contract provided for Defendant@) to respond to 
any inquiry under TlLA made by Plaintiff. 
7 .  That Plaintiff made an inquiry with Defendant@) on and about the 
~ 3 ' ~  of December, 2004 as to the inaccuracies on the monthly statement and 
requested further information and documentation. 
8. That Defendant(s) received said inquiry on and about the 3rd of 
January, 2005. 
9. That Defendant(s) has a duty to comply with any inquiry under T l lA  
made by Plaintiff. 
10. That more than ninety (90) days has elapsed since the time 
Defendant(s) received the billing inquiry from Plaintiff. 
11. That as of this date Defendant(s) has ignored, failed andlor 
neglected Plaintiff's inquiry by failing to respond to the same. This act was willful 
and knowing. 
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12. That by failing to respond Defendant is prohibited under Tl lA to 
proceed with any collection efforts. 
13. That by failing to respond Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666 
et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. These acts were willful and knowing. 
14. That Defendant's wrongfully and negatively reported to the credit 
reporting agencies that Plaintiff was delinquent on the contract. This act was 
willful and knowing. 
15. That as a result of Defendant's wrongfully reporting the foregoing to 
the credit reporting agencies Defendant(s) violated 15 USC section 1666 et seq 
and 12 CFR section 226.1 3 ef seq. This act was willful and knowing. 
16. That Defendant(s) ignored and disregarded the TlLA provisions by 
proceeding with collection efforts by filing a Claim with the National Arbitration 
Forum ("Forum"). This act was willful and knowing. A true and correct copy of 
the Claim is herewith attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A." 
17. That by filing said Claim Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666 
et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. This act was willful and knowing. 
18. That as a result of the foregoing Plaintiff is entitled to relief under 
TILA. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
19. That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs I through 18 herein 
and above by this reference. 
20. That Plaintiff is not currently in possession of the original contract, 
but will seek to obtain a copy thereof in discovery andlor will seek leave of court 
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to amend this complaint to incorporate a copy of said contract at that time when a 
copy can be ascertained. 
21. That if called to testify Plaintiff will testify that the original contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant did not contain any provision or clause to submit 
any dispute arising out the agreement to arbitration. 
22. That the original contract between Plaintiff and Defendant did not 
contain any provision that would allow Defendant to change or add new terms to 
the original agreement to include arbitration. 
23. That Plaintiff never received a copy of any change or addition of 
new terms to the original agreement. 
24. That Defendant filed a claim against Plaintiff in the Forum alleging 
that an agreement exists containing provisions to arbitrate any dispute arising out 
of the agreement. 
25. Plaintiff filed a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION with the Forum prohibiting the 
Forum to arbitrate the matter absence any provision, clause or contract 
authorizing either Plaintiff or Defendant to submit a claim to arbitration. 
26. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arbitrator and the Forum entered 
an award against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant in the amount of Thirty 
thousand two hundred forty one and 411100 ($30,241.41) Dollars, as evidenced 
by attached Award that is incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "B." 
27. Defendant(s) sewed upon Plaintiff a copy of the Award on and 
about the 6'h of August, 2005. 
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28. That Defendant(~) obtained the Award illegally and without 
authority, using the Forum whereby breaching the original contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. 
29. That the arbitrator exceeded his authority to decide the matter and 
illegally entered an Award against Plaintiff, absent jurisdiction when no 
agreement existed between parties to arbitrate. 
30. That Plaintiff would be prejudiced and adversely affected if 
Defendant is allowed to proceed with confirming the Award and a judgment is 
entered against Plaintiff. 
31. That Defendant had no right to force Plaintiff to arbitrate a claim 
when no agreement existed to arbitrate between parties. 
32. That Defendant had no right to obtain an Award against Plaintiff for 
any amount sought. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS 
33. That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32 herein 
and above by this reference. 
34. That Plaintiff's Rights will be severely impaired if the Award is 
enforced in a court of law and against Plaintiff. 
35. That the award and claim was filed and entered in violation of 
Plaintiff's Right to Due Process under the Law. 
36. That by filing said claim, Defendant(s) violated Plaintiff's Right to 
use the courts as a means to resolve the dispute. This act was willful and 
knowing 
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37. That by filing the claim, Defendant attempted to violate Plaintiff's 
Right to Due Process under the law. This act was willful and knowing. 
38. That by filing the claim, Defendant violated Plaintiffs Right to a trial 
by jury. This act was willful and knowing. 
39. That by filing the claim, Defendant violated the obligation of the 
original contract, thus impairing the protection and security of obligation of 
contract under the Constitution. This act was willful and knowing. 
40. That all of Defendant(s)'s actions have impaired and adversely 
affected Plaintiff, which is now entitled to immediate relief under the law. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - IMMEDIATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
41. That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 herein 
and above by this reference. 
42. That Plaintiff has no other immediate remedy under the law except 
to file this action. 
43. That Plaintiff is entitled to immediate relief from the arbitration 
award. 
44. That the award must be vacated immediately before further harm is 
done to Plaintiff. 
PRAYER AND RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant(s) and each 
of them, on each and every cause of action and count as follows: 
1. For immediate relief from Arbitration Award; 
2. For $30,241.41 ; 
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3. For unliquidated damages that may be ascertained by the court or 
jury; 
4. For punitive, general and special damages; 
5. For cost of this suit herein; 
6. For Violations of Rights; 
7. For such other relief as the court deems proper and demanded 
herein. 
Date: cT- ;<Ci C> 1- 
Signed and respectfully submitted by: 
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff 
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Plaintiff, in propria persona. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 
Hc-I I BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
Plaintiff, 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A. 
C/O Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two l~ ing ton  Centre 
702 Kina Farm Blvd. 
Case NO: ('J 05 -37q7 
b~ b 
COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR 
TRIAL BY JURY. 
COMES NOW, Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff and for causes of actions against 
Defendant@) alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AND DAMAGES 
1. That Plaintiff is a natural person and a resident in Kamiah, in the 
County of Idaho, the State of'ldaho. 
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2. That Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A., is a Corporation 
organized in the State of Delaware with its principal business location at P.O. 
Box 15026, Wilmington, DE 19850-5026. 
3. That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a consumer contract on 
and about the 15'~ of March, 1980. 
4. That the contract provided for Plaintiff to obtain a revolving open- 
ended account with Defendant. 
5. That the original contract was governed in part by the Truth In 
Lending Act. 15 USC section 1601 ef seq [TIM] by Plaintiff. 
6. That the original contract provided for Defendant@) to respond to 
any inquiry under TlLA made by Plaintiff. 
7. That Plaintiff made an inquiry with Defendant@) on and about the 
23rd of December, 2004 as to the inaccuracies on the monthly statement and 
requested further information and documentation. 
8. That Defendant@) received said inquiry on and about the 3rd of 
January, 2005. 
9. That Defendant($ has a duty to comply with any inquiry under T I M  
made by Plaintiff. 
10. That more than ninety (90) days has elapsed since the time 
Defendant@) received the billing inquiry from Plaintiff. 
11. That as of this date Defendant(s) has ignored, failed andlor 
neglected Plaintiffs inquiry by failing to respond to the same. This act was willful 
and knowing. 
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12. That by failing to respond Defendant is prohibited under Tl lA to 
proceed with any collection efforts. 
13. That by failing to respond Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666 
et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. These acts were willful and knowing. 
14. That Defendant's wrongfully and negatively reported to the credit 
reporting agencies that Plaintiff was delinquent on the contract. This act was 
willful and knowing. 
15. That as a result of Defendant's wrongfully reporting the foregoing to 
the credit reporting agencies Defendant(s) violated 15 USC section 1666 et seq 
and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. This act was willful and knowing. 
16. That Defendant(s) ignored and disregarded the TlLA provisions by 
proceeding with collection efforts by filing a Claim with the National Arbitration 
Forum ("Forum"). This act was willful and knowing. A true and correct copy of 
the Claim is herewith attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A." 
17. That by filing said Claim Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666 
et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. This act was willful and knowing. 
18. That as a result of the foregoing Plaintiff is entitled to relief under 
TILA. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
19. That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 18 herein 
and above by this reference. 
20. That Plaintiff is not currently in possession of the original contract, 
but will seek to obtain a copy thereof in discovery andlor will seek leave of court 
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to amend this complaint to incorporate a copy of said contract at that time when a 
copy can be ascertained. 
21. That if called to testify Plaintiff will testify that the original contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant did not contain any provision or clause to submit 
any dispute arising out the agreement to arbitration. 
22. That the original contract between Plaintiff and Defendant did not 
contain any provision that would allow Defendant to change or add new terms to 
the original agreement to include arbitration. 
23. That Plaintiff never received a copy of any change or addition of 
new terms to the original agreement. 
24. That Defendant filed a claim against Plaintiff in the Forum alleging 
that an agreement exists containing provisions to arbitrate any dispute arising out 
of the agreement. 
25. Plaintiff filed a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION with the Forum prohibiting the 
Forum to arbitrate the matter absence any provision, clause or contract 
authorizing either Plaintiff or Defendant to submit a claim to arbitration. 
26. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arbitrator and the Forum entered 
an award against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant in the amount of Thirty 
thousand two hundred forty one and 411100 ($30,241.41) Dollars, as evidenced 
by attached Award that is incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "6." 
27. Defendant(s) served upon Plaintiff a copy of the Award on and 
about the €jth of August, 2005. 
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28. That Defendant(s) obtained the Award illegally and without 
authority, using the Forum whereby breaching the original contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. 
29. That the arbitrator exceeded his authority to decide the matter and 
illegally entered an Award against Plaintiff, absent jurisdiction when no 
agreement existed between parties to arbitrate. 
30. That Plaintiff would be prejudiced and adversely affected if 
Defendant is allowed to proceed with confirming the Award and a judgment is 
entered against Plaintiff. 
31. That Defendant had no right to force Plaintiff to arbitrate a claim 
when no agreement existed to arbitrate between parties. 
32. That Defendant had no right to obtain an Award against Plaintiff for 
any amount sought. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION -VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS 
33. That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32 herein 
and above by this reference. 
34. That Plaintiff's Rights will be severely impaired if the Award is 
enforced in a court of law and against Plaintiff. 
35. That the award and claim was filed and entered in violation of 
Plaintiff's Right to Due Process under the Law. 
36. That by filing said claim, Defendant(s) violated Plaintiff's Right to 
use the courts as a means to resolve the dispute. This act was willful and 
knowing. 
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37. That by filing the claim, Defendant attempted to violate Plaintiff's 
Right to Due Process under the law. This act was willful and knowing. 
38. That by filing the claim, Defendant violated Plaintiff's Right to a trial 
by jury. This act was willful and knowing. 
39. That by filing the claim, Defendant violated the obligation of the 
original contract, thus impairing the protection and security of obligation of 
contract under the Constitution. This act was willful and knowing. 
40. That ail of Defendant(s)'s actions have impaired and adversely 
affected Plaintiff, which is now entitled to immediate relief under the law. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - IMMEDIATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
41. That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 herein 
and above by this reference. 
42. That Plaintiff has no other immediate remedy under the law except 
to file this action. 
43. That Plaintiff is entitled to immediate relief from the arbitration 
award. 
44. That the award must be vacated immediately before further harm is 
done to Plaintiff. 
PRAYER AND RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant(s) and each 
of them, on each and every cause of action and count as follows: 
1. For immediate relief from Arbitration Award; 
2. For $30,241.41; 
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3. For unliquidated damages that may be ascertained by the court or 
jury; 
4. For punitive, general and special damages; 
5. For cost of this suit herein; 
6. For Violations of Rights; 
7. For such other relief as the court deems proper and demanded 
herein. 
Date: m % c -  
Signed and respectfully submitted by: 
u, -2, G - c-r-3 
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff 
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3151 NATIONAL ARBRXATION FORUM " 
CLAIM 
MBNA America Bank. N.A.1 
c/o Wolpoff & Ahramsou, L.L.P. RE: 
Attorneys iu the Practice of Debt Collectiou Foruni File Number: FA0503000443990 
Two Irviugtou Ceutre Claimant File Number: 0135832603 
702 King Fam1 Blvd. Account No.: 4313033111006016 
Rockville, MD 20850 Card member Agreement Type: AGMT90 
Miriam G Carroll 
Hc 11 Box 366 
Kamiah ID 83536.9410 
For a Claim against Respoudeut(s), CIaiuiaut states: 
1 By way of contract aud nse of the credit accouul at issue, Respoudcut(s) became boeud by the terms of a credit agreement 
(hereiuafter the "Agreement"). which is attached hereto and iucorporated hereiu hy refereuce. 
2. Respondeut(s) islare in default uuder the terms of the Agreemeut aud islare uow iudebted to Claimaut in the amount of 
$24730.31 ,as reflected iu the attached account summary, plus iuterest of $290.50 as of the date of filing. and at 
8.75% thereafter. 
3. Despite repeated demauds for paymeut, Respoudent(s) haslhave not paid the au~o~ruts due. 
4. Claimant requests au Award fnr the auiouuts reflected iu Paragraph 2, plus all arhitratiou fees iucurred, Process of Service 
fees aud Attoruey Fees of $3709.54 , if allowed by law, equaliug 15% of the outstauding principal balance. 
5 .  The attached Agreemeut coutaius a Delaware choice of law provision and a provisiou for "reasouahle" attorney fees. 
Delaware law specifically provides that an attoruey fee may he awarded iu an aulouul up to 20% on an uupaid claim if 
allowed by law. &. 10 Del. Code Sec. 3912 (Pleading & Practice). 
6. The attached Agreemeut contains a maudatory arbitration provisiou under the Rules of the National Arhitratiou Fonrm 
("NAF"). 
The uudersigned couusel for Claimant asserts, uuder penalty of pcrjury, that the iuformatiou coutained in this Claim and 
the supporting documents attached hereto are accurate hased upon iuformatiou provided by Claimaut to the undersigued counsel. 
WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, L.L.P. 
Atton~ey~ 111 rl~e Pruclrrcrice of Debt Collecrio!~ 
By: 
Jamie B. Vodoklys, Esq. Neal J. Levitsky, Esq. 
ADMITTED. (MD) ADMITTED: (DE) 
Co n el for the Claiu~ant 
If Respondent o r  counsel wishes to contact Claimant, please call o r  write: 
Paralegal Department 
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two Irvington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd., 5th Floor 






MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
c/o Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection 
702 King Farm Blvd, Two Irvington Centre 
Rockville, MD 20850-5775 
CLAIiiTAiWs), -" AWARD . . . - I-._ 
RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v Miriam G Carroll 
File Number: FA0503000443990 
Claimant File Number: 4313033111006016 
Miriam G Carroll 
Hc 11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410 
The undersigned Arbitrator in this case FINDS: 
1. That no known conflict of interest exists. 
2. That on or before 0311 712005 the Parties entered into an agreement providing that this matter shall be 
iesolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the Fomm Code of Procedure. 
3. That the Claimant has filed a Claim with the Forum and served it on the Respondent in accordance with Rule 6. 
4. That the Respondent has filed a Response with the Fomm and served it on the Claimant. 
5. That the matter has proceeded in accord with the applicable Forum Code of Procedure. 
6. The Parties have had the opportunity to present all evidence and information to the Arbitrator. 
r 1s case. 7. That the Arbitrator has reviewed all evidence and information submitted in t?' 
8. That the information and evidence submitted supports the issuance of an Award as stated. 
Therefore, the Arbitrator ISSUES: 
An Award in favor of the Claimant, for a total amount of $30,241.41. 
Entered in the State of Idaho 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby 
certifies that a copy of th_isAwag,d was sent by fust class 
st e$XA! Moore, Esq. 
&mior mail postage p r e p a i d f a ~ ~ ; " P @ a ; i y @ ~ h e  above r ferenced 
addresses, or their,Kepresenbt@eqon this date. 
JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615 
LISA B. RASMUSSEN, ISB No. 493 1 
WILSON, McCOLL & RASMUSSEN 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED 
AT 3 165 O'CLOCKJ.M. 
ROSE E. GEHRING 
STRICT COURT 
EP UrY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CV36747 
1 
VS. 1 ANSWER 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 1 
1 
Defendant, ) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A., by and through its attorney of 
record, Lisa B. Rasmussen of the firm Wilson McColl & Rasmussen and answers the Complaint on 
file herein as follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically admitted 
herein. 
2. Answering paragraph 1,20, and 21, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein at 
present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
32,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,42,43, and 44, Defendant denies the allegations contained 
therein. 
ANSWER - 1 
4. Answering paragraph 4, Defendant admits that the account between the parties was a 
credit card account. 
5. Regarding paragraphs 5,6,9, 12 the allegations contained therein are legal conclusions 
and therefore no response is necessary. 
6. Answering paragraph 24, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
7. Answering paragraph 26 and 27, the arbitration proceeding is still pending and therefore 
Defendant cannot admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 26 and 27. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Court: 
1. Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice; 
2. Award Defendant its attorney's fees and costs; 
3. Award such further relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
DATED day of December, 2005. 
WILSON, McCOLL & RASMUSSEN 
r )  
; kZq /$~6~ fA '+  ------ 
LISA B. RASMUSSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
ANSWER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of ~ecember,  2005, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER by regular United States mail with the correct postage affixed 
thereon addressed to: 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
By: 
Lisa B. Rasmussen 
ANSWER - 3 
LEWIS COUNTY IDAHO C O U ~  DIS-C& 
FILED I 
' AT 2 7 1 I O'CLOCK..M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
DAVID F. CAPPS 1 
1 Case No. CV 05-36747 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 AND ORDER 





This case comes before me on defendant MBNA America Bank's (MBNA Ban) 
motion for summary judginent regarding saparate claims by Miriam Carroll and David 
Capps, residents of Kamiah who live together. The claims are substantially equivalent 
and have been consolidated. Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps arc suing MBNA Brink. for 
violations of certain provisions of the federal Truth in Lending Act related to the 
resolution of credit card disputes, for breach of contract rights incident to a credit card 
agreement between them and MBNA Bank, and for violations of theif rights to due 
process, their right to aooess the courts, and their right to the sanctity of contract. They 
ask for damages and also for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration awards entered 
in favor of MBNA Bank. against each ofthem individually. 
MBNA Bank has sued to confirm the arbitration award against M.T. Capps. It 
claims that both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps failed to pay their credit card debts as 
required undcr their agreements. It htther claims that the credit card agreements 
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requixed biding arbitration in the event of a dispute. Ms. Catroll and Mr. Capps each 
say there was no agreement to arbitrate. 
FACTS 
Both Mr. Capps and MBNA bank agree that a credit card agreement was formed 
betmen Mr. Capps and MBNA Rank in Febmary of 1999. Ms. Carroll and the Bank 
also agree that an agreement between them existcd, although they do not agree as when it 
was formed. MBNA Bank says the agreement was formed in April of nineteen-seventy- 
seven, whereas Ms. Carroll says their agreement was formed in March of nineteen- 
eighty. 
Subsequently, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps incurred debts under the agreement. In 
Dccember 2004, after receiving a monthly statement from MBNA Bank, they mailed a 
letter to MBNA Bank. The lctters were equivalent in language? but because hYo different 
credit cards were at issue the amounts and statement dates refcned to in the lctters 
differed. Ms. Carroll's lettw purported to place in dispute a liability in excess oF twcnty- 
four thousand dollars, and Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in disputc a liability in 
excess of twenty-one thousand dollars. Each letter Btated the following: 
I am writing regarding tho above account. 1 believe that my most recent 
statement . . . is inaccurate. . . . I am disputing the above amount because I 
believe that you failed to credit my account For prepayments you agreed to 
credit on the [December] statement . . . . It was my understanding that 
when I entered into the agreement with you that you would accept my 
signed note(s) or other similar instmment(s) as money, oredit$ or payment 
for previous account transactions, and then reflect those credits in the 
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[December] statement . . . . They do not appear in the statement and I am 
wondering why. The sunount of the credits on the prepayments of money 
or credit accepted by you should be the approximate amount that I list 
above. I am making this billing inquiry becausc I am uncertain of all the 
dates of the prepaid credits, charges and also because there may be 
additional credits that 1 am entitled to. Please provide me with a wrinen 
explanation why these credits are not showing. . . . T am requesting that 
you provide me with an acknowledgement of this billing error and 
complete a full investigation by sending me a written explanation reporl 
related t~ the subject matter of this billing enor. . . . I am also requesting 
additional documc:ntary evidence of indebtedness of the account chargcs, 
which includes copies of the account charges and entries that made you 
arrivc at the recent balance shown on my statement. . . . I am exercising 
m y  right to withhold the disputed amount until you comply. . . . 
Neither Ms. Canoll nor Mr. Capps received a reply to their letter. In March 2005 
they each wrote a follow-up letter to MBNA Bank, noting that thcy had received no 
response to their inquiry, and urging the bank to "comply with the resolution procedurks 
to avoid noncompliance." Subsequently both Ms. Carro1l and Mr. Capps noted that their 
credit reports with Experian had listed their accounts as closod by the creditor and 
overdue. Each thcn wrote a letter to MBNA Bank, Mr. Capps in June and Ms. Carroll in 
October, asking the Bank to observe certain procedures for resolving billing disputes as 
required by federal regulations. Each asked the bank to amend the report to indicate that 
the account balancc was in dispute rather than overdue, to remove any reference to late 
PAGE 03 




payments, and to report a balance on the account as of the day when the purported billing 
dispute was initiated, less the late fees and intercst accrucd since that time. 
At some point MBNA Banis. filed claims against both of them with the National 
Arbitration Fonun (NAF), requesting that the disputes be arbitrat:ed. In April 2005 Ms. 
Carroil wrote to the NAP and moved to dismiss the claim filed with them. In 11er motion 
to dismiss Ms. Carroll asserted that lhc original agreement she had with MBNA Bank 
involved no agreerncnt to arbitrate, that she had received no notice of any amendment to 
the agreement which added an arbitration clause and allowed her the opportwity to opt- 
out, and that consequently there was no cunent agreement which gave the NAF authority 
to arbimte her dispute with thc bank. In July 2005 Mr. Capps sent an equivalent lettcr. 
In each case the NAF acknowledged receipt of the motion to dismiss and 
requested thc subniission of evidence %om the paties to the dispute. On August 3,2005 
the NAF issued a decision in regaxds to the claim against Ms. Carroll. The N M  
arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agteement between the parties granting 
it authoxity to resolve the dispute. The arbitrator &her found that the information and 
evidence submitted in the case supported the issuance of an award to MBNA Bank in the 
amount of thirty thousand two hundred and forty-one dollars and forty-one cents. On 
September 30.2005 a different arbitrator made similar hdings in the claim against Mr. 
Capps and issued an. award in the amount of twenty-eight thousand one hundred fifty-six 
dollars and forty-nine cents in the favor of MBNA Bank. 
On September 30,2005 Ms. Cmoll filed a complaint in Idaho County. In hcr 
first cause of action Ms. Carroll claimed that MBNA Bank had violated federal law when 
it failed to follow the procedures required by the Tmth in Lending Act to rcsolve the 
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billing dispute raised by her letter of December 2004. A second cause of action alleged 
that her contract rights under her crcdit card agreement were breached when the Bank 
movcd to arbitrate its claim against ber, asserting that there was no valid agreement to 
arbitrate disputes. The third cause of action allcged that the hebitration claim and award 
had "impair[ed] the protection and security of obligation of conttact under the 
Constitution" and had also violated her rights to due process, her right of access to the 
courts, and her right to trial by jury. A fourth cause of action asked for immediate 
injunctive reliefinvalidating the arbitration award. On November 3,2005 Mr. Capps 
filed an equivalent complaint against MBNA Bank alleging the same causes of action and 
requesting the same relief. 
On .Tanuary 17,2006 MBNA Bank filed a request to confirm its arbitration award 
against Mr. Capps. The request was incorrectly filed in Lcwis County and was 
subsequently transferred to Idaho County. On March 29,2006 MRNA Bank moved for 
summary judgment in its favor regarding the complaints fited by both Ms. Carroll and 
Mr. Capps. On May 1 I, 2006 1 consolidated the cases. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, demonstrate that there is no material issue of fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. McColnz-Traska v. Baker, 139 
Idaho 948,950-51 (2004); Thornson v. City oflowiston, 137 Idalto 473,476 (2002); 
X.R.C.P. 56(c). All allegations of fact in the record and all inferences from the record are 
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construed in t l~e light most favorable to the non-moving party. Civ oflellogg v. Mission 
Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239,243 (2000). 
Summary judgment is improper whcn a conflict in affidavits respecting issues of 
material fact exists or when the relevant pleadings, depositions and affidavits raise any 
question of credibility ofwitnesses. On ihe otl~et hand, a mere scintilla of cvidencc will 
not create a genuine issue of material fact suficicnt lo preclude summary judgment. 
Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792,798 (2002)(citations omitted). 
The initial burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving 
party. Where the moving party has supported its motion, however, the non-moving party 
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but tho party's 
responsc, by mdavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that therc is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P. 56(c); Thompn, 137 Idaho at 
476; Doc 11. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,469 (1986). 
DISCUSSION 
The Arbitration Clause 
This outcome of this litigation depends in part of the t m s  and validity of the 
contract between MBNA Bank and its cardholders Ms. Carroll and Mx. Capps. A crucial 
issue is whether or not a valid, enforceable arbitration clause was contained in the 
agreement between thc parties at the time the disputes arose. Thc of Ms. 
Carroll and Mr. Capps state that there was no agreement lo agreement and that they were 
unaware of any attempt by MBNA Bank to amend their original credit card agreement to 
obtain one. Gregory Canapp. a Senior Personal Banking OEcer at MBNA Rank, states 
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that therc was an agreement and purports to attach a copy of the current operative 
agreement and copies of monthly stateinents. 
No such documents are attached, a fact notcd by Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps in 
their brie& in opposilion to the motion for summary judgment. MBNA Bank has taken 
no steps to rcmedy this situation. As a result I am left only with the patties avcrments as 
lo whether an arbitration agreement governed their dispute. S u m a r y  judgment on the 
arbitratton agreement dispute is not possible on such a record. 
Violation of the Fedcrai Credit Billing Act 
The issue of whether or not MBNA Bank violated federal law, howevcr, requires 
more discussion. Both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps claim that MBNA Bank has violated 
relevmt provisions of the Truth in Lending Act. Specifically they claim that thc bank 
failed to follow the procedures rcquired by law when a consumer raises a billing dispute 
regarding an opcn-ended revolving credit agreement. They each claim that their letter of 
December 2004 raised such a dispntc. MBNA Bank acknowledges receiving thc letters 
but denies that thc letters raised a billing dispute. It therefore claims it was not requircd 
to follow the procedures cited by Ms. Cmoll and Mr. Capps. 
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA), ori&ally enacted in 1968, was the first federal 
consumer protection law. Ksrz v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 273 F.Supp.2d 474,477 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2003); see 15 U.S.C.$ 1601 et seg. The overall pu.rposc of TXLA is to "assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the variaus credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, 
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card 
practices." 15 U.S,C. 1601(a); Citibank(South Dakota) N.A. v. Mincks, 135 S.W.3d 545, 
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552-53 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004). As a remedial act TILA must be strictly construed against 
creditors and liberally construed in favor of consumers. Kurz, 273 F.Supp.2d at 477; 
Minck, 135 S.W.3d at 553. 
Congress also sought to force creditors to be more responsive to their customers 
by displaying relevant information clearly and by responding promptly to complaints 
regarding billing errors. Kurz, 273 F.Supp.2d at 477. To advance this purpose Congress 
enacted thc Fair Credit Bijling Act, which added a number of provisio~ls to TILA and set 
for& the required procedure to be followed if the obligor wishes to query a bill in 
conncctionwith an extension of consumer credit. 88 Stat. 1512; 15 U.S.C. 8 1666(a); 
American &pres,s Co. v. Koernsr, 452 U.S. 233,234-35 (1981); Kt~rz, 273 F.Supp.2d at 
477. 
I fthe debtor believes that the sbtemenl: contains a billing enor, he then may send 
the creditor a written notice setting forth that belie< indicating thc amount of the enor 
and the reasom for his belief that it is an error. Koernev, 452 U.S. at 235-36. More 
precisely, the statutory language requires that the notice: "(1) set[] forth or otherwise 
enable[] the creditor to iderltifL the name sad account numbcr (if any) of the obligor, (2) 
indicate[] the obligor's belief that the statement contains a billi~lg crror and the mount of 
such billing error, and (3) setl] forth the reasons for the obligor's belief (to the extent 
applicable) that the statement contains a billing error. . ." 15. U.S.C. $ 1666(a); see also 
12 C.F.R. 4 226.13(b).. 
If the creditor receives this notice within 60 days of transmitting the statement of 
account, two obligations are imposed. Within 30 days, i t  must send a written 
acknowledgment U~at it has received tl~e notice. And, within 90 days or two complete 
< +: 
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billing cyclcs, whichever is shorter, the creditor must investigate the m a m  and either 
make appropriate corrections in the obligor's account or send a written explanation of its 
belief that thc original statement sent to the obligor was correct. The creditor must send 
its explanation before making any attempt to collect thc disputcd amount. Koerner, 452 
U.S. at 235-37. 
After complying with these provisions in regards to an alleged billing enor, a 
creditor has no further responsibility under section 1666 if the obligor continues to makc 
substantially the same allegation with rcspect to such error. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a); 
Koerner, 452 U.S. at 237. But a creditor that fails to comply with the section Forfeits its 
right t~ collect the tirst fifly dollars of thc disputcd amount including finance charges. 15 
U.S.C. 1666(e); Koerner. 452 U.S. al237. FuTthmore. pursuant to regulations issued 
by ihe Fcdcral Reserve Board and known as Regulation Z, a creditor may not restrict or 
close an account due to a failure to pay a disputed amount until its written explanation 
has been sent. 15 U.S.C. 1666(d); Koermr, 452 U.S. at 237; 12 C.F.R. 3 226.13(d)(l). 
The consumer necd not pay the amount during this period, the creditor may not threaten 
directly or indirectly to make a bad credit report due to the failure to pay, and the amount 
in dispute "may not be reportcd as delinquent to any third party" until the creditor has 
fulfilled its statutory obligations and has given the consumer at least ten days to pay any 
amount determined to be owed. 15 U.S.C. 6 1666a(a); Bernstein v. Sakr Ftlfh Avenue & 
Co,, 208 F.Supp.2d 765,773 (E.D. Mich. 2002); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(d)(2). 
As Congress intended these protections to apply to alleged "billing errors", it 
statutorily defined what a billing error is. A billing error is any of thc following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 9 ;: o - & LJ 
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(1) A reflection on a statcment of an extension of credit which was not 
made to the obligor or, if made, was not in the amount reflected on such 
statement. 
(2) A reflection on a statement of an extension of credit for which the 
obligor requests additional clarification including documentary evidcnce 
thereof. 
(3) A reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the 
obligor or his designee or not delivered to the obligor or his designee in 
accordance with the agreement made at the time of a transaction. 
(4) The creditor's failure to reflect properly on a statement a payment 
made by the obligor or a credit issued to the obligox, 
Q A computation tmor or similar error of an accounting nature of thc 
creditor on a statement. 
(6) Failure to transmit the statement required under section 1637(b) of this 
title to the last addresa of thc obligor which has becn disclosed to h e  
creditor, unless that address was furnished less than twenty days before the 
end of the billing cycle for which the statcrnent js required. 
(7) Any other error describcd in regulations of the Board. 
15 U.S.C. 9 lG66(b);seealso 12 C.F.R. § 226.1,3(a). 
MBNA Bank acknowledged in its response to Rcquest for Admission No. l that it 
received the letters forwarded by Ms. Can01 and Mr. Capps in eatly ~anwry.' Tbis is 
I Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps submitted the same interrogatories, requests for admission, 
and requests for production of documents, and the Bank responded tlxe same way to their 
separate submissions. 
PAGE 10 
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within the sixty day period required by 15 U.S.C. (j 16666 for credit card obligors who 
wish to inquire as to an allegcd billing error and trigger the procedures required by the 
Fair Credit Billing Act.. It is undisputed that the Bank never responded to the letters -the 
Bank admits in its rcsponse to Request for Admission No. 2 that it never conducted an 
investigation. Further, it is undisputed that the Bank engaged in subsequent attempts to 
collect by filing an arbitration claim and in at least Mr. Capp's case by filing a request for 
confirmation ofthe arbitration awatd. The Bank also listed the two accounts as closcd or 
restricted and reported them as overduc to a credit bureau. The Bank admits in its 
response to Requests for Admission Nos. 6 and 7 that it made an adverse credit report to 
Experian regarding Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps and that it did not identify the accounts as 
being in dispute. 
The issue prescntcd is whether the letters comprised valid billing error notices. If 
they did not thc Bank's subsequent actions were privileged. IFthey did the Bank has 
violated the mandates of 15 U.S.C 3 I666 and the agency regulations which implement 
it2 
MBNA Bank contends that a billing dispute must relate to a specific payment or 
extension of credit and it fkther contends that Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps have failed to 
specifically identify the payment they are referencing in their letters to thc Bank. It cites 
Griesz v. Iiosuehold Bankin support of its position. 8 F.Supp.2d 103 1 (N.D. 111. 1998). 
The Bank says d1at the Fair Credit Billing Act was designcd to rectify errors in billing 
2 Courts must give deference to agcncy interpretations of TILA and its implementing 
regulations. Anderson Bras. Ford v. Vglencia, 452 U.S. 205,219 (1981). Federal 
Reserve Board staff opinions construing the statute and Regulation Z must be dcfcrred to 
udess "demonstrably irrational." FordMotor Credit v. Milhollin, 444 {J.S. 555,565 
(1980). 
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statements such as misstated charges or calculations in bills. It contcnds that thc letters 
here have Failed to do so. In its opinion, ihe letters amount to a specious invocation of the 
universally discredited "'money lent" theory of credit, in which a debtor may repay in 
kind a crcditor who has made an extension of crcdit. By paying for an extension of credit 
with a promissory note, the debtor payg the creditor with credit and thus any extension of 
debt is retired. The Bank cites authority for the proposition that a debtor cannot use 
provisions of the Tmth in Lending Act an "instrument of harassment and oppression" 
against the lending industry. It a.ks me to recognize these letters for what the Bank 
contends they really are: illegitimate attempts to frustrate creditors in their atternpts to 
collect debts lcgally owcd. 
Botl~ Mr. Carroll and Mr. Capps deny that their letters rely on the 'honey lent" 
theory. But their representations shed no fusthcr light on what thc lcttcrs actually mcan. 
The letters do in fact make reference to the understanding of Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps 
that the Bank had agree to accept the "signed note(s) or other similar instwtnent(s) as 
money, credit, or payment for previous account transactions." But the letters citc no 
specific payment made, nor the time frame in which any payment or promise of payment 
was made. Nor do they dispute any charge or extension of credit directly. It is difficult 
to see what the letter is refening to if it is not referring to an allcged repayment of credit 
in kind. 
But the Bank undercu@ its own position with its responses to the requests for 
admission. In its response to Rcqucst for Admission No. 2 it admits that the lettcr 
contained a reference to the sender's name and account number. Request for Admission 
No. 3 then asked the Bank to admit that "the letter indicated that [sic] the p1aintilX"s belief 
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ei- <I A 
05/24/2006 14:11 20893797"3 LEWIS COUNTY ( .'', 




that a billing crror exists, the type of e m ,  the statement date and the amount of the 
enor." MRNA Bank's response to this requcst was not to admit or deny but rather to 
opine that "the letter speaks for itsclf." 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a), a matter to which a requcst for 
admiision is directed "is admitted unless, within 15 days after service ofthe request, . . 
.the party. . . scwcs . . .a writtcn answer or objection addressed to the matter. . . . If 
objection is made, the reasons therefore shall be stated. The answer shall specifically 
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot 
truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the 
requested admission. . . " 
The Bank neither admitted, denied, or objected to the request for admission even 
though it was a legitimate request entitled to a response. It clearly comprised a 'kcquest 
that relate[ed] to statements or opinions of fact or of the appljcation of law to fact" 
I.C.R.P. 36(a). Rule 36 will allow requests as to a broad range of matters, including 
opinions, conclusiovs, and ultimate facts as well as applications of law to fact. Ruge v. 
Posey, 114 Idaho 890,891 n. I (2003)(noting that even a request to admit negligence, 
fault, or liability may be permissible in certain ckcurnstances). This request addressed the 
presence or absence in the letter of relevant facts which could establish whether the letter 
met the statutory requirements for raising a valid billing dipute under 15 U.S.C. 1666. 
The request was entitled to a rcsponse. 
Recause a failure to deny or object amounts to admission, the requcst is deemed 
admitted. With thc Idaho rule, as with the comparable federal rule, any matter admitted, 
wl~ether admitted affirmatively or by default, is concl~~sively established. Quiring v. 
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Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,564 (1997)(citing American Auto. Ass'n v. AM Legal Clinic, 
930 F.2d l 117, 11 19 (5th Cir. 199I)('[alny matter admitted is conclusively establisl~ed"); 
scc al,voAsea, Inc. Y. Southern PaciJc Tramp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242,1245 (9th Cir. 1982) 
("it is undisputed that failure to answer or object to a propcr request for admission is itsclf 
an admission"). 
The Bank has not moved to witlidraw its admission, which aclrnowledges that the 
statutory elements of a valid billing dispute were contained in the letter. In light of such 
an admission, MBNA bank has not explained how it can bc entitled lo summary 
judgment in its favor, especially when 1 must construe the statute strictly against the 
creditor and liberally in favor of thc consumer. Viewing the evidencc in the lighl. most 
favorable to the non-moving party, jt would appear that tile Bank has failed to establish 
its right to a grant of summary judgment in its favor. 
Of course the Bank in its Responsc to Admission No. 1 manages to deny the that 
the lettcr constituted a valid billing noticc, thus contradicting the default admission made 
later by i ts response to Request for Admission No. 3. In point of fact, the Bank appears 
to want to have it both ways. ;It did not want to overtly deny the request and then be 
forced to cxplain why &err: was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Then it 
might not enjoy success with its motion for summary judgment. Nor did it want to admit 
the request directly and appear to concede the case or explain why it m s  still entitlcd to 
judgment as a matter of law. But the purpose of requests for admission is precisely to 
narrow the issues so that litigation may bc more narrowly defined and then resolved on 
the merits. 
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MRNA BElnk docs not havc the option to ignore the requirements and purposes of 
the Idaho Rules of Cjvil Procedure in order to prcvail on a motion for s u m m q  
judgment. I am disappointed that it thinks that it can. 
Where 1 "dcterminen that an answer does not comply" with Rule 36,X "may order 
either that t l~c matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served." I.C.R.P. 36(a). I 
conclude that an amended answer is rcquired. 
ORDER 
MBNA America Bank's motion for summary judgment as to thc claim by Ms. 
Carroll is DENIED. Its motion for summary judgment on the claim by Mr. Capps is also 
DENIED. The Bank will promptly amend its response to both Ms. Carroll and Mr. 
Capps' Request for Admission Number 3 so as to comply with the requirements of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 36. 
It i s  so ordered this 2 - 4 day of May, 2006. 
V 
John H. Bradbury 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIJ,WG 
&at a ante copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage 
May, 2006, to the following: 
- 
- 3 4 
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MBNA America Ban]< 
C/O Wilson, McColl& Rasmussen 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
David Capps 
HC-11 Box 366 
Kamiah, 1D 83536 
Miriam Carroll 
HC-I 1 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
ROSE B. GEEXRING, Court Clerk 
by: 
Miriam G. Carroll 
*o Q-- 
HC-11 Box 366 "2 
Kamiah, ID 83536 % %- 
208-935-7962 
Plaintiff, in propria persona 
, a61AHO COUNTY DlSTRlP "OURT 
FILED  AT^ ! 5 9 O~CLOCK LM. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) Case No. CV-06-37320 
VS. 
1 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
) OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) OPPOSITION TO 
) CONFIRMATION OF 
Defendant, ) AWARD LETTER 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Idaho ) 
I, MIRIAM G. CARROLL, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Defendant in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of 
my Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Award Letter. I make 
this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER. Pg 1 of 3. 
- - 3 6 
2. That on or about the 15Ih day of March, 1980, 1 entered into a consumer 
contract with the defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter 
referred to as "MBNA") for the purpose of securing an open-ended 
revolving credit card account number 4313-0331-1 00-6016. 
3. That the original agreement between myself and MBNA did not contain an 
agreement to arbitrate disputes. 
4. That I have not been aware of any attempt from MBNA to alter the 
agreement to include an arbitration clause. 
5. That I have never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA. 
Dated this 27 day of June, 2006. 
Cl -c+\\ Subscribed and sworn before me 
Miriam G. Carroll this 2 7 day of June, 2006 
County 
My Commission expires on 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER. Pg 2 of 3. 
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CERTIFCATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27 day of June, 2006, 1 mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER to the 
attorney for the Plaintiff by Certified Mail #7003 0500 0005 3304 9348, with 
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
William L. Bishop, Jr. 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 98111-2f3B 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle. WA 98101 
.'.,:,C. --\ I 
Miriam G. Carroll 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER. P 3 f 3. 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
IDNOCOUNTIl DlSTRlC iURT 
FILED *TM o.cLocK&-.M
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
) Case No. CV-06-37320 
Plaintiff, ) 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
VS. ) OPPOSITION TO 
) CONFIRMATION OF 




MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) claims to 
have amended the credit card agreement with the Defendant, Miriam G. Carroll 
(hereinafter referred to as "Carroll") in or around the month of January of the year 
2000. Carroll has not agreed to arbitrate this dispute, or any dispute with MBNA. 
MBNA claims that the amendment to the credit card agreement was made 
unilaterally, and that it has the authority to do so. This brief challenges the 
contention that MBNA has a right to unilaterally modify the credit card agreement 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD 
LETTER. Pg 1 of 16. 
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and demonstrates that Carroll's agreement was necessary to modify the credit 
card agreement and MBNA has no evidence that her agreement was obtained 
The alleged modification of the credit card agreement to include arbitration was 
not properly formed and is ineffective and unenforceable. 
II 
ARGUMENT 
There are two (2) arguments that MBNA uses to justify its alleged 
authority to unilaterally amend the credit card agreement. 
1 That in the original credit card agreement, the card holder agrees to 
abide by all future rules and amendments, and, 
2 That MBNA is authorized by Delaware statute Title 5 3 952 to 
amend the credit card agreement to include arbitration. 
While MBNA has not supplied a copy of the original agreement in support 
of its argument, it has supplied the alleged current credit card agreement. That 
agreement is titled: Credit Card Agreement Additional Terms and Conditions - 
Selected Sections. That alleged agreement states: 
"We May Suspend or Close Your Account. We may suspend or close 
your account or otherwise terminate your right to use your account. We may do 
this at any time and for any reason. Your obligations under this Agreement 
continue even after we have done this. You must destroy all cards, access 
checks, and other credit devices on the account when we request that you do 
SO." 
The alleged agreement also states: 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD . 
LETTER. Pg 2 of 16. 
.- 
"You May Close Your Account. You may close your account by 
notifying us in writing or by telephone and destroying all cards, access checks, 
and other credit devices on the account. Your obligations under this Agreement 
continue even after you have done this." 
The definition of an illusory contract is when one party to the contract can 
cancel the contract at any time, without notice, and the other party cannot. It is 
clear from the above sections of the Credit Card Agreement that MBNA claims 
the right to close the account at any time and for any reason, thus canceling its 
obligations and in effect, the contract, without notice. The card holder, however, 
must give notice and the card holder's obligations continue, where MBNA's 
obligations do not. In addition, the alleged Agreement also states: 
"We May Amend This Agreement. We may amend this agreement at 
any time. We may amend it by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this 
Agreement. When we amend this Agreement, we wili comply with the applicable 
notice requirements of federal and Delaware law that are in effect at that time. If 
an amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the change, and if you reject 
the change in the manner provided in such amendment, we may terminate your 
right to receive credit and may ask you to return all credit devices as a condition 
of your rejection. The amended Agreement (including any higher-rate or other 
higher charges or fees) wili apply to the total outstanding balance, including the 
balance existing before the amendment became effective. We may replace your 
card with another card at any time." 
MBNA claims the right to amend the alleged Agreement, but stops short of 
claiming a unilateral right to amend. If MBNA can cancel its obligations, and thus 
the contract without notice, and can unilaterally amend the contract, then it is 
clearly an illusory contract and as such is totally unenforceable. 
MBNA states that, "When we amend this Agreement, we will comply with the 
applicable notice requirements of federal and Delaware law." This brings us to 
the second argument: Delaware statute Title 5 § 952. Delaware Statute Title 5 $ 
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952 is in four subsections, (a) through (d). Subsection (d) applies to "other than 
an individual borrower" and does not apply in this case. Subsection (c) applies to 
decreases or increases in the number or amount of installment payments, small 
increases (less than %of 1 percent per annum, variable and fixed rate changes 
to periodic interest rates, formulas, and methods of determining the outstanding 
unpaid balance; none of which is germane to this case. What remains, and is 
germane, is subsection (a) and (b). In order to more clearly understand 
subsection (a), we will examine subsection (b) first. 
Subsection (b) appears in five sub-subsections, (1) through (5). Sub- 
subsections (1) through (3) deal specifically with "an amendment that increases 
the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 
or § 944 of this title." Section 943 deals specifically with periodic interest, and § 
944 deals specifically with variable rates of interest. Subsection (b) with sub- 
subsections (I), through (5) is provided as follows: 
(b)(l) If an amendment increases the rate or rates of periodic interest 
charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this title, the bank 
shall mail or deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date 
of the amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice that shall describe 
the amendment and shall also set forth the effective date thereof and any 
applicable information required to be disclosed pursuant to the following 
provisions of this section. 
(2) Any amendment that increases the rate of periodic interest charged by a 
bank to a borrower under §943 or 5 944 of this title may become effective as 
to a particular borrower if the borrower does not, within 15 days of the earlier 
of the mailing or delivery of the written notice of the amendment (or such 
longer period as may be established by the bank), furnish written notice to the 
bank that the borrower does not agree to accept such amendment. The 
notice from the bank shall set forth the address to which a borrower may send 
notice of the borrower's election not to accept the amendment and shall 
include a statement that, absent the furnishing of notice to the bank of 
nonacceptance within the referenced 15 day (or longer) time period, the 
amendment will become effective and apply to such borrower. As a condition 
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to the effectiveness of any notice that a borrower does not accept such 
amendment, the bank may require the borrower to return to it all credit 
devices. If, after 15 days from the mailing or delivery by the bank of a notice 
of an amendment (or such longer period as may have been established by 
the bank as referenced above), a borrower uses a plan by making a purchase 
or obtaining a loan, notwithstanding that the borrower has prior to such use 
furnished the bank notice that the borrower does not accept an amendment, 
the amendment may be deemed by the bank to have been accepted and may 
become effective as to the borrower as of the date that such amendment 
would have become effective but for the furnishing of notice by the borrower 
(or as of any later date selected by the bank). 
(3) Any amendment that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest 
charged by a bank to a borrower under 3 943 or 3 944 of this title may, in lieu 
of the procedure referenced in paragraph (2) of this subsection, become 
effective as to a particular borrower if the borrower uses the plan after a date 
specified in the written notice of the amendment that is at least 15 days after 
the mailing or delivery of the notice (but that need not be the date the 
amendment becomes effective) by making a purchase or obtaining a loan; 
provided, that the notice from the bank includes a statement that the 
described usage after the referenced date will constitute the borrower's 
acceptance of the amendment. 
(4) Any borrower who furnishes timely notice electing not to accept an 
amendment in accordance with the procedures referenced in paragraph (2) of 
this subsection and who does not subsequently use the plan, or who fails to 
use such borrower's plan as referenced in paragraph (3) of this subsection, 
shall be permitted to pay the outstanding unpaid indebtedness in such 
borrower's account under the plan in accordance with the rate or rates of 
periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this 
title without giving effect to the amendment; provided however, that the bank 
may convert the borrower's account to a closed end credit account as 
governed by subchapter Ill of this chapter, on credit terms substantially 
similar to those set forth in the then-existing agreement governing the 
borrower's plan. 
(5) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, no notice required 
by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement governing a revolving 
credit plan shall be required, and any amendment may become effective as of 
any date agreed upon between a bank and a borrower, with respect to any 
amendment that is agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either 
orally or in writing. (End of statutory quote). 
Subsection (b) very carefully provides for the amendment of an agreement 
that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a 
borrower. The borrower is given proper notice, and is given the opportunity to 
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accept, or reject the amendment, either expressly or by action consistent with 
recognition of the amendment. The proscribed process is consistent with a 
unilateral modification of previously settled terms, modified as agreed in the 
contract. These are terms entirely consistent with the common law of contracts 
(Restatement (second) of Contracts). Please take notice that everything 
discussed so far specifically deals with increases in the rate or rates of periodic 
interest, clearly established as a term in the original contract between the bank 
and the borrower. Every condition is clearly identified as applying to subsection 
(b), § 943 or § 944. No mention in subsection (b) is made of anything applying to 
subsection (a). Sub-subsection (5) is noteworthy in that it states; 
"no notice required by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement 
governing a revolving credit plan shall be required" when the amendment "is 
agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing." 
This reaffirms the common law of contracts (Restatement (second) of 
Contracts) is recognized as being in force. 
We now turn our attention to subsection (a), which is provided as follows: 
(a) Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise 
provides, a bank may at any time and from time to time amend such 
agreement in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of 
the amendment was originally contemplated or addressed by the parties 
or is integral to the relationship between the parties. Without limiting the 
foregoing, such amendment may change terms by the addition of new 
terms or by the deletion or modification of existing terms, whether relating 
to plan benefits or features, the rate or rates of periodic interest, the 
manner of calculating periodic interest or outstanding unpaid 
indebtedness, variable schedules or formulas, interest charges, fees, 
collateral requirements, methods for obtaining or repaying &tensions of 
credit, attorney's fees, plan termination, the manner for amending the 
terms of the agreement, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, or other matters of any kind whatsoever. Unless the 
agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise expressly provides, 
any amendment may, on and after the date upon which it becomes 
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effective as to a particular borrower, apply to all then outstanding unpaid 
indebtedness in the borrower's account under the plan, including any such 
indebtedness that arose prior to the effective date of the amendment. An 
agreement governing a revolving credit plan may be amended pursuant to 
this section regardless of whether the plan is active or inactive or whether 
additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any amendment that 
does not increase the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank 
to a borrower under § 943 or 5 944 of this title may become effective as 
determined by the bank, subject to compliance by the bank with any 
applicable notice requirements under the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 
$§ 1601 et seq.), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as in effect 
from time to time. Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be 
included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the 
periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower. (End of 
statutory quote). 
In subsection (a), the careful attention to recognition of the amendment and 
the procedures for rejecting or accepting the amendment so clearly spelled out in 
subsection (b), is absent. The only provision specified is that a notice may be 
sent in the same envelope with the periodic statements. There is nothing in sub- 
section (a) authorizing a unilateral amendment. Section 952(a) of the Delaware 
statute is a restatement of the common law of contracts. The parties have the 
ability to amend any contract or agreement in any respect, including the addition 
of new terms, not originally contemplated by the parties. The statute confirms 
the common law of contracts, and is not a statute in abrogation of the common 
law. Parties have the power to amend their contract under the same power of 
contract formation, and under the same constraints of contract formation. 
In Mandril v. Kasishke, 620 S.W.2d 238, the court held; 
[8] "To modify contract, new or modifying agreement must possess essential 
elements of contract; in particular, there must be meeting of minds of parties 
and terms of original contract cannot be unilaterally remade by one of the 
parties." 
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The four required elements of contract formation are: ( I )  Agreement (includes 
an offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4) 
Legality. The agreement (offer and acceptance) is addressed as follows. 
In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to 
use the notification scheme for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest 
specific to subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection 
(a), in an apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious 
and express consent of the cardholder. MBNA offers the card holder the option 
of refusing the amendment by sending a written statement to that effect to MBNA 
(opting out). No such provision is present in subsection (a) of $j 952 of the 
Delaware statute. MBNA further attempts to use the continued use of the card 
as an act on the part of the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed 
arbitration modification to the contract. If a cardholder is aware of the proposed 
arbitration clause, and agrees to the modification, the cardholder will continue to 
use the card. If a cardholder is unaware of the proposed arbitration clause, and 
would not agree to it if they were aware of the proposed modification, the 
cardholder would continue to use the card. The proposed act to indicate assent 
is ambiguous and thus ineffective. The act of the cardholder must be specific to 
the proposed amendment. The Restatement (second) of Contracts, Section 18, 
manifestation of mutual assent (c), states; 
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in 
some way be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a 
conscious will to engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere 
mechanical instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual 
relations." 
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"This is true even though the other party reasonably believes that the 
assent is genuine." 
In Walker v Percy, 142 N.H. 345 (1997). 702 A.2d 313, The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that 131, 
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to contract 
cannot alter its terms without assent of the other party; parties' minds must meet 
as to the proposed modification" 
"While agreement to modify contract may be inferred from parties' 
conduct, it is not sufficient for party seeking to prove modification to show 
ambiguous course of dealing from which one party might reasonably infer that 
original contract was still in force, and the other that it had been changed." 
For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration action against MBNA, that 
would be a clear act in recognition of the addition of the proposed arbitration 
clause to the cardholder agreement. Continued normal use of the card cannot 
be construed as assent to a proposed amendment new to the contract terms. 
The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendment itself, 
but rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the 
conscious recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common 
Law of Contracts. 
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the 
Federal courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was 
intended; 
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had 
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and 
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer 
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Ed. 2d 26 (1 986). 
As other Federal courts have noted; 
"a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of any 
agreement to do so." GTFM v. TKN Sales, Inc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2000) rev'don othergrounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Mount Ararat Cemefery v. Cemefery Workers & Greens Attendants Union, 975 
F.Supp. 445,446,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life 
Assurance Co., 879 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 85 
F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996). 
The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into 
play in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Carson v. Giant 
Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 329 (4" Cir. 1999); Va. Carolina Tools, lnc. v. lnf4 Tool 
Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4th Cir. 1993); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. 
App. 4th 779, 790, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (1998). The question of whether 
parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate is resolved through 
application of state contract principles that govern the formation of any 
contractual agreement. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, 944, 11 5 S. Ct. 1920. 131 U Ed. 2d 985 (1 995). "The policy favoring 
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." 
Victoria v. Super. Cf., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 739, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1,710 P.2d 833 (1985). 
To apply the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses to the question of 
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, 
"would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that 
parties can be required to arbitrate only that which they have agreed to 
arbitrate." Hendrick v. Brown &Roof, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 527, 538 
(E.D.Va. 1999). 
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Specific to the case at bar, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001 
WL 965063 (D.Mont.), the 91h Federal District Court in Montana held; 
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the 
parties' relationship that would be effective unless rejected by the card holder. 
In other words, MBNA skipped offer and went straight to acceptance. Myers 
did not perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act. 
It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the 
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does 
not intend it to be so. The offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,] 
may be such as to make the silence operative. The offeror's own 
language or other conduct may be such as to make the offeree's silence a 
I sufficient acceptance binding upon the offeror. But an offeror can not, 
merely by saying that the offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance, 
cause it to be such. The offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in 
hand, to use a postage stamp, or to speak, under penalty of being bound 
by a contract by not expressing a rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on 
Contracts § 3.18 (1993 & Supp. Fall 2000), at 407-08. 
Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. At 402- 
05. However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers' 
acceptance is her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is 
dismissed by Perillo and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up 
its right to a jury trial in exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is not 
evidence that anything was "bargained for." In sum, there is no indication that 
Myers agreed to arbitrate the dispute with MBNA." 
MBNA generally argues that the card holder "agreed" to any changes it 
makes in the future as part of the card holder agreement. Myers also addressed 
this argument, 
"If MBNA's argument that Myers "agreed" to arbitration when she agreed 
to allow MBNA to amend the Aareement were acceoted. there would be ., 
no reason to stop at arbitration. MBNA could "amend" the Agreement to 
include a provision taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring 
Myers to pay a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for 
MBNA cards. Such provisions were as much within the agreement of the 
parties at the outset of their relationship as the arbitration provision." 
In conclusion, the court held, 
"Absent circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to 
arbitrate their disputes, the Arbitration Section cannot be enforced against 
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Myers. Nor can her agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement 
to agree to MBNA's amendments." 
In the case preceding this action, between the same parties and over the 
same issue (CV-36747), Carroll has specifically requested evidence regarding 
Carroll's knowledge and agreement to the arbitration agreement from MBNA, as 
follows; 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the evidence you have andlor will use at 
trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged Arbitration Agreement. 
ANSWER: Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the 
card agreement; and the credit card account statements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the evidence you have andfor will use at 
trial to prove the Plaintiff agreed to the alleged Arbitration Agreement. 
ANSWER: See Answer to lnterrogatory No. 7. 
Under Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; 
REQUEST NO. 5: Please provide and make available for copying and 
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 7 above. 
ANSWER: Documents have previously been provided with Defendant's 
Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Please provide and make available for copying and 
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 8 above. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Request No. 5 above. 
The documents previously provided are "Credit Card Agreement 
Additional Terms and Conditions" which is not the agreement entered into by 
Carroll and MBNA, and does not represent the agreement governing this 
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account. The Additional Terms and Condifions contains no evidence whatsoever 
that Carroll had any knowledge of the proposed arbitration amendment, nor any 
evidence that Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. The other documents 
are monthly statements and likewise contain no evidence that Carroll had any 
knowledge of the proposed arbitration agreement, nor any evidence that Carroll 
agreed to the arbitration amendment. MBNA has presented no evidence of a 
meeting of the minds, conscious knowledge of the offer to amend on the part of 
Carroll, nor any evidence of Carroll's agreement to arbitrate. 
Other courts have held similarly. The alleged addition of the arbitration 
clause is a parol modification. in Scoff v. Castle, 104 ldaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163, 
The ldaho Supreme Court held that; 
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral 
agreement or may contract further with respect to its subject matter; 
however, one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without assent of 
the other and minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed 
modification, and fact of agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from 
acts of one party in accordance with terms of change proposed by the 
other." 
Carroll was not aware of any contract modification regarding arbitration, there 
was no conscious knowledge of a proposed arbitration clause, there was no 
"meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its addition to the existing contract 
between MBNA and Carroll (see attached affidavit). Assent may be implied from 
acts, but the acts must be consistent with the nature of the change. Carroll has 
not acted in a manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the contract. In 
Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 ldaho 890, 693 
P.2d 1092, the ldaho Supreme Court held that, 
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"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds 
and embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties." 
And in Hieman Aber & Goldlusf v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05-047, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 251, April 23, 1998, 
The Delaware court held that, 
[2j"lt is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made 
in the form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the 
minds unless the acceptance is of the identical thing offered." 
(See also Mesa Partners v. Phillips PefroleumCo., Civil action No. 7871, COURT 
OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 540; and Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-1 1-064 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 De1.C.P. 
LEXlS 2) 
No such meeting of the minds and common understanding exists between MBNA 
and Carroll regarding arbitration 
In Yellowpine Water User's Assh v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the 
ldaho Supreme Court held; 
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts 
to add terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual." 
MBNA relies on Edelisf v. MBNA America Bank, Del. Super., 2001 (Aug. 
09, 2001), 790 A.2d 1249, in support of its ability to modify its contract by notice. 
In Edelist, the plaintiff, Daniel Edelist, made only bare assertions [FN4], providing 
no evidence, nor affidavit. The court properly ruled against Edelist, based on a 
lack of evidence. Because there was no real controversy before the court, and 
the actual interpretation of the statute was not challenged, the court rightfully did 
not analyze the statute. MBNA uses the decision of the court, which did not 
analyze the statute, as verification of its position. 
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Carroll has examined the following cases to determine if the courts have 
actually analyzed or examined the Delaware statute (Title 5 § 952(a) and (b)): 
Lloyd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 27 Fed.Appx. 82 
Pick v. Discover Financial Services, Inc., 2001 WL 11 80278 
Fields v. Howe, 2002 WL 41 801 1 
Jaimez v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 470587 
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.Supp.2d 632,635 
Blanchard v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 1921000 
Stone v. Golden Wexler& Sarnese, P.C., 341 F.Supp.2d 189, 193 
Kurz v. Chase Manhaftan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F.Supp.2d 457,459+ 
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909, 915 
Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249,1250+ 
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309+ 
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424,430,163 N.C.App. 207 
Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 (W.D.N.C. 2000) 
In none of these cases has the text of the statute been examined or 
compared to the interpretation of MBNA or any other bank or financial institution. 
Ill 
CONCLUSION 
Carroll asserts that MBNA's interpretation of the statute is not correct and 
asks this court to examine the Delaware statute in question (Delaware Title 5, § 
952(a) and (b)) as explained above. MBNA has provided no evidence of any 
authority to unilaterally amend its Credit Card Agreement. Because there was, 
and is, no meeting of the minds regarding arbitration, there is no agreement to 
arbitrate disputes between Carroll and MBNA. MBNA has presented no proof or 
circumstantial evidence demonstrating a meeting of the minds regarding 
arbitration. MBNA breached its contract with Carroll by proceeding to arbitration 
without a valid agreement to do so. MBNA also violated Carroll's constitutionally 
protected right to a trial by jury by proceeding to arbitration without a valid 
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agreement to arbitrate. Carroll therefore prays that this court will deny MBNA's 
motion to confirm the arbitration award letter. In conclusion, Carroll also prays 
that this court will grant immediate relief by vacating the Award letter obtained 
from the National Arbitration Forum (File Number FA0503000443990 in the 
amount of $30,241.41 dated 08/03/2005), as it was obtained without an 
agreement to arbitrate. 
Dated this a? day of June, 2006. 
- hA [ML- 
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Miriam G. Carroll, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER 
and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD 
LETTER this 9.7 day of June, 2006, by First Class Certified Mail #7003 
0500 0005 3304 9348 to the attorney for the Plaintiff at the following address: 
William L. Bishop, Jr. 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 1 I-= 2/86 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle. WA 98101 
IL\, 5,;- G C-,-A\ 
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona 
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David F. Capps 
Miriam G. Carroll 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll 
(hereinafter referred to as "Capps and Carroll") and lodge their brief for the 
- evidentiaty hearing on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. 
INTRODUCTION 
MBNA America Bank (hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) asserts that it 
has the right to unilaterally amend the contracts with Capps and Carroll, and 
pursuant to such right added an arbitration clause to the agreement during, or 
shortly following the month of January, 2000. Capps and Carroll assert that the 
contract cannot be amended unilaterally and that the proposed arbitration clause 
has no agreement in fact, and is ineffective. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
MBNA's claim of adding an arbitration clause stems from an interpretation of 
Delaware Statute Title 5 § 952 (Banking - Part II, Banks and Trust Companies), 
specifically; Amendment of agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the Delaware 
statute"). That interpretation is hereb~hal lenged~ - 
Delaware Statute Title 5 Cj 952 is in four subsections, (a) through (d). 
Subsection (d) applies to "other than an individual borrower" and does not apply 
in this case. Subsection (c) applies to decreases or increases in the number or 
amount of installment payments, small increases (less than %of 1 percent per 
annum, variable and fixed rate changes to periodic interest rates, formulas, and 
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methods of determining the outstanding unpaid balance; none of which is 
germane to this case. What remains, and is germane, is subsection (a) and (b). 
In order to more clearly understand subsection (a), we will examine subsection 
(b) first. 
Subsection (b) appears in five sub-subsections, (1) through (5). Sub- 
subsections (1) through (3) deal specifically with "an amendment that increases 
the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 
or § 944 of this title." Section 943 deals specifically with periodic interest, and § 
944 deals specifically with variable rates of interest. Subsection (b) with sub- 
subsections (I), through (5) is provided as follows: 
(b)(l) If an amendment increases the rate or rates of periodic interest 
charged by a bank to a borrower under 3 943 or § 944 of this title, the bank 
shall mail or deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date 
of the amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice that shall describe 
the amendment and shall also set forth the effective date thereof and any 
applicable information required to be disclosed pursuant to the following 
provisions of this section. 
(2) Any amendment that increases the rate of periodic interest charged by a 
bank to a borrower under 5 943 or $944 of this title may become effective as 
to a particular borrower if the borrower does not, within I 5  days of the earlier 
of the mailing or delivery of the written notice of the amendment (or such 
longer period as may be established by the bank), furnish written notice to the 
bank that the borrower does not agree to accept such amendment. The 
notice from the bank shall set forth the address to which a borrower may send 
notice of the borrower's election not to accept the amendment and shall 
include a statement that, absent the furnishina of notice to the bank of 
nonacceptance within the referenced 15 day {or longer) time period, the 
amendment will become effective and apply to such borrower. As a condition 
to the effectiveness of any notice that a &;rower does not accept such 
amendment, the bank may require the borrower to return to it all credit 
devices. If, after 15 days from the mailing or delivery by the bank of a notice 
of an amendment (or such longer period as may have been established by 
the bank as referenced above), a borrower uses a plan by making a purchase 
or obtaining a loan, notwithstanding that the borrower has prior to such use 
furnished the bank notice that the borrower does not accept an amendment, 
the amendment may be deemed by the bank to have been accepted and may 
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become effective as to the borrower as of the date that such amendment 
would have become effective but for the furnishing of notice by the borrower 
(or as of any later date selected by the bank). 
(3) Any amendment that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest 
charged by a bank to a borrower under 5 943 or § 944 of this title may, in lieu 
of the procedure referenced in paragraph (2) of this subsection, become 
effective as to a particular borrower if the borrower uses the plan after a date 
specified in the written notice of the amendment that is at least 15 days after 
the mailing or delivery of the notice (but that need not be the date the 
amendment becomes effective) by making a purchase or obtaining a loan; 
provided, that the notice from the bank includes a statement that the 
described usage after the referenced date will constitute the borrower's 
acceptance of the amendment. 
(4) Any borrower who furnishes timely notice electing not to accept an 
amendment in accordance with the procedures referenced in paragraph (2) of 
this subsection and who does not subsequently use the plan, or who fails to 
use such borrower's plan as referenced in paragraph (3) of this subsection, 
shall be permitted to pay the outstanding unpaid indebtedness in such 
borrower's account under the plan in accordance with the rate or rates of 
periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or 5 944 of this 
title without giving effect to the amendment; provided however, that the bank 
may convert the borrower's account to a closed end credit account as 
governed by subchapter Ill of this chapter, on credit terms substantially 
similar to those set forth in the then-existing agreement governing the 
borrower's plan. 
(5) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, no notice required 
by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement governing a revolving 
credit plan shall be required, and any amendment may become effective as of 
any date agreed upon between a bank and a borrower, with respect to any 
amendment that is agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either 
orally or in writing. (End of statutory quote). 
Subsection (b) very carefully provides for the amendment of an agreement 
that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a 
borrower. The borrower is given proper notice, and is given the opportunity to 
accept, or reject the amendment, either expressly or by action consistent with 
recognition of the amendment. The proscribed process is consistent with a 
modification of previously settled terms, modified as agreed in the contract. 
Please take notice that everything discussed so far specifically deals with 
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increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest, clearly established as a term in 
the original contract between the bank and the borrower. Every condition is 
clearly identified as applying to subsection (b), 3 943 or § 944. No mention in 
subsection (b) is made of anything applying to subsection (a). Sub-subsection 
(5) is noteworthy in that it states; 
"no notice required by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement 
governing a revolving credit plan shall be required" when the amendment "is 
agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing." 
This reaffirms the common law of contracts (Restatement (second) of 
Contracts) is recognized as being in force. 
We now turn our attention to subsection (a), which is provided as follows: 
(a) Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise 
provides, a bank may at any time and from time to time amend such 
agreement in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of 
the amendment was originally contemplated or addressed by the parties 
or is integral to the relationship between the parties. Without limiting the 
foregoing, such amendment may change terms by the addition of new 
terms or by the deletion or modification of existing terms, whether relating 
to plan benefits or features, the rate or rates of periodic interest, the 
manner of calculating periodic interest or outstanding unpaid 
indebtedness, variable schedules or formulas, interest charges, fees, 
collateral requirements, methods for obtaining or repaying extensions of 
credit, attorney's fees, plan termination, the manner for amending the 
terms of the agreement, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, or other matters of any kind whatsoever. Unless the 
agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise expressly provides, 
any amendment may, on and after the date upon which it becomes 
effective as to a particular borrower, apply to all then outstanding unpaid 
indebtedness in the borrower's account under the plan, including any such 
indebtedness that arose orior to the effective date of the amendment. An 
agreement governing a revolving credit plan may be amended pursuant to 
this section regardless of whether the wlan is active or inactive or whether 
additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any amendment that 
does not increase the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank 
to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this title may become effective as 
determined by the bank, subject to compliance by the bank with any 
applicable notice requirements under the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1601 et seq.), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as in effect 
from time to time. Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be 
included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the 
periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower. (End of 
statutory quote). 
In subsection (a), the careful attention to recognition of the amendment and 
the procedures for rejecting or accepting the amendment so clearly spelled out in 
subsection (b), is absent. The only provision specified is that a notice may be 
sent in the same envelope with the periodic statements. Nothing in subsection 
(a) provides for, or authorizes, unilateral amendments to the agreement. The 
agreement is a contract of adhesion; the bank constructs the contract and the 
cardholder is left with the choice of accepting the contract as is, or refusing the 
contract. The cardholder is not given the option of negotiating any terms of the 
contract. As such, the bank is the only party in a position to amend the contract. 
This does not equate to a unilateral right to amend. Each amendment must still 
meet the basic requirements of contract formation, including mutual assent - a 
"meeting of the minds" of both parties. 
Section 952(a) of the Delaware statute is a restatement of the common law of 
contracts. The parties have the ability to amend any contract or agreement in 
any respect, including the addition of new terms, not originally contemplated by 
the parties. The statute confirms the common law of contracts, and is not a 
statute in abrogation of the common law. Parties have the power to amend their 
contract under the same power of contract formation, and under the same 
constraints of contract formation. 
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In Mandril v. Kasishke, 620 S.W.2d 238, the court held; 
[8] "To modify contract, new or modifying agreement must possess essential 
elements of contract; in particular, there must be meeting of minds of parties 
and terms of original contract cannot be unilaterally remade by one of the 
parties." 
The four required elements of contract formation are: (1) Agreement (includes 
an offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4) 
.., 
Legality. The;agreem-erit(ofKei3nd acceptance) is addressed as follows. 
In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to use 
the notification procedure for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest 
specific to subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection 
(a), in an apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious 
and express consent of the cardholder. MBNA offers the option of refusing the 
amendment by sending a written statement to that effect to MBNA (opting out). 
No such provision is present in subsection (a) of § 952 of the Delaware statute. 
In addition, the proposed arbitration amendment was not solicited by Capps or 
Carroll. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states in $69, "Acceptance by 
Silence - . . . (a) Acceptance by silence is exceptional. 
Ordinarily an offeror does not have power to cause the silence of the 
offeree to operate as acceptance. The usual requirement of notification is 
stated in 9 54 on acceptance by performance and § 56 on acceptance by 
promise. The mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does not impair the 
offeree's freedom of action or inaction or impose on him any duty to 
speak. 
MBNA further attempts to use the continued use of the card as an act on 
the part of the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed arbitration 
modification to the contract. If a cardholder is aware of the proposed arbitration 
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clause, and agrees to the modification, the cardholder will continue to use the 
card. If a cardholder is unaware of the proposed arbitration clause, and would 
not agree to it if they were aware of the proposed modification, the cardholder 
would continue to use the card. The proposed act to indicate assent is 
ambiguous and thus ineffective. The act of the cardholder must be specific to the 
proposed amendment. The Restatement (second) of Contracts, 318, 
manifestation of mutual assent (c), states; 
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in 
some way be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a 
conscious will to engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere 
mechanical instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual 
relations." 
"This is true even though the other party reasonably believes that the 
assent is genuine." 
In Walker v Percy, 142 N.H. 345 (1997), 702 A.2d 313, The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court heldthat [3], 
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to contract 
cannot alter its terms without assent of the other party; parties' minds must meet 
as to the proposed modification" 
and [41, 
"While agreement to modify contract may be inferred from parties' 
conduct, it is not sufficient for party seeking to prove modification to show 
ambiguous course of dealing from which one party might reasonably infer that 
original contract was still in force, and the other that it had been changed." 
For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration action against MBNA, that 
would be a clear act in recognition of the addition of the proposed arbitration 
clause to the credit card agreement. Continued normal use of the card cannot be 
construed as assent to a proposed amendment new to the contract terms. 
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The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendmentitself, 
but rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the 
conscious recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common 
Law of Contracts. 
MBNA also asserts that the cardholder has agreed to accept all changes in 
the original agreement. The only form of the agreement supplied by MBNA in the 
Plaintiffs request for the original contract is the "Credit Card Agreement - 
Additional Terms and Conditions - Selected Sections" which states, 
"We May Amend This Agreement. We may amend this Agreement at any 
time. We may amend it by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this 
Agreement. When we amend this Agreement, we will comply with the applicable 
notice requirements of federal and Delaware law that are in effect at that time. If 
an amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the change, and if you reject 
the change in the manner providecfiTsuch amendKEi3:we may terminate your 
right to receive credit and may ask you to return all credit devices as a condition 
of your rejection. The amended Agreement (including any higher-rate or other 
higher charges or fees) will apply to the total outstanding balance, including the 
balance existing before the amendment became effective. We may replace your 
card with another card at any time." 
There is no provision, or authorization, in this Agreement to unilaterally 
amend the Agreement. The language is consistent with a contract of adhesion 
where the cardholder cannot negotiate the terms of the contract. Any 
amendment to the contract must still comply with the common law of contracts: 
There must be a "meeting of the minds: both parties must agree as to the terms 
of the contract." Without this "Meeting of the minds", there is no agreement. 
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the 
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Federal courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was 
intended; 
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had 
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and 
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 11 1 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L. 
Ed. 2d 26 (1 986). 
As other Federal courts have noted; 
"a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of any 
agreement to do so." GTFM v. TKN Sales, Inc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,2000) rev'd on othergrounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Mount Ararat Cemetery v. Cemetery Workers & Greens Attendants Union, 975 
F.Supp. 445,446,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life 
Assurance Co., 879 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 85 
F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996). 
The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into 
play in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Carson v. Giant 
Food, Inc., I75 F.3d 325, 329 (4'h Cir. 1999); Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int? Tool 
Supply, lnc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4'h Cir. 1993); Badie v. Bank ofAm., 67 Cal. 
App. 4'h 779, 790, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (1998). The question of whether 
parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate is resolved through 
application of state contract principles that govern the formation of any 
contractual agreement. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, 944, 11 5 S. Ct. 1920. 131 U Ed. 2d 985 (1 995). "The policy favoring 
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." 
Victoria V. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 739,222 Cal. Rptr. 1, 710 P.2d 833 (1985). 
To apply the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses to the question of 
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, 
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"would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that 
parties can be required to arbitrate only that which they have agreed to 
arbitrate." Hendrick v. Brown & Roof, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 527, 538 
(E.D.Va. 1999). 
Specific to the case at bar, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001 
WL 965063 (D.Mont.), the 9'h Federal District Court in Montana held; 
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the 
parties' relationship that would be effective unless rejected by the cardholder. 
In other words, MBNA skipped offer and went straight to acceptance. Myers 
did not perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act. 
It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the 
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does 
not intend it to be so. The offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,] 
may be such as to make the silence operative. The offeror's own 
language or other conduct may be such as to make the offeree's silence a 
sufficient acceptance binding upon the offeror. But an offeror can not, 
merely by saying that the offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance, 
cause it to be such. The offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in 
hand, to use a postage stamp, or to speak, under penalty of being bound 
by a contract by not expressing a rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on 
Contracts 5 3.18 (1993 & Supp. Fall 2000), at 407-08. 
Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. At 402- 
05. However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers' 
acceptance is her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is 
dismissed by Perillo and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up 
its right to a jury trial in exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is not 
evidence that anything was "bargained for." In sum, there is no indication that 
Myers agreed to arbitrate the dispute with MBNA." 
MBNA generally argues that the cardholder "agreed" to any changes it 
makes in the future as part of the cardholder agreement. Myers also addressed 
this argument, 
"If MBNA's argument that Myers "agreed" to arbitration when she agreed 
to allow MBNA to amend the Agreement were accepted, there would be 
no reason to stop at arbitration. MBNA could "amend" the Agreement to 
include a provision taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring 
Myers to pay a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for 
MBNA cards. Such provisions were as much within the agreement of the 
parties at the outset of their relationship as the arbitration provision." 
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In conclusion, the court held, 
"Absent circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to 
arbitrate their disputes, the Arbitration Section cannot be enforced against 
Myers. Nor can her agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement 
to agree to MBNA's amendments." 
Capps and Carroll have specifically requested evidence regarding Capps' 
and Carroll's knowledge and agreement to the arbitration agreement from MBNA, 
as follows; 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the evidence you have andlor will use at 
trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged Arbitration Agreement. 
ANSWER: Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the 
card agreement; and the credit card account statements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the evidence you have andlor will use at 
trial to prove the Plaintiff agreed to the alleged Arbitration Agreement. 
ANSWER: See Answer to lnterrogatory No. 7. 
Under Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; 
REQUEST NO. 5: Please provide and make available for copying and 
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 7 above. 
ANSWER: Documents have previously been provided with Defendant's 
Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents 
REQUEST NO. 6: Please provide and make available for copying and 
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 8 above. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Request No. 5 above. 
The testimony of Greg Canapp, in answer to lnterrogatory No. 7, above, is 
as follows: 
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1. I am the Senior Personal Banking Officer at MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
and I make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and 
belief. 
2. On or about February 20,1999, David Capps opened a credit card 
account with MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
3. A true and correct copy of the cardholder agreement governing the 
account is attached hereto as Exhibit "A .  
4. True and correct copies of the monthly statements associated with the 
Capps account are attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
5. MBNA does not have record of having received a billing dispute letter from 
Mr. Capps in reference to this account. 
This is the full extent of Mr. Canapp's testimony. There is no attached Exhibit 
"A". There is no attached Exhibit "B". There is nothing in Mr. Canapp's 
testimony regarding Capps' knowledge of the alleged arbitration agreement, or 
any information regarding any form of acceptance, or of a "meeting of the minds" 
about arbitration at all. His testimony is totally silent on the subject. The affidavit 
of Greg Canapp in regards to Carroll, is virtually identical with the exception of 
the date of the agreement, and Carroll in place of Capps. 
The documents, previously obtained during discovery by the plaintiffs, are 
"Credit Card Agreemenf Additional Terms and Conditions" which is not the 
agreement entered into by Capps and Carroll with MBNA, and does not 
represent the agreement governing this account. The Addifional Terms and 
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Conditions contains no evidence whatsoever that Capps and Carroll had any 
knowledge of the proposed arbitration amendment, or any evidence that Capps 
and Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. The other documents are 
monthly statements and likewise contain no evidence that Capps and Carroll had 
any knowledge of the proposed arbitration agreement, or any evidence that 
Capps and Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. MBNA has presented 
no evidence of a meeting of the minds, conscious knowledge of the offer to 
amend on the part of Capps and Carroll, or any evidence of Capps' or Carroll's 
agreement to arbitrate. 
Other courts have held similarly. The alleged addition of the arbitration 
clause is a parol modification. In Scott v. Castle, 104 ldaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163, 
The ldaho Supreme Court held that; 
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral 
agreement or may contract further with respect to its subject matter; 
however, one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without assent of 
the other and minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed 
modification, and fact of agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from 
acts of one party in accordance with terms of change proposed by the 
other." 
Capps and Carroll were not aware of any proposed contract modification 
regarding arbitration, there was no conscious knowledge of a proposed 
arbitration clause, there was no "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its 
addition to the existing contcact between MBNA and Capps and Carroll (see 
attached affidavits). Assent may be implied from acts, but the acts must be 
consistent with the nature of the change. Capps and Carroll have not acted in a 
manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the contract. In Gulf Chemical 
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Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 ldaho 890, 693 P.2d 1092, the 
ldaho Supreme Court held that, 
"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds 
and embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties." 
And in Hieman Aber & Goldlust v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05-047, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXlS 251, April 23, 1998, 
The Delaware court held that, 
[2]"lt is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made 
in the form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the 
minds unless the acceptance is of the identical thing offered." 
(See also Mesa Partners v. Phillips PetroleumCo., Civil action No. 7871, COURT 
OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch. 
LEXlS 540; and Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-1 1-064 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 De1.C.P. 
LEXlS 2) 
No such meeting of the minds and common understanding exists between MBNA 
and Capps and Carroll regarding arbitration. 
In Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the 
ldaho Supreme Court held; 
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts 
to add terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual." 
MBNA relies on Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, Del. Super., 2001 (Aug. 
09, 2001), 790 A.2d 1249, in support of its ability to modify its contract by notice. 
In Edelist, the plaintiff, Daniel Edelist, made only bare assertions [FN4], providing 
no evidence, nor affidavit. The court properly ruled against Edelist, based on a 
lack of evidence. Because there was no real controversy before the court, and 
the actual interpretation of the statute was not challenged, the court rightfully did 
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not analyze the statute. MBNA uses the decision of the court, which did not 
analyze the statute, as verification of its position. 
Capps and Carroll have examined the following cases to determine if the 
courts have actually analyzed or examined the Delaware statute (Title 5 5 952(a) 
and (b)): 
Lloyd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 27 Fed.Appx. 82 
Pick v. Discover Financial Services, lnc., 2001 WL 1180278 
Fields v. Howe, 2002 WL 41801 1 
Jaimez V. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 470587 
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.Supp.2d 632,635 
Blanchard v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 1921 000 
Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P. C., 341 F.Supp.2d 189, 193 
Kurr v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F.Supp.2d 457,459+ 
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909,915 
Edelisf v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1250+ 
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309+ 
Sears Roebuckand Co. v. Avety, 593 S.E.2d 424,430, 163 N.C.App. 207 
Goeisch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 W.D.N.C. 2000) 
In none of these cases has the text of the statute been examined or 
compared to the interpretation of MBNA or any other bank or financial institution. 
Capps and Carroll assert that MBNA's interpretation of the statute is not correct 
and asks this court to examine the Delaware statute in question (Delaware Title 
5, § 952(a) and (b)) as explained above. Because there was, and is, no meeting 
of the minds regarding arbitration, there is no agreement to arbitrate disputes 
between Capps and Carroll and MBNA. MBNA has presented no proof or 
circumstantial evidence demonstrating a meeting of the minds regarding 
arbitration. Any statute which abrogates the common law must do so explicitly; it 
cannot be vague or ambiguous. The Delaware statute does not explicitly 
abrogate the common law, nor does the cardholder agreement explicitly abrogate 
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the common law. Neither document provides for, or authorizes, the unilateral 
amendment of the agreement. 
Based on the common law of contracts, the Delaware statute and the 
cardholder agreement, there is no right, authority or power, on the part of MBNA 
to unilaterally amend the contract. Because this is a contract of adhesion, it is to 
be strictly construed against MBNA, which constructed the contract. Capps and 
Carroll therefore respectfully pray that this court will find that there are no 
agreements to arbitrate between Capps and MBNA, and Carroll and MBNA, and 
will subsequently vacate the following award letters from the National Arbitration 
Forum: 
Award letter against David F. Capps, dated 09/30/2005, in the amount of 
$28,156.49, File Number: FA0506000498945. 
Award letter against Miriam G. Carroll, dated 08/03/2005, in the amount of 
$30,241.41, File Number: FA0503000443990. 
Dated this @day of July, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that on this zGay of July, 2006, 1 
mailed a true and correct copy of this PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVDENTIARY 
HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE to the opposing party by Certified 
mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 3128, with proper postage affixed thereon at the 
following address: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise. ID 83701 
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65 David F. Capps 
HC-11 Box 366 ?& &% 2 6 2008 
Kamiah, ID 83536 % 
208-935-7962 
Plaintiff, in propria persona 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID F. CAPPS ) 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV-36747 
VS. 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 
Defendant, 
1 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
) OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR 
1 EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 
) AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Idaho ) 
I, DAVID F. CAPPS, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of my 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT 
TO ARBITRATE. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE Pg. 1 of 3. 
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2. That on or about the 2oth day of February, 1999, 1 entered into a consumer 
contract with the defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter 
referred to as "MBNA) for the purpose of securing an open-ended 
revolving credit card account number 5490353603674374. 
3. That the original agreement between myself and MBNA did not contain an 
agreement to arbitrate disputes. 
4. That I have not been aware of any attempt from MBNA to alter the 
agreement to include an arbitration clause. 
5. That I have never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA. 
Dated this ~ S S  day of July, 2006. 
Subscrib$$and sworn before me 
this 25 day of July, 2006 
My Commission expires on 
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CERTIFCATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @day of July, 2006, 1 mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE to the 
Defendant by Certified Mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 3128with correct postage 
affixed thereon addressed to: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE Pg. 3 of 3. 
-. P' P d d 
<b 
Miriam G. Carroll 9- 
HC-11 Box 366 '$ 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
$3 
Plaintiff, in propria persona 
FILED 
AT I GS WCLOCKJ.M. 
JUB 2 6 2QB6 
ROSE E. GEHRlNG 
OF DlSlRlCT'M)uKf' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV-36747 
) 
vs . ) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
) OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) FOR EVIDENTIARY 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Idaho ) 
I, MIRIAM G. CARROLL, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of my 
Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate. I make 
this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY NEARING 
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE. Pg 1 of 3. . . 
2. That on or about the 1.5'~ day of March, 1980, 1 entered into a consumer 
contract with the defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter 
referred to as "MBNA) for the purpose of securing an open-ended 
revolving credit card account number 4313-0331-1 00-6046. 
3. That the original agreement between myself and MBNA did not contain an 
agreement to arbitrate disputes. 
4. That I have not been aware of any attempt from MBNA to alter the 
agreement to include an arbitration clause. 
5. That I have never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA. 
Dated this 2T+6 day of July, 2006. 
s 
I--- ~ . ~ - - - - ~  1 Subscribed and sworn before me 
Miriam G. Carroll this 257% day of July, 2006 
Notary Public, ~ t a t e b f  Maho 
Residing in T,=!. -6, County 
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CERTIFCATE OF MAILING 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @day of July, 
2006, 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE to 
the attorney for the Defendant by Certified Mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 3128, 
with correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise. ID 83701 
u:-L- c.c-- \ \  
Miriam G. Carroll 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON03UDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID F. CAPPS ) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL ) 
1 case No. CV-05-36747 
Plairitiffs. ) 
1 POST HEARING 
vs . 1 MEMORANDUM 
1 REBUTTAL 
) MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.. 
1 
) Defendant, 
COMES NOW the Plaiptiffs, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll, and 
submits the follow~ng Post Heanng Memorandum Rebuttal with respect to thrs 
matter. As to the Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum statements 1 through 
7, RE: Capps, the testimony of Michael Milties ~nequivocally established that the 
. . 
proposed arbitration amend~nent was not solicit&>d ,: ., by Capps. Under $69 of the 
, , 
,. . , 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Capps had,iio legal responsibility to respond 
to an unsol~cited offer, and his silence cannot be taken as assent to the offer In 
addition, there was, and is, no "meeting of the minds" in regard to arbitration, 
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which is a requirement in botli Delaware and Id$b , . for the formation of an 
agreement, or the inodificationof an agreemen$ . , 
As l o  the Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum statement number 8, 
the testimony of Michael Milnes . , clearly and undfillivocally established that Miriam 
, ,  . .,:, . 
, 
G. Carroll opened her accouiitin 1977. t~revious'admissioi? of MBNA's counsel 
and an affidavit of Miriain G. Carroll have establisl?ed that the original cardholder 
agreement between MBNA arid Carroll did not contain an arbitration clause. 
Stateinent nuinber 8 is a patent lie before this court and is objected to in the 
,:::I : 1: . . i .:,., , , , ,. , ,,,. 
strongest terms possible. Tlie Plaintiff demands sanctions against the Defendant 
t .:: 
and Defendant's counsel as the court deems bibper. 
In testimony, Michael ~ ' i lhes tated thaihirikm G. Carroll's account was 
' 1  ,: . . .  a ! : ,  .'!.. 
subsequently acquired, and that a welco~ne pacK was mailed to her. It is a well 
established principle of contract law that an assignment, or other related lneans 
. . . ; .  ' .:. / . , ,: ,:,,'{ , . , . c , . .  . 
of acquiring contracts do not alter the ierms of the agreement other than to name 
. . .. ,;,: ..I, . 
the new owner of the agreement. No terms areadbed, deleted, or otherwise 
:, . , .  
changed by the assignment: .,.  he testimony of '~ ichael  Milnes clearly and 
:, , , / 7 : . 1 .  , .. 
% 
unequivocally established that Miriam G.  ~ar rd l i  did not solicit any amendment to 
,,'.. , , . ;. ~ 
the cardholder agreement fr6h MBNA. ~i ider '&9 of the Restatement (Second) 
, ( , <  
,:, , . : . .  :',, t 
of Contracts, Carroll had no legal responsibility. tq respond to an unsolicited offer, 
., . . .. . . ,;/ ..,, 
. ,  . . .  . ( :, ( ; 
and her silence cannot he taken as assent to th&;offer. In addition, there was, 
.:: , 
. . .,. . 
'. . 
! ! < ( , $  , ) ! '  ~: 
and is, no "meeting ofthe minds" , . in regard to'arbitiation, which is a requirement 
. . . , ,  . , j ; , ; .  ,,: 
! !i I , /  I : , / .  
in both Delaware and Idahofor the formation of an agreement, or the 
, :. , ' ,  
. . /  : #  4 :  
inodification of an agreement. 
:;. . , 
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~. 
The previous attempt by MBNA to amend the cardliolder agreement in 
December of 1999 through January of 2000, w$~.ineffective, and the assigned 
agreement did not contain an arbitration agreeinent. Any differences between 
the existing agreement beforc! assignment, and :?lie alleged agreement in the 
"Welcome Pack" are still an unsolic~led ofter to arnend, to which Carroll had no 
legal responsibility lo respond, and her silence cannot be taken as assent to any 
new agreement 
As to the Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum statements 9 through 
13, RE: Carroll, these conditions are an ~~nsolicited offer to arnend, to which 
Carroll need not replay and her silence cannot be taken as assent, as outlined 
above. 
Delaware statute Title 5 §952(a) and the cardliolder agreement do allow 
the cardholder agreement to be amencied Notliitig in the Delaware statute or 
the cardholder agreement authorizes a unilateral right to arnend. Any 
amendment still requires a "meeting of the m~nds" and without evidence of such, 
IS ineffective. MBNA has presented no evidence of a "meeting of the minds" in 
testimony, affidavit or any other form Nothing 111 Delaware statute Title 5 
§952(a) authorizes an "opt-out" provtslon for new terms to an agreement, and the 
attempted use of such an unauthorized scheme is ineffectual 
The evidence presented at the hearing held August loih, 2006 clearly 
establishes that the offer lo  amend presented by MBNA was unsolicited and 
Capps and Carroll had no legal respons~bility to'respond to the offer, and their 
silence cannot be taken as assent Delaware and Idaho both require a "meeting 
. . . . . , .  . 
DnCT UFARlhlC hi lFhRnRAhlnl  IRR RFRI ITTAI ' ~ n  3 nf A 
, , : '  
~~~~~, .,. . ,  ..:. . , 9  
of the minds" for contract formation or cof7tracf!&bdification, which is clearly 
i 
absent in these cases. The Plaintiff prays that this court will find that there was 
no agreement to arbitrate this, or any, dispute between MBNA and Capps and 
Carroll. 
Datecl this / Yrn day of August. 2006. 
,(:, ;! kLa* -. G . C - ~  ' , . 
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, i1.1 propria pcllso17a 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. CBpps, hereby certify that I FAXED a true and correct copy of this 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM REBUTTAL io the attorney for the Defendant 
at approxi~nately /:@@ $M PST on,tlle 17"' day of August, 2006. 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-9264169 
Defendant, in propria persona 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A. ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) case No. CV-2006-37320 
) 
VS. 1 DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN 
1 SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 TO CONFIRMATION 
) OF ARBITRATION AWARD 
Defendant, ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter referred to as 
"Carroll") and lodges her brief in support of her opposition to confirmation of 
arbitration award and on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. 
INTRODUCTION 
MBNA America Bank (hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) asserts that it has 
the right to unilaterally amend the contracts with Carroll, and pursuant to such right 
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added an arbitration clause to the agreement during, or shortly following the month 
of January, 2000. Carroll asserts that the contract cannot be amended unilaterally 
and that the proposed arbitration clause has no agreement in fact, and is ineffective. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
MBNA's claim of adding an arbitration clause stems from an interpretation of 
Delaware Statute Title 5 $952 (Banking -Part I!, Banks and Trust Companies), 
specifically; Amendment of agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the Delaware 
statute"). That interpretation is hereby challenged. 
Delaware Statute Title 5 $952 is in four subsections, (a) through (d). Subsection 
(d) applies to "other than an individual borrower" and does not apply in this case. 
Subsection (c) applies to decreases or increases in the number or amount of 
installment payments, small increases (less than 1/4 of 1 percent per annum, variable 
and fixed rate changes to periodic interest rates, formulas, and methods of 
determining the outstanding unpaid balance; none of which is germane to this case. 
What remains, and is germane, is subsection (a) and (b). In order to more clearly 
understand subsection (a), we will examine subsection (b) first. 
Subsection (b) appears in five sub-subsections, (1) through (5). Sub-subsections 
(1) through (3) deal specifically with "an amendment that increases the rate or rates 
of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under $ 943 or $ 944 of this 
title." Section 943 deals specifically with periodic interest, and § 944 deals 
specifically with variable rates of interest. Subsection (b) with sub-subsections (I), 
through (5) is provided as follows: 
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(b)(l) If an amendment increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by 
a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this title, the bank shall mail or 
deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date of the 
amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice that shall describe the 
amendment and shall also set forth the effective date thereof and any applicable 
information required to be disclosed pursuant to the following provisions of this 
section. 
(2) Any amendment that increases the rate of periodic interest charged by a bank 
to a borrower under $943 or $ 944 of this title may become effective as to a 
particular borrower if the borrower does not, within 15 days of the earlier of the 
mailing or delivery of the written notice of the amendment (or such longer period 
as may be established by the bank), furnish written notice to the bank that the 
borrower does not agree to accept such amendment. The notice from the bank 
shall set forth the address to which a borrower may send notice of the borrower's 
election not to accept the amendment and shall include a statement that, absent 
the furnishing of notice to the bank of nonacceptance within the referenced 15 
day (or longer) time period, the amendment will become effective and apply to 
such borrower. As a condition to the effectiveness of any notice that a borrower 
does not accept such amendment, the bank may require the borrower to return to 
it all credit devices. If, after 15 days from the mailing or delivery by the bank of a 
notice of an amendment (or such longer period as may have been established by 
the bank as referenced above), a borrower uses a plan by making a purchase or 
obtaining a loan, notwithstanding that the borrower has prior to such use 
furnished the bank notice that the borrower does not accept an amendment, the 
amendment may be deemed by the bank to have been accepted and may 
become effective as to the borrower as of the date that such amendment would 
have become effective but for the furnishing of notice by the borrower (or as of 
any later date selected by the bank). 
(3) Any amendment that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged 
by a bank to a borrower under fi 943 or § 944 of this title may, in lieu of the 
procedure referenced in paragraph (2) of this subsection, become effective as to 
a particular borrower if the borrower uses the plan after a date specified in the 
written notice of the amendment that is at least 15 days after the mailing or 
, delivery of the notice (but that need not be the date the amendment becomes 
effective) by making a purchase or obtaining a loan; provided, that the notice 
from the bank includes a statement that the described usage after the referenced 
date will constitute the borrower's acceptance of the amendment. 
(4) Any borrower who furnishes timely notice electing not to accept an 
amendment in accordance with the procedures referenced in paragraph (2) of 
this subsection and who does not subsequently use the plan, or who fails to use 
such borrower's plan as referenced in paragraph (3) of this subsection, shall be 
permitted to pay the outstanding unpaid indebtedness in such borrower's account 
under the plan in accordance with the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by 
a bank to a borrower under $ 943 or $ 944 of this title without giving effect to the 
amendment; provided however, that the bank may convert the borrower's 
account to a closed end credit account as governed by subchapter Ill of this 
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chapter, on credit terms substantially similar to those set forth in the then-existing 
agreement governing the borrower's plan. 
(5) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, no notice required by 
this subsection of an amendment of an agreement governing a revolving credit 
plan shall be required, and any amendment may become effective as of any date 
agreed upon between a bank and a borrower, with respect to any amendment 
that is agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing. 
(End of statutory quote). 
Subsection (b) very carefully provides for the amendment of an agreement that 
increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower. The 
borrower is given proper notice, and is given the opportunity to accept, or reject the 
amendment, either expressly or by action consistent with recognition of the 
amendment. The proscribed process is consistent with a modification of previously 
settled terms, modified as agreed in the contract. Please take notice that everything 
discussed so far specifically deals with increases in the rate or rates of periodic 
interest, clearly established as a term in the original contract between the bank and 
the borrower. Every condition is clearly identified as applying to subsection (b), § 
943 or § 944. No mention in subsection (b) is made of anything applying to 
subsection (a). Sub-subsection (5) is noteworthy in that it states; 
"no notice required by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement 
governing a revolving credit plan shall be required" when the amendment "is 
agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing." 
This reaffirms the common law of contracts (Restatement (second) of Contracts) 
is recognized as being in force. 
We now turn our attention to subsection (a), which is provided as follows: 
(a) Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise provides, a 
bank may at any time and from time to time amend such agreement in any 
respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of the amendment was 
originally contemplated or addressed by the parties or is integral to the 
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relationship between the parties. Without limiting the foregoing, such 
amendment may change terms by the addition of new terms or by the 
deletion or modification of existing terms, whether relating to plan benefits or 
features, the rate or rates of periodic interest, the manner of calculating 
periodic interest or outstanding unpaid indebtedness, variable schedules or 
formulas, interest charges, fees, collateral requiremetats, methods for 
obtaining or repaying extensions of credit, attorney's fees, plan termination, 
the manner for amending the terms of the agreement, arbitration or other 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, or other matters of any kind 
whatsoever. Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan 
otherwise expressly provides, any amendment may, on and after the date 
upon which it becomes effective as to a particular borrower, apply to all then 
outstanding unpaid indebtedness in the borrower's account under the plan, 
including any such indebtedness that arose prior to the effective date of the 
amendment. An agreement governing a revolving credit plan may be 
amended pursuant to this section regardless of whether the plan is active or 
inactive or whether additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any 
amendment that does not increase the rate or rates of periodic interest 
charged by a bank to a borrower under Ej 943 or § 944 of this title may 
become effective as determined by the bank, subject to compliance by the 
bank with any applicable notice requirements under the Truth in Lending Act 
(15 U.S.C. !j§ 1601 et seq.), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as 
in effect from time to time. Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank 
may be included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of 
the periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower. (End of 
statutory quote). 
In subsection (a), the careful attention to recognition of the amendment and the 
procedures for rejecting or accepting the amendment so clearly spelled out in 
subsection (b), is absent. The only provision specified is that a notice may be sent 
in the same envelope with the periodic statements. Nothing in subsection (a) 
provides for, or authorizes, unilateral amendments to the agreement. The 
agreement is a contract of adhesion; the bank constructs the contract and the 
cardholder is left with the choice of accepting the contract as is, or refusing the 
contract. The cardholder is not given the option of negotiating any terms of the 
contract. As such, the bank is the only party in a position to amend the contract. 
This does not equate to a unilateral right to amend. Each amendment must still 
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meet the basic requirements of contract formation, including mutual assent - a 
"meeting of the minds" of both parties. 
Section 952(a) of the Delaware statute is a restatement of the common law of 
contracts. The parties have the ability to amend any contract or agreement in any 
respect, including the addition of new terms, not originally contemplated by the 
parties. The statute confirms the common law of contracts, and is not a statute in 
abrogation of the common law. Parties have the power to amend their contract 
under the same power of contract formation, and under the same constraints of 
contract formation. 
In Mandril v. Kasishke, 620 S.W.2d 238, the court held; 
[8] "To modify contract, new or modifying agreement must possess essential 
elements of contract; in particular, there must be meeting of minds of parties and 
terms of original contract cannot be unilaterally remade by one of the parties." 
The four required elements of contract formation are: (1) Agreement (includes an 
offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4) 
Legality. The agreement (offer and acceptance) is addressed as follows. 
In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to use the 
notification procedure for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest specific to 
subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection (a), in an 
apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious and express 
consent of the cardholder. MBNA offers the option of refusing the amendment by 
sending a written statement to that effect to MBNA (opting out). No such provision is 
present in subsection (a) of 3 952 of the Delaware statute. In addition, the proposed 
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arbitration amendment was not solicited by Carroll. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts states in $69, "Acceptance by Silence - ... (a) Acceptance by silence is 
exceptional. 
Ordinarily an offeror does not have power to cause the silence of the offeree 
to operate as acceptance. The usual requirement of notification is stated in $ 
54 on acceptance by performance and 5 56 on acceptance by promise. The 
mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does not impair the offeree's freedom of 
action or inaction or impose on him any duty to speak. 
MBNA further attempts to use the continued use of the card as an act on the 
part of the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed arbitration modification to 
the contract. If a cardholder is aware of the proposed arbitration clause, and agrees 
to the modification, the cardholder will continue to use the card. If a cardholder is 
unaware of the proposed arbitration clause, and would not agree to it if they were 
aware of the proposed modification, the cardholder would continue to use the card. 
The proposed act to indicate assent is ambiguous and thus ineffective. The act of 
the cardholder must be specific to the proposed amendment. The Restatement 
(second) of Contracts, $18, manifestation of mutual assent (c), states; 
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in some 
way be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a conscious will 
to engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere mechanical 
instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual relations." 
"This is true even though the other party reasonably believes that the assent 
is genuine." 
In Walker v Percy, 142 N.H. 345 (1997), 702 A.2d 313, The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court held that [3], 
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to contract cannot 
alter its terms without assent of the other party; parties' minds must meet as to the 
proposed modification" 
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"While agreement to modify contract may be inferred from parties' conduct, it 
is not sufficient for party seeking to prove modification to show ambiguous course of 
dealing from which one party might reasonably infer that original contract was still in 
force, and the other that it had been changed." 
For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration action against MBNA, that 
would be a clear act in recognition of the addition of the proposed arbitration clause 
to the credit card agreement. Continued normal use of the card cannot be construed 
as assent to a proposed amendment new to the contract terms. 
The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendment itself, but 
rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the conscious 
recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common Law of 
Contracts. 
MBNA also asserts that the cardholder has agreed to accept all changes in the 
original agreement. The only form of the agreement supplied by MBNA in Carroll's 
request for the original contract is the "Credit Card Agreement -Additional Terms 
and Conditions - Selected Sections" which states, 
"We May Amend This Agreement. We may amend this Agreement at any time. 
We may amend it by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this Agreement. 
When we amend this Agreement, we will comply with the applicable notice 
requirements of federal and Delaware law that are in effect at that time. If an 
amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the change, and if you reject the 
change in the manner provided in such amendment, we may terminate your right to 
receive credit and may ask you to return all credit devices as a condition of your 
rejection. The amended Agreement (including any higher-rate or other higher 
charges or fees) will apply to the total outstanding balance, including the balance 
existing before the amendment became effective. We may replace your card with 
another card at any time." 
There is no provision, or authorization, in this Agreement to unilaterally amend 
the Agreement. The language is consistent with a contract of adhesion where the 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD . - Pg 80f  17. 
.. s 0 
cardholder cannot negotiate the terms of the contract. Any amendment to the 
contract must still comply with the common law of contracts: There must be a 
"meeting of the minds: both parties must agree as to the terms of the contract." 
Without this "Meeting of the minds", there is no agreement. 
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the Federal 
courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was intended; 
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had 
existed at Enalish common law and had been ado~ted bv American courts, and to 
place arbitracon agreements on the same footing i s  other contracts." Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 11 1 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L. Ed. 
2d 26 (1986). 
As other Federal courts have noted; 
"a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of any 
agreement to do so." GTFM v. TKN Sales, lnc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 7,2000) rev'don othergrounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001); Mount Ararat 
Cemetery v. Cemetery Workers & Greens Atfendants Union, 975 F.Supp. 445,446, 
447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 879 
F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev'don othergrounds, 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996). 
The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into 
play in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Carson v. Giant Food, 
Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1999); Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int? Tool Supply, 
lnc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4th Cir. 1993); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th 779, 
790, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (1998). The question of whether parties have 
entered into an agreement to arbitrate is resolved through application of state 
contract principles that govern the formation of any contractual agreement. See 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S. Ct. 1920.131 LI 
Ed. 2d 985 (1995). "The policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the necessity for 
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a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." Victoria v. Super. Cf., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 739, 222 
Cal. Rptr. 1,710 P.2d 833 (1985). To apply the policy in favor of enforcing 
arbitration clauses to the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, 
"would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that parties 
can be reauired to arbitrate onlv that which thev have agreed to arbitrate." 
Hendrick i. Brown & Roof, lnc.: 50 F.Supp. 2d 5 2 7 , 5 3 8 ( ~ . ~ . ~ a .  1999). 
Specific to the case at bar, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001 WL 
965063 (D.Mont.), the 9'h Federal District Court in Montana held; 
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the parties' 
relationshir, that would be effective unless rejected by the cardholder. In other 
words, MBNA skipped offer and went straighi to acceptance. Myers did not 
perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act. 
It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the 
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does not 
intend it to be so. The offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,] may be 
such as to make the silence operative. The offeror's own language or other 
conduct may be such as to make the offeree's silence a sufficient acceptance 
binding upon the offeror. But an offeror can not, merely by saying that the 
offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance, cause it to be such. The 
offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in hand, to use a postage stamp, 
or to speak, under penalty of being bound by a contract by not expressing a 
rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 3.18 (1993 & Supp. Fall 
2000), at 407-08. 
Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. At 402-05. 
However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers' acceptance is 
her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is dismissed by Perillo 
and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up its right to a jury trial in 
exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is not evidence that anything 
was "bargained for." In sum, there is no indication that Myers agreed to arbitrate the 
dispute with MBNA." 
MBNA generally argues that the cardholder "agreed" to any changes it makes 
in the future as part of the cardholder agreement. Myers also addressed this 
argument, 
"If MBNA's argument that Myers "agreed to arbitration when she agreed to 
allow MBNA to amend the Agreement were accepted, there would be no 
reason to stop at arbitration. MBNA could "amend" the Agreement to include 
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a provision taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring Myers to pay 
a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for MBNA cards. 
Such provisions were as much within the agreement of the parties at the 
outset of their relationship as the arbitration provision." 
In conclusion, the court held, 
"Absent circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to 
arbitrate their disputes, the Arbitration Section cannot be enforced against 
Myers. Nor can her agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement to 
agree to MBNA's amendments." 
Carroll has specifically requested evidence regarding Carroll's knowledge and 
agreement to the arbitration agreement from MBNA, as follows; 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the evidence you have and/or will use at 
trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged Arbitration Agreement. 
ANSWER: Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the card 
agreement; and the credit card account statements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the evidence you have and/or will use at 
trial to prove the Plaintiff agreed to the alleged Arbitration Agreement. 
ANSWER: See Answer to lnterrogatory No. 7. 
Under Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; 
REQUEST NO. 5: Please provide and make available for copying and 
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 7 above. 
ANSWER: Documents have previously been provided with Defendant's 
Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Please provide and make available for copying and 
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 8 above. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Request No. 5 above. 
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The testimony of Greg Canapp, in answer to Interrogatory No. 7, above, is as 
follows: 
1. I am the Senior Personal Banking Officer at MBNA America Bank, N.A. and I 
make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. On or about September I, 1980, Miriam Carroll opened a credit card account 
with MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
3. A true and correct copy of the cardholder agreement governing the account is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
4. True and correct copies of the monthly statements associated with the Carroll 
account are attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
5. MBNA does not have record of having received a billing dispute letter from 
Ms. Carroll in reference to this account. 
This is the full extent of Mr. Canapp's testimony. There is no attached Exhibit 
"A". There is no attached Exhibit "B. There is nothing in Mr. Canapp's testimony 
regarding Carroll's knowledge of the alleged arbitration agreement, or any 
information regarding any form of acceptance, or of a "meeting of the minds" about 
arbitration at all. His testimony is totally silent on the subject. 
The documents, previously obtained during discovery by Carroll, are "Credit 
Card Agreement Additional Terms and Conditions" which is not the agreement 
entered into by Carroll with MBNA, and does not represent the agreement governing 
this account. The Additional Terms and Conditions contains no evidence 
whatsoever that Carroll had any knowledge of the proposed arbitration amendment, 
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or any evidence that Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. The other 
documents are monthly statements and likewise contain no evidence that Carroll 
had any knowledge of the proposed arbitration agreement, or any evidence that 
Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. MBNA has presented no evidence of a 
meeting of the minds, conscious knowledge of the offer to amend on the part of 
Carroll, or any evidence of Carroll's agreement to arbitrate 
Other courts have held similarly. The alleged addition of the arbitration 
clause is a parol modification. In Scott v, Castle, 104 ldaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163, 
The ldaho Supreme Court held that; 
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral 
agreement or may contract further with respect to its subject matter; however, 
one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without assent of the other and 
minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed modification, and fact of 
agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in accordance with its 
existence and assent may be implied from acts of one party in accordance 
with terms of change proposed by the other." 
Carroll was not aware of any proposed contract modification regarding 
arbitration, there was no conscious knowledge of a proposed arbitration clause, 
there was no "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its addition to the 
existing contract between MBNA and Carroll (see attached affidavit). Assent may be 
implied from acts, but the acts must be consistent with the nature of the change. 
Carroll has not acted in a manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the 
contract. In Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 ldaho 
890, 693 P.2d 1092, the ldaho Supreme Court held that, 
"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds and 
embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties." 
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And in Hieman Aber & Goldlust v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05-047, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 251, April 23,1998, The 
Delaware court held that, 
[2j"lt is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made in 
the form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the minds 
unless the acceptance is of the identical thing offered." 
(See also Mesa Partners V. Phillips PetroleumCo., Civil action No. 7871, COURT OF 
CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
540; and Martin Newark Dealership, lnc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-1 1-064 COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 De1.C.P. LEXIS 2) 
No such meeting of the minds and common understanding exists between MBNA 
and Carroll regarding arbitration. 
In Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the 
ldaho Supreme Court held; 
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts to 
add terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual." 
MBNA relies on Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, Del. Super., 2001 (Aug. 09, 
2001), 790 A.2d 1249, in support of its ability to modify its contract by notice. In 
Edelist, the plaintiff, Daniel Edelist, made only bare assertions [FN4], providing no 
evidence, nor affidavit. The court properly ruled against Edelist, based on a lack of 
evidence. Because there was no real controversy before the court, and the actual 
interpretation of the statute was not challenged, the court rightfully did not analyze 
the statute. MBNA uses the decision of the court, which did not analyze the statute, 
as verification of its position. 
Carroll has examined the following cases to determine if the courts have 
actually analyzed or examined the Delaware statute (Title 5 § 952(a) and (b)): 
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Lloyd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 27 Fed.Appx. 82 
Pick v. Discover Financial Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1180278 
Fields v. Howe, 2002 WL 41 801 1 
Jaimez v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 470587 
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.Supp.2d 632,635 
Blanchard v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 1921 000 
Stone V. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P. C., 34 1 F.Supp.2d 189, 193 
Kurr v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F.Supp.2d 457,459+ 
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909, 915 
Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1250+ 
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309+ 
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424,430, 163 N.C.App. 207 
Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 (W.D.N.C. 2000) 
In none of these cases has the text of the statute been examined or 
compared to the interpretation of MBNA or any other bank or financial institution. 
Carroll asserts that MBNA's interpretation of the statute is not correct and asks this 
court to examine the Delaware statute in question (Delaware Title 5, § 952(a) and 
(b)) as explained above. Because there was, and is, no meeting of the minds 
regarding arbitration, there is no agreement to arbitrate disputes between Carroll 
and MBNA. MBNA has presented no proof or circumstantial evidence 
demonstrating a meeting of the minds regarding arbitration. Any statute which 
abrogates the common law must do so explicitly; it cannot be vague or ambiguous. 
The Delaware statute does not explicitly abrogate the common law, nor does the 
cardholder agreement explicitly abrogate the common law. Neither document 
provides for, or authorizes, the unilateral amendment of the agreement. 
Based on the common law of contracts, the Delaware statute and the 
cardholder agreement, there is no right, authority or power, on the part of MBNA to 
unilaterally amend the contract. Because this is a contract of adhesion, it is to be 
strictly construed against MRNA, which constructed the contract. Carroll therefore 
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respectfully prays that this court will find that there is no agreement to arbitrate 
between Carroll and MBNA, and will subsequently vacate the following award letter 
from the National Arbitration Forum: 
Award letter against Miriam G. Carroll, dated 08/03/2005, in the amount of 
$30,241.41, File Number: FA0503000443990. 
Dated this % day of September, 2006. 
b 't c-L-* 
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD . Pg . 16 of 17. 
- . 38 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of my 
Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Arbitration Award this s* day 
of September, 2006, by Certified Mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 2985 to the attorney 
for the Plaintiff at the following address: 
William L. Bishop, Jr. 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 11 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona 
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This case comes before me on a motion by David Capps and Miriam Carroll for 
injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration awards entered in favor of MBNA Bank 
against them individually. The claims of Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll, residents of Kamiah 
who reside together, are similar and they were consolidated on May 1 1,2006. 
FACTS 
In December 2004, after receiving a monthly statement for their credit card 
agreement, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll mailed a letter to MBNA Bank alleging a dispute 
in their credit card liability. Ms. Carroll's letter purported to place in dispute a debt in i 
excess of twenty-four thousand dollars. Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in dispute a 
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debt in excess of twenty-one thousand dollars'. The Bank did not reply to this letter, nor 
did it conduct an investigation but rather made attempts to collect on the outstanding debt 
by filing an arbitration claim. In addition, the Bank listed the two accounts as closed or 
restricted and reported them as overdue to a credit bureau. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll each wrote a letter to MBNA Bank (M*. Capps in June 
and Ms. Carroll in October) asking the Bank to observe prescribed procedures for 
resolving billing disputes as required by federal regulations. The letters requested that 
the Bank amend their respective credit reports to indicate that the account balance was in 
dispute rather than overdue, to remove any reference to late payments, and to report a 
balance on the account as of the day when the purported billing dispute was initiated, less 
the late fees and intere 
Subsequently, MBNA Bank filed claims against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll with 
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), requesting that the disputes be arbitrated. In 
April 2005 the NAF received a letter from Ms Carroll moving to dismiss the claim filed 
with them. The motion to dismiss alleged that the original agreement between Ms. 
Carroll and MBNA Bank did not include an arbitration agreement. The motion to 
dismiss also alleged that she had not received notice of an amendment to the agreement 
' Each letter stated the following "I am writing regardmg the above account, I believe that my most recent 
statement ... is inaccurate . I am disputing the above amount because I believe that yon failed to credit 
my amount for prepayments you agreed to credit on the [December] statement ... It was my understanding 
that when I entered into the agreement with yon that you would accept my signed notefs) or other similar 
instrnment(s) as money, credit, or payment for previous account transactions, and then reflect those credits 
m the [December] statement ... They do not appear in the statement and I am wondering why. The amount 
of the credits on the prepayments of money or credit accepted by you should he the approximate amount 
that I list above. I am making this billing inquiry because I am uncertain of all the dates of the prepaid 
credits, charges and also because there may be additional credits that I am entitled to. Please provide me 
with a written explanation why these credits are not showing . . . I am requesting that you provide me with 
an acknowledgement of this billing error and complete a full investigation by sending me a written 
explanation report related to the subject matter of this hilling error ... I am also requesting additional 
documentary evidence of mdehtedness of the account charges, which includes copies of the account 
charges and entries that made yon arrive at the recent balance shown on my statement . . . I am exercising 
my right to withhold the disputed amount until you comply .. . 
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which added an arbitration clause that would have allowed her the opportunity to opt-out. 
Therefore, the motion to dismiss posited that NAF did not have authority to arbitrate her 
dispute with MBNA Bank. In July 2005, an equivalent letter was received by NAF from 
Mr. Capps. 
On August 3,2005 the NAF issued a decision after acknowledging receipt 
of the April motion to dismiss and requesting submission of evidence from the parties to 
the dispute. The NAF arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agreement 
between the parties thereby granting it authority to hear the dispute. The arbitrator, upon 
considering the evidence submitted, issued an award to MBNA in the amount of $30, 
241.41 against Ms. Carroll. On September 30,2005 a different arbitrator made similar 
findings in the claim against Mr. Capps. The arbitrator issued an award against him to 
MBNA in the amount of $28,156.49. 
On September 30, 2005 Ms Carroll filed a complaint in Idaho County. She made 
several claims including one for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration award. On 
November 3,2005 Mr. Capps filed an equivalent complaint against MBNA Bank 
alleging the same causes of action and requesting the same relief. 
On January 17,2006 MNBA filed a request to confirm its arbitration award 
against Mr. Capps. The request was incorrectly filed in Lewis County and was 
subsequently transferred to Idaho County. On March 29,2006 MNBA moved for 
summary judgment in its favor regarding the complaints filed by both Ms. Carroll and 
Mr. Capps. On May 11,2006 the cases were consolidated. On May 24,2006 MBNA's 
motion for summary judgment as to the claim by Ms. Carroll was denied, and the motion 
for summary judgment as to the claim by Mr. Capps was also denied. I also ordered 
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MNBA lo amend its response to both Ms. Carroll's and Mr. Capps' Request for 
Admission Number 3 to comply Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36. MNBA complied 
with the order. 
ISSUES 
1. Mr. Caps and Ms. Carroll content that there was no enforceable arbitration clause 
contained in the credit agreement between the parties at the time the dispute arose. 
2. MBNA Bank alleges that there was in fact a valid arbitration agreement between the 
parties at the time the dispute arose. 
DISCUSSION 
Enforceability of Credit Card Arbitration Agreements 
Federal policy liberally favors arbitration agreements and requires courts to 
rigorously enforce them. ShearsodAm. Exp., Inc v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,226 
(1987); Dean Witter Renyolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,221 (1985); Marsh v First 
USA Bank, 103 F.Supp.2d 909,914 (N.D. Tex. 2000). Under the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. $ 1 et seq., written arbitration agreements in transactions involving 
interstate commerce are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" according to their terms as 
long as they are otherwise valid under general principles of contract law. 9 U.S.C. $2;  
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Bud. OfTrustees, 489 U.S. 468,478 (1989); Jaimez v. 
MBNA America Bank, 2006 WL 470587 *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 27,2006); Marsh, 103 
F.Supp.2d at 914. Federal law prohibits courts from subjecting arbitration provisions to 
special scrutiny. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
The FAA was intended by Congress to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,510 (1974); Marsh, 
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103 F.Supp.2d at 914. Consequently, while the scope of an arbitration agreement is an 
issue for judicial resolution, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should 
be resolved in favor of arbitration. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers 
ofAmerica, 475 U.S. 643,650 (1986); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 24-25 (1983). Idaho has adopted the same public policy in enacting 
the Uniform Arbitration Act, which provides by similar language for the enforceability of 
valid arbitration agreements. LC. § 7.901 et seq.; International Assoc. of Firefighters, 
LocalNo. 672, 136 Idaho 162, 167-68 (2001) (recognizing that arbitration is a favored 
remedy in Idaho and that doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration). 
Of course, courts may not force parties to arbitrate disputes if the parties have not 
entered into a valid agreement to do so. Maestle v. Best Buy Co., 2005 WL 1907282 
(Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug. 1 1,2005). "Arbitration . . . is a way to resolve disputes-but 
only those disputes-that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration." First Options 
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,943 (1995). Consequently, whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate is determined by state contract law. Id. at 944; Kurz v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 3 19 F.Supp.2d 457,461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Furthermore, under the FAA 
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may 
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements." Doctor's Assocs., Inc, v. Casarotto, 5 17 
U.S. 681, 687 (1996). Again, courts look to state law to resolve these issues. Jaimez, 
2006 WL 470587 at *3. 
In the case at hand the original agreement included an express provision providing 
for future amendment. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2. The original contract also 
included a choice of law provision stating that Delaware law would govern the rights and 
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obligations under the contract. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2. Neither Ms. Carroll nor 
Mr. Capps are contesting that Delaware law applies; indeed, they affirmatively state that 
it does. See Plaintiffs Post Hearing Memorandrun Rebuttal and Plaintifrs Brief for 
Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate. 
Therefore, Delaware law governs whether the parties agreed to arbitrate or 
whether there are any contract defenses to the validity of any agreement to do so. The 
right of a credit card company to amend agreements to provide for arbitration is statutory. 
5 Delaware Code 3 952(a), entitled "Amendment of Agreement," provides that unless the 
original credit card agreement provides to the contrary, that a bank "may at any time and 
from time to time amend such agreement in any respect," including modifying the 
agreement to allow terms in regards to "arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, or other matters of any kind whatsoever." The later amendment need not 
have been "originally contemplated by the parties or addressed by the parties" in the 
original contract agreement or be "integral to the relationship between the parties." Id. 
Section 952(b) details what unilateral amendment procedures may be followed in 
cases where the rate of interest charged is to be changed. Where the rate is to be 
changed, the bank must "deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date 
of the amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice, that shall describe the 
amendment and that shall set forth the effective date . . . ." 5 Del. C. 3 952(b)(l). If 
proper notice is mailed, the amendment will become effective "if the borrower does not, 
within fifteen days of the earlier of the mailing or delivery of the written notice . . . 
furnish written notice to the bank that the borrower does not agree to accept such 
amendment." 5 Del. C. 3 952(b)(2). If the bank's notice states that usage of the card 
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after the effective date will constitute acceptance of the amendment, such usage will 
render the amendment effective. 5 Del. C. 5 952(b)(3). In sum, where the rate is to be 
changed, notice with an option to opt-out suffices, and failure to object in writing or 
continued use of the card will operate to render an amendment effective. 
As to amendments which do not involve changing the rate of interest charged, 
including an amendment regarding arbitration, section 952(a) states that such 
amendments "may be deemed effective as determined by the bank," subject to 
compliance by the bank with any of the notice requirements of the Truth in Lending Act 
or its implementing regulations. Notice of such an amendment may be sent in the same 
envelope with the monthly billing statement or in the same envelope with other materials 
sent to the borrower. Id. 
In the case where there is clear statutory authority allowing unilateral amendment, 
courts have not hesitated to give effect to the mandate of the FAA that arbitration 
agreements must be enforced. Both Delaware courts and courts applying Delaware law 
have recognized that the right to unilaterally amend a credit card agreement by notice and 
an opportunity to opt out in writing has been provided for by the Delaware legislature and 
is to be given effect. Jaimez, 2006 WL 470587 at *3-4; Blanchard v. MBNA America 
Bank, 2005 WL 1921000 (W.D. N. C.) (unreported) Kurz, 319 F.Supp.2d 457; Fields v 
Howe, 2002 WL 41801 1 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F.Supp.2d 909 
(N.D. Texas 2000); Joseph, 775 N.E.2d 550; Edelist, 790 A.2d 1249; Pick v. Discover 
Fin. Serv ,2001 WL 1180278 (D.Del. 2001). 
The court in Edelist put it plainly: "Delaware statutory law . . . permits MBNA to 
unilaterally amend agreements by notice and an opt-out provision. . . . MBNA, therefore, 
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followed the statutory scheme for amending credit card agreements. By doing so and by 
Edelist's failure to opt out, his credit card agreement was properly amended. . . . In short, 
Delaware's statutory scheme permitting unilateral amendment with opt-out availability is 
an acceptable means of amending a credit card agreement " 790 A.2d at 1257-59; see 
also Marsh, 103 F.Supp.2d at 915-19 (where cardholder did not opt out and continued to 
use the card, he was both statutorily and contractually bound). 
Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps concede that acceptance can be implied by conduct. 
The original credit card agreement in this case contained a choice of law clause under 
which the parties agreed that Delaware law would govern any issues arising concerning 
the contract. Under choice of law principles articulated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws $145 and accepted by the Idaho Supreme Court, Idaho courts give 
effect to such choice of law provisions unless that chosen forum has no significant 
relation to the parties or unless the law chosen violates some fundamental public policy 
of Idaho. Seubert Excavalors, Znc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 126 Idaho 648,65 1,889 
P.2d 82, 85 (1995) (citing Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397,400,700 P.2d 19,22 
(1985)). Neither ofthose two conditions is met in this case. Thus Delaware law governs 
the resolution of the dispute. Under Delaware law the arbitration agreement is valid and 
enforceable. There is evidence of mailed notice in regards to the arbitration clause (see 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2) and the Plaintiffs in this case admit that no opt-out letter was 
mailed. Therefore, the decision of the arbitrator is valid and enforceable. 
Order 
1. The arbitration award in favor of MBNA against Ms. Carrol in the sum of 
$30,24 1.41 is CONFIRMED. 
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2. The arbitration award in favor of MBNA against Mr. Capps in the sum of 
$28,156.49 is CONFIRMED 
It is so ordered this &day of September, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoi MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this &ay of September, 2006, to the 
following: 
MBNA America Bank 
C/O Wilson, McColl & Rasmussen 
P.O.Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
David Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
Miriam Carroll 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah. ID 83536 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
) Case No. CV-36747 
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) 
vs ) AMENDED 
) MOTION FOR 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N A ,  1 RECONSIDERATION 
) 
Defendant, ) 
) or in the alternative 
) 




DAVID F. CAPPS, 
) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 




COMES NOW Miriam G. Carroll, and David F. Capps, and moves this 
court under Rule I 1  (B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for a Motion for 
AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
i , $ f l  li 
Reconsideration, or in the alternative, under Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure for a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment for the following 
reasons: 
1 .  The Delaware choice of law provision is not valid. 
2. MBNA's claim to be owed money by Capps and Carroll is fraudulent. 
3. MBNA obtained the award letters without proper lurisdiction. 
4. The National Arbitration Forum has displayed a bias in favor of the party 
granted the arbitration award. 
5. The arbitration with the National Arbitration Forum was unconscionable. 
6. The arbitration clause was employed as a "stealth" amendment, without 
effective notice. 
7. The cardholder agreement was created with an illusory promise, making 
the entire contract illusory and unenforceable. 
8. The cardholder agreement was constructed to be deceptive, acting as a 
snare to the cardholder. 
I. 
THE DELAWARE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IS NOT VALID. 
The Delaware choice of law provision in the alleged cardholder agreement 
is not allowed under Delaware law. The Delaware State Code, Title 6 - 
Commerce and Trade, Subtitle II, Other laws Relating to Commerce and Trade, 
Chapter 27. Contracts, Subchapter I, General Provisions, 5 2708. Choice of law 
states: 
(a) The parties to any contract, agreement or other undertaking, contingent or 
otherwise, may agree in writing that the contract, agreement or other 
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undertaking shall be governed by or construed under the laws of this 
State, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of 
this State shall govern, in whole or in part, any or all of their rights, 
remedies, liabilities, powers and duties if the parties, either as provided by 
law or in the manner specified in such writing are, (i) subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be 
served with legal process. The foregoing shall conclusively be presumed 
to be a significant, material and reasonable relationship with this State and 
shall be enforced whether or not there are other relationships with this 
State. 
(b) ... 
(c) This section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or other 
undertaking, (i) to the extent provided to the contrary in 5 1-301(c) of this 
Title, or, (ii) involving less than $100,000. (emphasis added). 
As clearly stated in the Delaware Code, the Delaware choice of law provision 
in the alleged cardholder agreement does not apply to contracts or agreements 
of less than $100,000. Since the amount of the alleged cardholder agreement is 
significantly less than $100,000, the Delaware choice of law provision is not valid. 
MBNA has come into the State of ldaho, solicited business, and in doing so 
has subjected itself to the laws and jurisdiction of the State of ldaho. In addition, 
any contract or agreement, or any modification to such contract or agreement, 
made within the State of ldaho, must be properly formed under the laws of ldaho 
before it comes into existence whether it contains a choice of law provision or 
not. If a valid choice of law provision exists within the contract, or agreement, it 
does not gain authority until the contract, or agreement, is properly formed under 
ldaho law. Only then does the choice of law provision begin to operate. Contract 
formation, or contract modification, which takes place within the State of ldaho. 
between an ldaho resident and a foreign corporation who has entered the state 
to solicit business, must conform to the laws of contract formation in the state of 
Idaho. If the contract, or agreement, is not properly formed under the laws of the 
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State of ldaho, then the contract, or agreement, does not exist and any choice of 
law provision, which would otherwise be valid within the contract, does not come 
into existence either. The arbitration clause in the alleged cardholder agreement 
was not properly formed under ldaho law. There was no "meeting of the minds", 
there was no common understanding, and the arbitration clause was entered 
unilaterally, which is not allowed in the State of ldaho 
Even if the choice of law provision were valid, which it is not, Delaware also 
requires a "meeting of the minds" or mutual manifestation of assent for the 
formation, or modification, of a contract or agreement 
A contract involves an agreement or meeting of the minds, and every 
contract to be binding and unimpeachable must have been entered into by 
parties with minds of sufficient soundness for the purpose. Poole v. Newark 
Trust Co., 8 A.2d 10, 40 Del. 163, Del Super. 1939. 
Manifestation of assent must be overt and intentional 
Overt manifestation of assent - not subjective intent - controls formation of a 
contract, the only intent of parties to a contract which is essential is an intent 
to say the words or do the act which constitute the manifestation of assent; 
the intent~on to accept is unimportant except as manifested. Where an offeror 
requests an act in return for his promise and the act is performed, the act 
performed becomes the requisite overt manifestation of assent if the act is 
done intentionally. Industrial America, Inc., v. Fulton Industries, Inc., 285 
A.2d 412, Del Super. 1971. 
Any amendment to a contract, whether written or oral, relies on the presence 
of mutual assent and consideration. Continental Ins. Co., v. Rutledge & Co., 
lnc., 750 A.2d 1219, re-argument denied 2000, WL 268297, Del. Ch. 2000. 
For any contract modification, there must be conscious knowledge of the 
modification and knowing consent of the modification 
When contract is made, no modification can be brought about without consent 
of both parties and without consideration. Defendants are thus forced into the 
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position of arguing that plaintiffs did agree to the modification because (1) 
they did not notify defendants of a refusal to accept it, ... The cases appear to 
be practically unanimous in holding that the first reason given is insufficient to 
show consent to a modification; DeCecchis v. Evers, 174 A.2d 463, 54 Del. 
99, Del Super. 1961. See also: Unruth v. Taylor, 18 Del. 42, 43 A. 515; 
Josloff v. Falbourn, 32 Del. 433, 125 A. 349; Brasch v. Sloan's Moving & 
Storage Co., 237 Mo. App. 597, 176 S.W. 2d 58; Colgin v. Security Storage & 
Van Co., 208 La. 173, 23 So. 2d 36; French v. Bekins Moving & Sforage Co., 
118 Colo. 424, 195 P 2d 968. Cf. 1 Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.) 279. 
There was no meeting of the minds between MBNA and Capps or Carroll on 
arbitration. There was, and is, no intention on the part of Capps or Carroll to 
arbitrate this or any dispute with MBNA, nor was any manifestation intentionally 
performed by either Capps or Carroll to indicate assent to this, or any, arbitration 
with MBNA 
In the State of Idaho: 
Generally, silence and inaction, or mere silence or failure to reject offer 
when it is made, does not constitute acceptance of offer, absent specific 
exceptions to rule which may be used to create contract. Vogf v. Madden, 
713 P.2d 442, 110 ldaho 6, ldaho App. 1985. 
Silence or failure to reject an offer usually is not evidence of intent to 
accept the offer, except if offeror has stated or given offeree reason to 
understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and offeree 
in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer. Eimco Div. 
Envirotech Corp., v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 672, 109 ldaho 762, 
ldaho App. 1985. 
Capps and Carroll were not aware of the offer to amend regarding 
arbitration by MBNA, as evidenced in their previous affidavits, and their silence 
and inaction cannot be taken as assent to the alleged arbitration clause. There 
was, and is, no intention on the part of Capps and Carroll to agree to any form of 
arbitration with MBNA, and the silence and inaction on the part of Capps and 
Carroll in regard to the arbitration clause was not done with any intent toward 
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assent, or any intentional manifestation of assent or mutual understanding 
regarding arbitration. As such, no agreement to arbitrate exists between MBNA 
and Capps or Carroll. 
2. 
MBNA'S CLAIM TO BE OWED MONEY BY CAPPS AND CARROLL IS 
FRAUDULENT 
Capps and Carroll could not have discovered the fraud evidence and have 
become aware of the evidence only by providence. MBNA stated it had 
extended credit to Capps and Carroll and was entitled to receive repayment 
under Title 12 USC § 24. Paragraph 7 of this statute authorizes a national 
bank to loan its money, not its credit. In First National Bank of Tallapoosa v. 
Monroe, 135 Ga. 614; 69 S.E. 1123 (1911), the court, after citing the above 
statute, said, "[Tlhe provisions referred to do not give power to a national 
bank to guarantee the payment of the obligations of others solely for their 
benefit, nor is such power incidental to the business of banking. A bank can 
lend its money but not its credit." In Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizens National 
Bankof Union, 135 S.C. 202; 130 S.E. 758, (1927), it was said, "It has been 
settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under federal law, being 
limited in its power and capacity, cannot lend its credit by guaranteeing the 
debt of another. All such contracts being entered into by its officers are ultra 
vires and not binding upon the corporation." In First National Bank of 
Monfgomery v. Jerome Daly, (1968 Minn. Case; jury reached its verdict Dec. 
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7, 1968, cite not found.) prohibits banks from creating money and credit upon 
their own books by means of bookkeeping entries. We believe this is what 
MBNA has done in regard to our accounts. 
The title cited by MBNA (12 USC 24) authorizes the lending of money for 
security. No authorization is present in this statute for extending or loaning 
credit. MBNA may have monetized our accounts at the discount window of 
the Federal Reserve, in which case its claim that we owe the bank money is 
also fraudulent 
3. 
MBNA OBTAINED THE AWARD LETTERS WITHOUT PROPER 
JURISDICTION 
The jurisdictional issue would not have been discovered by Capps and 
Carroll, and it is only by providence that it has come to their attention. Capps 
and Carroll objected to the arbitration on the grounds that they did not agree to 
arbitrate this, or any, dispute with MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter 
"MBNA), see EXHIBIT 1 and 2. Because of the objections of Capps and Carroll, 
the arbitrators did not have subject matter jurisdiction and proceeded without 
proper jurisdiction or authority. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 
126 S.Ct. 1204, 1208 n. 1 (2006) (rule that arbitrators may decide validity of 
contract does not apply to question of whether an agreement was formed in the 
first instance). In MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Boata, 94 Conn.App. 559, 893 
A.2d 479, the court held, 
"Because the arbitrator's jurisdiction is rooted in the agreement of the 
parties, a party who contests the making of a contract containing an 
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arbitration provision cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue 
of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; only a court can make that 
decision", "In any given case, whether a particular dispute is arbitratable is 
a question for the court, and deference need not be given to the 
arbitrator's decision", ..." The arbitration provision in an agreement is, in 
effect, a separate and distinct agreement", MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. 
Boafa, (supra). 
MBNA failed to go to Federal District Court to obtain an order to compel 
arbitration. Without that court order, MBNA and the arbitrator did not have 
authority or jurisdiction to proceed. In MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Credit, No. 
94,380 (April 28, 2006), 132 P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006), (See EXHIBIT 3), the court 
held, 
"An agreement to arbitrate bestows such jurisdiction. When the existence of 
the agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court before the 
arbitrator may proceed. See 9 U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402." "All we have in the 
record is Credit's assertion that she sent an apparently timely objection to the 
arbitrator, contesting the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no 
copy of this objection is in the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral 
argument before this court that his client 'probably' has a copy of the 
objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to demonstrate that the 
objection was somehow ineffective to trigger its responsibility to seek court 
intervention to compel arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the 
absence of such a demonstration, we, like the district court, have no choice 
but to accept Credit's version of events. Under both federal and state law, 
Credit's objection to the arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to 
litigate the issue of the agreement's existence. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5- 
402. Neither MBNA, as the party asserting existence of an arbitration 
agreement, nor the arbitrator was simply free to go forward with the arbitration 
as though Credit had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. 
If there is a challenge to the arbitration, it is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to 
decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the issue in 
dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate." MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. 
Credit, (supra). 
Capps and Carroll timely asserted their objection to the arbitrator, a copy 
of which is attached as EXHIBIT 1 and 2. 
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4. 
THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM HAS DISPLAYED A BIAS IN 
FAVOR OF THE PARTY GRANTED THE ARBITRATION AWARD 
The National Arbitration Forum [NAF] has a demonstrated bias in favor of 
corporate claimants. In an affidavit by Michael Geist (see EXHIBIT 3), a law 
professor at the University of Ottawa, where he holds the Canada Research 
Chair in lnternet and E-commerce Law, the results of his published academic 
research on arbitration providers was provided to the court in McQuillan v. Check 
'N Go of North Carolina, Michael Geist studied the arbitration process used in 
the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP") of the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). The information 
revealed in his study about the practices of the NAF is most enlightening. His 
original study examined 3,094 decisions from 1999 through July, 2001. He also 
did a follow-up study in which he updated his findings to include all UDRP 
decisions through February 18, 2002, for a total of 4,332 cases. 
The NAF uses two main forms of arbitration, single panel and three- 
member panel. In NAF cases where a three member panel was used (in which 
both participants choose the arbitrators), the complainant won only 49% of the 
time. However, despite claims of impartial random case allocation as well as a 
large roster of panelists, the majority of NAF single panel cases were actually 
assigned to little more than a handful of panelists. Of the 1,379 NAF cases 
decided by a single NAF-assigned arbitrator through February 18, 2002, 778 of 
them - 56.4% - were decided by only six arbitrators. In cases decided by the six 
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arbitrators most frequently assigned by the NAF, the complainant won 95.1% of 
the time. The award letters obtained by MBNA against Capps and Carroll from 
the NAF were decided by single panel arbitrators assigned by the NAF 
In a deposition of Edward C. Anderson (see EXHIBIT 4) employed by the 
NAF, in Toppings v. Merifech Mortgage Services, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 149 (W. Va. 
2002) in response to the question, "How are arbitrators paid?" Mr. Anderson 
states that, "They get all or a portion of the fees that are paid by the parties." Mr. 
Anderson also stated, "If they don't handle any cases that come through our 
system, we don't pay them anything." Because cases are assigned by the NAF 
to specific arbitrators, there is a financial incentive to the arbitrators to decide 
cases in favor of the claimant, especially with a corporate claimant as large as 
MBNA, who is a repeat client of the NAF. The NAF has a history of steering 
cases to arbitrators who decide cases in favor of large corporate ciients, making 
the entire process biased against the consumer. This bias is particularly present 
in single panel cases assigned by the NAF, consistent with the cases of Capps 
and Carroll. 
Michael Geist found, 
"By assigning the majority of cases to the subset of arbitrators who ruled 
most consistently for its clients, the complainants, the NAF exerted a great 
deal of influence over case outcome. When combined with the fact that 
outcome was the most decisive factor among complainants choosing 
arbitration providers, and evidence that the NAF aggressively marketed its 
services to potential complainants by promoting complainant wins, this 
data supports the conclusion that the NAF used its control over the 
selection of arbitrators in single panel cases to achieve outcomes that 
would enable it to attract the business of future UDRP complainants." 
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The same practice was used with large corporate clients in soliciting their 
business as demonstrated in letters sent by the NAF to potential clients. 
Representative of these letters is the Brown letter (see EXHIBIT 5). This letter 
states "All arbitration is not the same." If arbitration was fair and independent, 
why wouldn't all arbitration be the same? The NAF also promises to protect its 
clients from class-actions and jury trails. The letter states that the NAF will make 
a positive impact on the client's bottom line. The NAF makes good on its 
promise to corporate clients through biased and unfair practices 
Numerous people have complained about the bias of the NAF. The 
following affidavit is representative of those complaints: 
Gregory Duhl had a dispute with Suburban Moving and Storage 
("Suburban"), an agent of United Van Lines, for damages to his property arising 
from his move from Chicago to Pennsylvania. In his affidavit (see EXHIBIT 6) he 
states, 
"My experience with the NAF was deeply troubling. In a variety of ways, I 
found that the NAF implemented (or refused to follow) its rules in ways 
that favored Suburban and disfavored me, the consumer. 
At each step of the arbitration process, for example, the NAF allowed 
Suburban to violate procedural rules. I followed the procedures set forth 
in the NAF's rules, and asked the NAF to require Suburban to comply with 
the NAF's rules. Repeatedly, however, the NAF refused to consider my 
motions. 
After some time, I found the NAF's procedural bias against me to be so 
pervasive and blatant that it no longer made sense to go forward. As a 
result, I was forced to abandon my claim, and settle the matter with 
Suburban for far less than it was worth. 
I am a professor of business law, and I presume that I am likely more 
sophisticated than the average consumer. I am concerned that if the 
NAF's system favored the corporate defendant over the consumer in my 
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case to such a degree that I was not able to overcome this kind of 
procedural unfairness by invoking the rules, it is unlikely that the average 
consumer would have much of a chance in cases before the NAF. 
Without going through an exhaustive discussion of the entire matter, I will 
describe now a few instances of the NAF's abusive conduct in my case. 
As one illustration of how the NAF was lax with its rules with respect to 
Suburban, the NAF accepted a late submission from Suburban without 
following NAF's own procedures for late submissions. I knew that the 
submission was late because of the date and time on the FAX stamp. 
In addition, the NAF did not require Suburban to follow the rules of the 
American Moving and Storage Association (AMSA), as my contract with 
Suburban required the NAF to do. Under the AMSA rules, for example, 
Suburban was required to submit three copies of its response to my claim 
The NAF permitted Suburban to ignore this requirement, among others, 
despite my objections 
I learned that there were several instances of ex parte communications 
between the NAF and Suburban. When I demanded to know what 
information had been exchanged between Suburban and the NAF, the 
NAF refused to communicate with me about the contents of the ex parte 
communications. 
As another illustration of the NAF's favoritism, the NAF directed me that I 
had to hand-write the case number on each page of a 150-page 
document. The NAF also directed me that I must spend my own money to 
copy and mail hard copies to the NAF and Suburban. The NAF had a 
different system rn place for Suburban, however, and Suburban was 
permitted to subm~t its documents without numbers and via fax. I 
objected, without success, that the NAF should requlre Suburban to follow 
the same rules that I was required to follow. 
On at least four separate occasions, I filed motions with the NAF objecting 
to procedural irregularities. Each time, I followed the NAF rules, which, 
according to the AMSA rules, applied when the AMSA rules were silent. 
Pursuant to the NAF rules, my motions were filed with the Director of 
Arbitration. With each motion, as the NAF rules required, I enclosed the 
$25 filing fee. In each case, however, an NAF program administrator 
refused to even accept my motions, and the NAF clerk refused to permit 
me to be heard, notwithstanding the NAF rules that authorize these 
motions. The clerk said to me that "We don't hear motions like this," 
referring to motions that challenge procedural irregularities of the NAF 
itself. 
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The NAF agreed to allow Suburban to pursue in arbitration issues that 
were beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. 
Finally, the NAF told me that all of my correspondence with them 
regarding the procedural irregularities in the document submission 
process would be turned over to the arbitrator assigned to hear the case. 
I objected to this, because it was not relevant to my loss claim and 1 was 
concerned it would prejudice the arbitrator against me. I decided to move 
the NAF to dismiss my claim without prejudice, which it did. I then settled 
the claim for about $2750. 
In my opinion, it was impossible for me to get a fair result through 
arbitration before the NAF. The procedural unfairness of the process 
made arbitration an unworkable option for me." 
THE ARBITRATION WITH THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM WAS 
UNCONSCIONABLE 
Because of the biased and continued business relationship with MBNA, 
via Wolpoff & Abramson, the forced selection of the NAF is unconscionable. The 
NAF steers the majority of the collection cases to a small number of arbitrators 
who consistently decide these cases in favor of its corporate clients. To require 
consumers, who have no idea of the massive and lucrative business provided to 
the NAF by its corporate clients, and the biased system of case allocation and 
rule enforcement practiced by the NAF, to abide by that system is to deprive the 
consumer of any chance of a fair and impartial hearing of their case. Such bias, 
which is hidden from the consumer by both the NAF and its corporate clients in 
their arbitration provisions, is unconscionable and unenforceable. 
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6. 
THE ARBITRATION PROVISION WAS EMPLOYED BY MBNA AS A 
"STEALTH" AMENDMENT, WITHOUT EFFECTIVE NOTICE 
The addition of the arbitration provision was the result of a number of 
related events. In Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902 (N.D.Cal. 2002) also 319 
F.3d 1126, discovery revealed that AT&T had commissioned a survey to 
determine the percentage of people who actually looked at the contents of the 
"bill stuffers" which they received. The results of the survey revealed that 12% of 
the people actually looked at the contents of the "bill stuffe~s" which accompanied 
their monthly statements. MBNA commissioned a similar survey with similar 
results. The Delaware legislature was then lobbied to add a section (now Title 5 
5952) to the state statutes allowing notice of amendments to the cardholder 
agreement to be sent in the same envelope as the monthly statement as a "bill 
stuffer", with full knowledge that 88% of their customers would never see the 
notice. This clearly constitutes deception and ineffective notice 
Any program designed to not inform seven out of eight customers and 
then use the "notice" to enforce amendments of which the cardholder has no 
practical knowledge is done in a "stealth" manner, deceiving the cardholder, and 
is unenforceable due to the lack of proper notice. In Lea Tai Textile Co., v. 
Manning Fabrics, Inc., (S.D.N.Y.) 41 1 F.Supp. 1404, the court held, "If a party 
wishes to bind another to arbitrate, that purpose must be accomplished in such a 
way that each party fully and clearly comprehends that an agreement to arbitrate 
exists." By employing the "stealth" tactics noted above, MBNA has deliberately 
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sought to obscure the nature of the arbitration amendment, leaving seven out of 
eight cardholders, including Capps and Carroll, without any meaningful 
comprehension that an agreement to arbitrate may exist. 
THE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT WAS CREATED WITH AN ILLUSORY 
PROMISE, MAKING THE ENTIRE CONTRACT ILLUSORY AND 
UNENFORCABLE 
In the cardholder agreement MBNA states, "We may suspend or close 
your account or otherwise terminate your right to use your account. We may do 
this at any time and for any reason." MBNA also states, "You may close your 
account by notifying us in writing or by telephone, and destroying all cards, 
access checks or other credit devices on the account." Please note that there is 
a notice req'uirement for the cardholder, but not MBNA. The lack of a notice 
requirement means that MBNA's promise cannot be enforced, as they may 
cancel their obligation at any time without notice. This is an illusory promise and 
constitutes no consideration at all. As such, the agreement is never actually 
formed, and is illusory. An agreement which is not actually formed, is illusory, 
and cannot be enforced. 
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8. 
THE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT WAS CONSTRUCTED TO BE 
DECEPTIVE, ACTING AS A SNARE TO THE CARDHOLDER 
The cardholder agreement, when examined in parts, stretches the 
envelope of the law, creating questionable practices which courts viewing the 
part exclusive of the whole, generally excuse and reform. The illusory promise 
detailed above is a typical example. In Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 
10 (1984), American Express exercised its option to close Gray's account without 
notice. Gray was publicly embarrassed when he presented his American 
Express card to pay for a wedding anniversary dinner which he and his wife had 
consumed. The court ordered American Express to honor the transaction, as 
American Express had not given any prior notice to Gray that his account had 
been closed. The court noted that "Indeed, the interpretation of the language 
urged by American Express would subsume the entire contract and make the 
underlying contractual relationship illusory." The court thus reformed the contract 
with Gray to require prior notification to the cardholder before closing the 
account. 
When the agreement is examined as a whole, many provisions of the 
agreement fall into the same type ofcategory. The "stealth" amendments, the 
illusory promise, the implied ability to unilaterally amend the agreement, the 
practice of changing interest rates upon 15 day notice all create an ever shifting 
and changing agreement at the whim of MBNA. The cardholder is lulled into 
believing that the agreement is basically stable, when in fact it is not. MBNA's 
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promise to do anything cannot be depended on, and any belief that there is an 
enforceable agreement on the part of the cardholder is an illusion. The 
agreement, when taken as a whole is designed to deceive the cardholder and lull 
him or her into a false sense of security. The cardholder is deceived and the 
agreement acts as a snare to the cardholder when the cardholder is required to 
adhere to rules while MBNA exempts itself from any and all rules through its 
illusory promise. 
MBNA's premise that it can unilaterally amend its agreement at any time 
to include any term it wishes deprives the cardholder of any meaningful 
dependence of what was bargained for when the account was opened. Any, or 
all, of the cardholder's rights may be amended away, and new rights of the 
creditor may be inserted at will. None of these conditions were bargained for by 
the cardholder. The premise that MBNA can unilaterally amend its cardholder 
agreement alone renders the contract illusory and unenforceable. The 
cardholders end up with nothing they bargained for and an agreement which is 
used to deceive and deprive them of their basic rights and dignity. 
CONCLUSION 
Capps and Carroll believed that the choice of law provision in the 
cardholder agreement was valid during the evidentiary hearing on the existence 
of an agreementto arbitrate. Capps and Carroll have since discovered that the 
choice of law provision is not valid and pray that this court will reverse its 
decision based on Idaho law rather than Delaware law, which now clearly does 
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not apply. Capps and Carroll also believed they would have an opportunity to 
challenge the validity of the arbitration separate from the issue of there being an 
agreement. to arbitrate in the evidentiary hearing, and were surprised that the 
court confirmed the arbitration awards concurrent with its decision on the 
arbitration agreement. Capps and Carroll beg the court's indulgence in their 
presentation of these additional challenges to the account and the arbitration 
award letters and pray that the court will consider the above issues in its 
reconsideration. Capps and Carroll also pray that this court will determine that 
MBNA fraudulently represented the account and the arbitration process to which 
Capps and Carroll were subjected was procedurally flawed, biased, 
unconscionable, illusory, andlor unenforceable. 
Dated this /Q@ day of October, 2006 
fj.(',.,C .L t (D I (  
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona 
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I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that on this f'fl day of October, 
2006, 1 mailed a true and correct copy of my Motion for Reconsideration to the 
attorney for the Defendant I Plaintiff by certified mail # 7V'aS )/&0 mQZ 76s 3029 
at the following address: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC-I I BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G CARROLL, 1 
) Case No CV-36747 
Plarntrff, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
vs ) MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N A ,  ) 
) 
) 






DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
State of Idaho: ) 
) ss: 
County of ldaho: ) 
Miriam G. Carroll, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
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1. I am the Plaintiff in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of my 
Motion for Reconsideration. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. In Michigan before moving to Idaho, I was a real estate broker with my 
own company. All during those 30 years I helped many people obtain 
mortgages. Without fail the banks very carefully qualified the buyers to be 
sure that they could afford to repay the loan. This is how I know that 
credit card bank's primary purpose is not to  loan money to earn 
interest. They mail checks in  huge numbers to every cardholder on 
their list with enticing letters urging the cardholder to  use the checks 
for whatever luxury their heart desires. The credit card company does 
not know or care how deeply in debt the cardholder may already be. The 
purpose of offering all this easy money to the cardholder is obviously to 
cause the type of thing that has happened to us - to force the cardholder 
to lose his or her property through court action or bankruptcy. The banks 
already control the wealth of the world, now they also have power over the 
people. 
3. When Dave and I moved to ldaho we couldn't find a way to earn a living 
for a long time, so we borrowed oncredit cards for living expenses. 
4.  ina all^ we found an income of $1,000 to $1,500 per month which we can 
live on if we are very careful and forego all unnecessary items. But this 
was not enough to repay the money we had borrowed on credit cards. 
Because I could not conceive of not paying a bill, I borrowed on credit 
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cards to make the monthly payments under the belief that our income 
would increase to the point where we could pay the bills. Thus the biggest 
percentage of what we now owe was given back to the credit card 
companies as monthly payments. I continued to pay all bills on time until 
there was nothing left to borrow 
5. We never bought consumer items. This money was borrowed strictly to 
make credit card payments. 
6. 1 started using credit cards when they first came out and the companies 
were still doing business honestly. I remember one company 
representative telling me on the phone, "As long as the payment reaches 
us within ten days of the due date we're happy"., 
7. 1 did not realize that over time the credit card companies were no longer 
honest but were, in fact, breaking the law every day and using their power 
to force unsuspecting consumers into bankruptcy or into losing their 
property. 
8. Here are some of the things that credit card companies have done to me: 
A. After mailing a bill to me in' Idaho every month which I paid, they mailed 
the bill for three months to a house I lived in 20 years ago (four houses 
ago) and used that as an excuse to raise my interest from 4.99% for the 
life of the loan to 27.99%. While looking at law books in Moscow I found 
another case where the credit card company did the same thing to 
someone else. 
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B. I've had numerous late charges when the payment was not actually 
late from MBNA and others which was then used to increase the interest 
rate which in turn increased the monthly payment by as much as a few 
hundred dollars making it impossible to pay. 
C. I took part in a class action suit in which the bank had made the rule 
that payments must be received on or before the due date by 7:00 a.m. 
effectively giving a late charge to everyone whose payment arrived on the 
due date. 
D. I took out a cash advance which, when they added interest went over 
limit. I paid the over limit fee for five months before I noticed it. They are 
theexperts; they knew exactly what they were doing. I was too trusting. 
9. At my age (68), it is too late for me to start over. Anyway I have not 
had enough energy since having cancer to work full time. The doctors 
said I'd never be well and I guess they were right. Dave cannot work full 
time since having stage three cerebral Lyme disease. He has never fully 
recovered. It doesn't seem fair to take what little financial security we 
have away from us and give it to a multi-billion dollar bank that 
breaks the law and takes advantage of people every day. 
10. 1 have been told by two people, one of them a lawyer's wife that pro 
se litigants have no chance of winning in court no matter how strong their 
case. I would hate to think that is true. My father was a circuit court judge 
in Macomb County, Michigan for many years and he said in his day pro se 
litigants were treated equally in court. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Pg 4 of 5 
11. I am enclosing an article from Consumer Reports magazine that 
explains how this industry operates 
Dated this (Of2,  day of October, 2006. Subscribed and sworn before me 
this ( 0 t h  day of October, 
2006. 
<- 
Miriam G. Carroll 
Plaintiff, in propria persona County of Idaho. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (w day of October, I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION by Certified Mail # 7 s / / 6 Q  0082 763Q SO 
with the correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
b;bi-w, 6.C--\\ 
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Pg 5 of 5. 





They really are out to get you 
Ruth Owem' tmubles began when she 
stopped using her Discover card. The 
Cleveland woman. who was on Sodal 
Security disability, had just passed her 
$1,9W balSnceUmit 
Over the next six years, she made 
$3,492 inpapmnts but never Muced her 
debt. Discover charged fees and fkmce 
that used up alt her payments 
and ballooned her balance to $5,564. Io 
2W3, the card company sued Owens, 
asserting that she breached the card 
cornact by faiting to make . . 
nanath?y payments 'After paying my 
s~oaWy uUEti~s there is no money left' 
Owens pleaded in court papea 'If my 
situation was different, I would pay.' 
Cleveland muoictpal cow judge pobert 
%Q& Ulat  wen^ had paid 
anwghdeihingtbatshehadbeenprey 
to *the pIainWs unreasoWle, uucon- 
scionable and unjust business pmclices.' 
0- trapped in the jamof uedtt- 
card debt has becoma alanninghl easy 
temstrates for years, so a temptingly low 
1.9 percentA.FR can morph into double- 
digit territory at the whim of the credit- 
card company. Qz it can dimb beyond 30 
percent when a consumer does nothing 
~ugethansignupforanewcardinquire 
about a car loan, or make a single late 
payment to any aeditot 
A s f o r f e e s . ~ g o f % Y o u c a n r e -  
c e h r e a S f 9 ~ h r r ~ o y e r t h e l i  
pay@ late, or paying less than the mi& 
mum. for balance mnsfets and a s h  ad- 
vances. and foreign m c y  hmsacUom 
Cteditcardri haveNnedintointo~tbing1ess 
t t I i m ~ - S i z e d p r s a ; d o r y ~ o ~  
See Gxktopher Dcdd, DCom, dmhg a 
c m g m s b n a l h e ~  in2005. 
The effects o n A m M  finances are 
showing. Average card debt per house- 
hold with at least one credit card topped 
$9,3M) in 20aLThet's more than triple the 
average in 1990. Consumer bankruptcies 
have skyrocketed from 287,463 in 1980, 
the dawn of Card-Wtry dezqvktion to 
just over 1.5 &n in 2004. Cner'W-car& 
fees and finance charges are m1a8 morc 
dif6cult to Rpay for m e s  with othe~ 
moneypmblem~saymedicaf W I s  orajol 
loss. 'It is the risiag cost of the lriastic it 
@that is tipping hundreds of tlie~usmd! 
of families over the edge,. says IQiizabett 
Warren a Earvard law pmfer~.~ 'or ant 
ba~ktup tc~  tlpen 
Nessa Feddis, senior federal ~counse 
at the Amerfcan Bankers Associ,xtion, i! 
not totaIIysympathetic?t isn'tjastmed. 
ical exp+?nses that can cause the trouble: 
he says. ?tS that nice handbkg theq 
charged, that kind of s p e n d i .  Penalty 
fees are needed, she ad&, as "dceterrents 
to bad behavior" 
In 2003 those deterrents, alcrilg with 
fees far Cash advances, exsee&d the 
aftertax profits of the entire austtit-card 
industry just two years earliter. Card 
issuers have been experiencing record 
profits since 2000 and saw ttwm tap 
$!XI billion in 2004.Awave of mez~ers hw 
e11$ue& cMlSO~datingmifl&)i$'han& 
of a fewplayerswb6set~i t  a::leave-it 
terms for mnsnmers.Prior to 1978 the top 
Xi issuers represented 50.perw.a~ dzhe 
credit-card market but by mid-2005 OD@ 
five companies. American Exprest, Bank 
of America. Citigmup, JPMorgan Chase 
and MBNA controBed 65 peke:rt of the 
'market. 'The impending hamiage of 
MBNA and Bank of AmericawIB. i'uruler 
&TOW the cirde of big playe:~:;. con-. 
nuners can expect to be squee2edbeven 
W e r  by rim r@es and fee%' ~ m e d  
Roben D. ldambg, professor of finance 
at Rochester Institute of Technofogy and 
author of-C;edit ~ a r d ~ a ! ~ ~ n :  
Don't think you are off the hotagr if you 
are among the 45 percent of cardk~olders 
who paybalasces in fo.ll each mo~zth.As 
interest rates rise, card issuers are reekirg 
ways to eke out income from you as well. 
I 
Warren notes, 'This is not a case of a 
few piranhas naimmhrg amidst a sea of 
bib: benign &Fh B e  deregulation of this 
mdustcyhas made tiIe watem treacherOus 
fcr an consumers~ Bere are the most slg- 
nifrcant dangers, along with advice on 
howtominimkethem. 
RATES lWAT ARICtl'T REAL 
Mom than one rate Unwarg con- 
s m c a n  easilywiml up with an inter- 
estratethat%imySopranoumnlbcharge 
Takearecentsolidtationfor a ChaseVw 
Platinum c d  I~ I  giant type, ~t tnunpeted 
a Opercent fixed ~ c t o r y ~  per- 
centage rate on purchases and balance 
transfers for up to 15 months and a 7.99 
percent fixed rate thereaik. 
Sounds good, but a fixed rate means 
only thatthe mdit-wd company has to 
give at least Pidays' w&en nonot befm 
: it chwges Insmaller print on an accom- 
E panyrOg page you l a  We reserve Ute 
right to change the terms (including the 
APRs) at any time for any re~!L* 
The 35 percent ts8p. Most card is- 
suers impose a penalty rate if you pay 
your bill late or exceed your carU's a& 
limit CwtW& it ~ ~ e r s g e s  24.23 pacent 
But according m a survey conducted last 
spring by Consumer Action. a San 
Francisco-based advocacy gmup, about 6 
percemofcardissuets alsohaveso-called 
W I M ? ~  delsult @ides The companies 
monitor your ctedit report and kick up 
your rates if they believe your behavior 
With other creditozs sfgaals that you've 
become agreatpr credit risk. 
Pediaing &t scores and late pay- 
ments Oa any accoupts reported to credit 
4neau6wemthemostcummonuniv~ 
default t r igge~~,  bntabout 24 percent of 
card issuers said that Bimgly inq&ing 
about a carloan or xnus$age mulct e@er 
such a rate hike; 33 percent said getting 
a new credit card could do so. Tracey 
Milk, a s p o m m a u  for the American 
Bankers Association, defends default 
rates, saying that they are "part of risk- 
based pridng. which means that you 
em the interest rate yau receivee 
Penaltgrates amich C-Action's 
S u N ~ f O U l l d  had already NM aS bigh a8 
35 percent last spring, may then be ap- 
plied not just to new charges but also to 
eKistfng b-es. Consumer aerPoLsts 
argue that Us nnfair ta apply ~~ 
to balmces mtmactivel~ -1 M w  ot m 
other h r n t b a t i s  alIowedto lnmXSe 
the price of a product once it i% p u e ~
chased." says '&a& PIunkett le@Mke 
director of the Consumer Federation of 
Amerlca. Chase, Citibank andimNA are 
I CardWeb.com, a leading source of data on the credit-card industry, have a orace perlod of at least 25 days and have no annual fees. The ' malvzed10.200 card offers to identify those with the lowest cosl in a Information is current as of Aug. 1. 2005. An "I" indicates that the 1 
grwp that provided the best terms based on CR's criteria. None of , card has a fixed rate; "v:' a variable rate. Rates are the loweti6ff&d 
the 10 cards has a universal defauik clause, two-cycle billing. w bal- to customers who meet issuers' credit-score standards. The:''ii-to I 
.J .;>. :. '. . , -  
. . atiCt.Wnsfer fw.all of whlch.can jack u~flnirnc~cfiargea~ll qrds APR" takes effect at the end of the pCOmOtlot!al perlod. . ': ,~' ....., -'f?l 
among catd Issuers that have armminced 
their intention to give cardholders ad- 
vance notice of penalty rate hikes and 
&ow them to *opt our  of paying the 
higher rates on existing balances 
And one rate hike can lead to another 
Thars wbat happened to Ann Craig. who 
ran her credit-card balances dose to the 
limits to make ends meet after her hus- 
band's South Carolina consulting busi- 
ness went intoa post-9/11 dump.Though 
Craig says she always made on-time 
monulty payments, the noose Wtened 
whenherFSmt U S A ~ t r a r d ~ h e r  
9.99par~it htw?St rate to 22.99 parent 
in one month. Tn the wake of that in- 
mase. she says rates on her other cards 
shat up above 20 percent. She doesn't 
think that she can get awiit at lower 
rates, so right now she is sluck ?eople 
whoarelrf iugreal ly~tomanage 
their &bts are being outrageow penal- 
jzed+' she says. 
l b l a n w - t a n s O e r ~ Z b ~ m ~ )  
customem away from n,@ors, &is- 
suersafk.rteaserrate~aslowasOpercent 
farln~ctoryperiods that mightlast as 
long as 15 months. If you can transfer a 
balance on a high-rate Uud to one wlth a 
low rate, such offers can be useful took 
But they come at a higb cost Any pay- 
ments youmake typic~Uy are appuedfkst 
to the lowest rate balance. So while the 
adit-card company uses your payment 
to quickly pay off that 0 percent trmfer 
balance you are piling up intenst on pur- 
chases at, say. 18 pemnt. 
TbMcgadIl just tmnsferbalances and 
not make any purchases? Not so fast. 
Some card Issuers have attached strings 
to their offem For example at one point 
Pmvidb required tbat customers taJte 
cash advances to earn the 0 percent rate. 
FEES AND MORE PEES 
For Wd%ness Since 19%, when a 
court ruling eJimbted caps on card fees. 
the average fee for maldng a late pay- 
2 the top 10 &suers now charging $39. 
? Mom than half of caixlhoIde~s p ~ y  late 
fees at least once a yea and it's geiting 
easier than ever to trigger them. Card 
issuers are systematically maiUng state- 
ments closer to the due date. @viq~eun; 
t o m a  less lumaraund time. At least a 
Wrd of issue rsin ConsumerAction's sly- 
vey set a cutoff rime on the due date, 
raagisg from noon local time to 9 p.m 
Eastern time Gene- payments 
procwed after that are rmrded as late. 
We've he& fmm consumem who 
haw been reconled as late for payments 
they've mailed over a week in advance 
of the due date. so they suspect issuers 
are deliberately delaying processing 
payments simply to generate late-fee 
revenue,' says Joe Ridout of Consumer 
Adion, which is among advocacy groups 
lobbying to require card companies to 
follow the practice of the IRS and accept 
a postmarked date as proof of o n a e  
payments'This daim. that card bsuers 
are holding QZI to payments in order to get 
fees is not Mushy practice and it doesn't 
make basiness sew?," says Milts of the 
ABA. She adds that consumers who sus- 
pect their issuer of such tactics can choose 
among 6,000 other cards. 
For over the JfmIt. Batha thm 
rejecting charges that exceed your credit 
limit, issuers today often 
through but then charge a 
which averages amund $3 
hoUm are hit with penalty r>ttes an 
dtberfee, Bmnce cbarges alme can sut 
ject them to overlimit fees mcr~ith aRf 
month. creating a neverending spiful t 
debt Other fees to watch: For balm< 
transfers, you pay 2 percent to 3 pezcet 
of the amount W@rn?d, with a cap I 
$50 to $75 for each w f e r  ]ww mak 
Andf9rcashadvances.youpay :Cpem?~ 
to 4percent of the amount you tske 
TRICKY BILLING 
The minimum-payment Itrap. Ovl 
the year$ card issuers have lo&rered tl 
requhdminimumpayment fmnt tbe pn 
vious standan3 of 5 percent of 0iu:btandiz 
balances to 2 pement Consuntc?~ migl 
not realize fhat by payiag the minimu 
&#re barely m&ng a dent in j~rinapr 
If fees and penalty interest ratta m % 
getwlahey couldendup wing awze tha 
they ever & w e d  
Indeed. in a North Carobna ban1 
NPW PIOC- last  yea^ C6q)ital 01 
itemized how much of the doIIaram0~ 
it said it- owed by 18 cardhc~lders rq 
resented prinapal rather than h a n ~  
charge6 It turned out that on w?rege, n 
terest and fees consisted of tioore thz 
half of total amnunts owed 
Concern about the effect af reduct 
minimum payments promptrtl feder 
regulators to Issue guidelines this ye< 
calling for card issuers to increase the 
mjnimum payment r ~ m e r t 1 s  enoq 
to cover finance charges and8tn.s durh 
the bilbgcyclc andrrducesol~~ep&ic 
of p w p a l  tea 
Issuers have until the end of 2006 
phase in higher minimums, L~ut son 
already have changed their formula 
Citiiank now req-s mfnirnums 
cover 1 percent of ghe balance plua la 
fees aDdfipance charges whil>e, at pre 
time. Bank of America mquinEv a mia 
mum equal to fees and Bqance chaxgk 
plus $10 per month. 
In- en Qayona Cardcrtmpant 
have been graduaUyxd=h 1;mce pts 
ods, the time during which triusactipr 
don't w e  interesCAnd more ,rad mol 
cards come packwedwith a airchanis 
called double-cycleinterest wzdch aUm 
you to avoid credit-card c b w p s  only 
souham paidthe 1asttwOb~laIKeSiIIftI 
h n o t b e r t a 3 s t c a l k i ~ f r i m n  
il 14 CONSUHKR REPORTS 0 VISIT US AT WW 
cently adoptedbyAmeriQn ~ ! i w o r k s  
liket6is.You get a bill with a $l,CWWance 
onNm land~inyourchecksothatitar- 
lives by the due date say 25 days later. On 
Nav. 2, howwer, you charge $500. Before 
Amexs change you paid w finance charge 
on the $500. NowAmex cLwges interest on 
the p* until it receivg your$l,CW. 
Li7TI.E HELP 
Whew can consumers turn 
for relief? Not necessarily to 
the courts. About 45% of 
credit-card companies force 
customers to submit disputes 
to arbitration instead. 
Regulaa313rn'tWrnbe 
thebanla atways have tbe optionofswitch- 
ingtoanotbern@atorybaiyiftheydon't 
like OCC poliaes"Mier&n&says 
State attorneys general. who have long 
been m s s i v e  infighting a b w e  carb- 
industrypraaicffwerepushedaside last 
yearwbmthe OCC imposed rules assert- 
ing that it had sole legal authority to enact 
and enforce consumer prutfxtion regula- 
tions for national banki and their state- 
standards of consumer protection ac,lbe 
national level.' 
Some of those consumer cops .we 
pressing ahead despite the OCC's at- 
tempt to preempt. In December 2004, 
~ e s o t a ' s  attorney general, BKike 
Hatch, a e d  a suit against Capital One, 
saying it Used false, deceptive, and mis- 
leading Tv a&.direct-mail solicitatians. 
and customerservice tele~honesaislts 
dustrghasan~musual~ofswayover 
its reguhto~~, says Ed Mi- of U.S. 
EublisInlemtRwarch GroupCardissuas 
can choose to be cluvterrd as state banks, 
whicharespxvkdbytheFederal.R~ 
o r t h e F e d e r a l D e p m i t ~ C o ~ ~ ~ w t o  
benationath/-mthem& 
taeofsceofWCompboDer0fUle~ 
(OCC) or the Oitice ofThdft SnpmWb 
The o w w b b b g  majority of issues$ 
nourareaemwnbytheOCCwhweapaa- 
tions are fundedby the card i n d m  i W  
"lbe OCC has a mnch greater incentive to 
bea~wmmoda~tocmiissuembec~& 
The MAJORlTY of 
card issuers are 
overseen by an agency 
funded by the industry. 
.. . * 
t0 .wket  fledit cards with 
rat& .mt 
snpposedlywouldn't rise. ii4- 
like those of their com]ye?ti- 
tom' who were portrayed. in 
TV ads as plundering barbar- 
ians. Yet a clause in the card 
agreement allowed Capital 
licensed Operating subsidiaries 'Simply 
put. the OCC rules will eliminate 50 cops 
born the beat" testified Roy Cooper, 
North Camlina's attorney general, before 
a congressional committee last year. 
Cooper said OCC &ah in their efforts 
to entice federal thrift? and state banks 
to become OCC regulated, behave like 
basketball coaches hying to remit play- 
ers. As a selling point they tout rules 
aimed at preempting any role for states 
in consumer protection Kevin Mukri an 
OCC spokffmarzsays that such a charge 
is xridiculons.' He add$ -We have hjgh 
One to change interrst rates fmany ma- 
- son. The case is still peading. and when 
asked for comm&nt capitol One said it 
believes it hascompliedfuliywiththe 1 . a ~  
For now thegreatest power that mn- 
sumers have is in their awn hands. 
MchieMiUs,wllose awlit-cardratervas 
raisedtoa nosebleed leveL has filedcnm- 
plaints about card-industry tactics with 
federal regulators. 'As a atizen." 3d:iUs 
says; 'the only power I have is towith- 
draw my business bom these companies 
and encourage friends, family, and bu.si- 
ness partners to do the same." 
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IN THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 
I\/IBNA America Bank, N.A. 
c/o Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two Irvington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Rockville, MD 20850 
1-800-830-2793 
M i a m  G. Carroll 
C/O HC-I 1 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID, 83536 
208-935-7962 
RESPONDENT, 
Forum File Number: FA0503000443990 
Claimant File Number: 0135832603 
Account Number: 43 13-033 1 - 1 100-601 6 
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-2487 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO 
ARBITRATION 
CLAIMANT. I 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, Respondent, hereby declare and state: 
1. That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of 
arbitration or any provision that allowed for new terms to be added, such as arbitration. 
2. I have never been notified or received any amendment containing an arbitration clause, 
thus giving me an opportunity to opt out of any such change of terms; 
3. That there is no agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the 
National Arbitration forum (Hereinafter "Forum"), or any other Arbitration forum, or at all; 
4. That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any 
way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceeding; 
Motion to Dismiss Page 1 of 2 
- 1 3 8  
5. That the National Arbitration Forum would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by 
proceeding on the claim; 
6. That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action 
whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under 
penalty of perjury. 
Signed by Miriam G. Carroll 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed 
on the 4th day of April, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1 160-0006-1161-2494 to 
the following party: 
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two Irvington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Rockville, MD 20850 
Dated this 4th day of April, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted and signed by 
Miriam G. Carroll, 
Motion to Dismiss Page 2 of 2 
- "9 c w 
David F. Capps 
C/O HC-11 BOX 366 
Karniah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
IN THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 




MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
C/O Wolpoff & Abrarnsoa, L.L.P. 
Two Irvington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Rochilie, MD 20850 
240-386-3900 
I, David F. Capps, Respondent, hereby declare and state: 
Forum File Number: FA0506000498945 
Account Number: 5490-3536-0367-4374 
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-3323 
1. That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of' 
arbitration or any provision that allowed for new terms to be added, such as arbitration. 
2. The agreement attached to the Claim filed with the National Arbitration Forum is not the 
agreement I entered into with Claimant and does not represent the original agreement. 
3. I have never been notified or received any amendment containing an arbitration clause, 
thus giving me an opportunity to opt out of any such change of terms; 
4. That there is no agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the 
National Arbitration fonun (Hereinafter 'Torum"), or any other Arbitration forum, or at all; 
Motion to Dismiss Page 1 of 3 
5. That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any 
way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceeding; 
6. That the National Arbitration Forurn would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by 
proceeding on the claim; 
7. That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action 
whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack ofjurisdiction. 
I, David F. Capps declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under penalty 
of perjury. 
Signed by David F. Capps 
Motion to Dismiss Page 2 of 3 
- .  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed 
on the 8th day of July, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1160-0006-1461-3316 to 
the following party: 
Paralegal D e p m e n t  
Wolvoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Twd Inrington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd., 5" Floor 
Rockville, MD 20850 
Dated this 8th day of July, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted and signed by 








NEW HANOVER COUNTY 
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 
ADRIANA MCQUILLAN, and 1 
WALTER JAMES FAUST, on behalf 1 





V. 1 AOC-CV-752 
) 
CHECK 'N GO OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1 
INC., CNG FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 1 




JAMES P. TORRENCE, SR., and BEN HUBERT ) 
CLINE, on behalf of themsetves and all other ) 





NATIONWIDE BUDGET FINANCE, QC 1 
HOLDINGS, INC., QC FINANCIAL 1 
SERVICES, INC., FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and DON EARLY, ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL GEIST 
MICHAEL GEIST provides this declaration. 
I .  My name is Michael Geist. I am over the age of twenty-one years, have never 
been convicted of a felony, have personal knowledge of the facts statcd horein, and am competent 
which was published at 27 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 903-38 (2002). A true and 
correct copy of this article is attached as Exhibit A. 
6 .  I subsequently conducted a follow-up study in which i updated my findings to 
include all UDRP decisions through February 18,2002, for a total of 4,332 cases. I published the 
key findings of this follow-up study in a second article, FundanzentulZy Fair.coill? Aiz Update 0 1 1  
Bias Allegantioizs nlzd tlie ICANN UDRP. A true and conect copy of this article is attached as 
Exhibit B. 
7. As explained in more detail below, based on my research and analysis, I 
concluded that the NAF disproportionately assigned arbitrators who issued pro-complainatlt 
rulings, and thus exerted influence over the outcomes of arbitrations in the UDRP system in 
order to market itself favorably to complainants, who have the exclusive power to choose 
whether the NAF or a different provider will earn their business. 
8. My study was premised on the belief that complainants rationally selected 
arbitration providers that they perceived as most likely to rule in their favor. This assumption 
was based on the fact that, after the establishment of the UDRP, the two accredited arbitration 
providers with the most favorable outcomes for complainants-the NAF and WIPO-were 
increasingly selected by complainants. (The success of these two complainant-friendly 
providers eventually contributed to the bankruptcy of the Ieast compIainant-friendly provider, 
eliesolution.) In my study, I set out to determine whether-and if so, how-arbitration 
providers curried favor with poteiltial complainants. 
9. First, I analyzed the potential factors influencing complainant selection of 
arbitration provider, including differences among filing fee costs, pa~~clist rosters, language 
Most troublillg was data that suggested that, despite claims of impartial random case allocatio~i 
as well as a large roster of panelists, the majority of NAF single panel cases were actually 
assigned to little more than a handful of panelists. Of the 1,379 NAF cases decided by a single 
NAF-assigned arbitrator through February 18,2002,778 of them-56.4%-were decided by 
only six arbitrators. (In comparison, the six busiest single panelists at the two other providers 
accounted for approximately 17% of those providers' single panel caseloads.) 
13. In cases decided by the six arbitrators most frequently assigned by the NAF, the 
complainant won 95.1% of the time. This win rate was significantly higher than virtually any 
other point of comparison, including overall complainant winning percentage and complainant 
winning percentage by provider. 
14. During my research, I was on the NAF's media distribution list. Unlike the WlPO 
and eResolution, the NAF regularly distributed press releases heralding recent decisions. From 
May through August 2001, for example, 1 received several press releases, all but one of wl~ich 
promoted a complainant win. 
15. By assigning the majority of cases to the subset of ahitratots who ruled most 
consistently for its clients, the complainants, the NAF exerted a great deal of influence over case 
outcorne. When combined with the fact that outcome was the most decisive factor among 
complainants choosing arbitration providers, and evidence that the NAF aggressively marketed 
its services to potential complainants by promoting complainant wins, this data supports the 
conclusion that the NAF used its control over the selection of arbitrators in single panel cases to 
achieve outcomes that would enable it to attract the business of fihire UDRP complainants. 
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(formerly CHASE BANK OF TEXAS, NA), 
and SALMONS AGENCY, INC., a West 
Virginia corporation, 
Detendants. .................................... 
IN THE UNWED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THJE 410UTltnaluY DISTRICT 0s WIGST VIRGINIA 
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September 23, 1996 
Richard E. Shephard 
Asst. Gen'l Counsel 
Saxon Mortgage. Inc. 
4880 Cox Rd. 
Glen Allen, VA 23060 
. - .  Dear Richard: 
Thanks for your call last week. It was good talking to you. 
Following on our conversation, i am enclosing the National Arbitration Forum's 
1996 Arbitration Overview for your review. 
By adding arbitration language to yqur contracts, the National Arbitration Forum's 
national system of arbitration lets you minimize lawsuits, and the threat of lender 
liability jury verdicts. 
We have successfUlly handled more than 20,000 creditor-debtor and other cases 
nationwide. You will probably be most interested in the Gammaro case that is 
enclosed sinceit involves the National Arbitration Forum in a mortgage transaction. 
After you have had a chance to review these materials, I will give you a call. In the 
meantime, if you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, - 
&- 
Curtis D. Brown, Esq. . 
Director of Development 
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Tbe Forum's fcer an maonably priced tn ha imesible ta consumma aad 
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NATIONAL - ARBITRATOW FOLLOW TIE LAW'-~redictable decisions 
ARBITRATION based on legal standards. 
FORUM - AWARDS LIMITED -Awards may not exceed claim for which 
fee paid 
. . .. 
UNIFORM NATIONAL SYS'IEM - Same rules, same 
h r i w ~ i ~ .  MN procedures - every case, everywhqe. 
Atlanta GA 
\k'&ingwn. D.C. 
P~OFESSIONALS - Ddsions are made legal professional, not 
jurom or volunteers. 
COST CONTROL - The cost of arbitration is far lower 
fhan any lawsuit. 
LIMITED DISCOVERY - Very little, if any, discovery and 
pre-hehg maneuvering. 
PRXVAllE - Arbitration proceedings are completely private. 
NO SPURlOUS CLAW;IS - Arbitration procedures discourage 
lawsuit extortion. 
LOSER PAYS - Prevailing party may be awarded costs. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
NEW HANOVER COUNTY 
ADRIANA MCQurLLAN, and 
WALTER JAMES FAUST, on behalf 
of themselves and all other persons similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
CHECK'N GO OF NORTH CAROLINA,.. 
INC.;CNG FINANC.IAL CORPORATION, 
JARED A. DAVIS and A. DAVID DAVIS, 
IN TI33 GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 
Defendants. i 
1 
JAMES P. TORRENCE, SR., and BEN HUBERT ) 
CLINE, on behalf of themselves and all other 1 





NATIONWIDE BUDGET FINANCE, QC 1 
HOLDINGS, INC., QC FINANCIAL ) 
SERVICES, INC., FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and DON EARLY, ) 
Defendants. ) 
DECLARATION OF GREGORY DUHL 
GREGORY DUHL provides this declaration. 
1. My name is Gregory Duhl. I am over the age of twenty-one years, have never 
been convicted of a felony, have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and am competent 
to testify to them. The facts stated herein are true and correct. 
2. I understand that this declaration will be used by the plaintiffs in this case in 
support of their effort to challenge the binding mandatory arbitration clause used by a lender. I 
am not familiar with the allegations or issues in that case, however, and I have no opinion about 
the merits of the matter. I have not reviewed the arbitration clause at issue, and have no opinion 
as to its enforceability. I also have no financial interest in this case. I provide this declaration 
only to describe my own experiences with the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"). 
3. In 2003, I had a dispute against Suburban Moving & Storage Company 
("Suburban"), an agent of United Van Lines, for damages to my property arising from my move 
from Chicago to Pennsylvania. In keeping with my contact with Suburban, I pursued my claim 
by filing a case with the NAF. When I agreed to arbitrate with the NAF, I was not familiar with 
them, and had no basis for suspecting them of any bias. 
4. My experience with the NAF was deeply troubling. In a variety of ways, I found 
that the NAF implemented (or refused to follow) its ruies in ways that favored Suburban and 
disfavored me, the consumer. 
5. At each step of the arbitration process, for example, the NAF allowed Suburban to 
violate procedural rules. I followed the procedures set forth in the NAF's rules, and asked the 
NAF to require Suburban to comply with the NAF's rules. Repeatedly, however, the NAF 
refused to consider my motions. 
6. After some time, I found the NAF's procedural bias against me to be so pervasive 
and blatant that it no longer made sense to go forward. As a result, I was forced to abandon my 
claim, and I settled the matter with Subuiban for far less than it was worth. 
7. I am a professor of business law, and I presume that I am likely more 
sophisticated than the average consumer. I am concerned that if the NAF's system favored the 
corporate defendant over the consumer in my case to such a degree fhat I was not able to ' 
overcome this kind of procedural unfairness by invoking the rules, it is unlikely that the average 
consumer would have much of a chance in cases brought before the NAF. 
8. Without going through an exhaustive discussion of the entire matter, I will 
describe now a few instances of the NAF's abusive conduct in my case. 
9.  As one illustration of how the NAF was lax with its rules with respect to 
Suburban, the NAF accepted a late submission fiom Suburban without following the NAF's own 
procedures for late submissions. I knew that the submission was late because of the date and 
time on the fax stamp. 
10. In addition, the NAF did not require Suburban to follow the rules of the American 
Moving & Storage Association (AMSA), as my contract with Suburban required the NAF to do. 
Under the AMSA rules, for example, Suburban was required to submit three copies of its 
response to my claim. The NAF permitted Suburban to ignore this requirement, among others, 
despite my objections. 
11. I learned that there were several instances of ex parte communication between the 
NAF and Suburban. When I demanded to know what information had been exchanged Eetween 
Suburban and the NAF, the NAF refused to communicate with me about the contents of the ex 
parte communications. 
12. As another illustration of the NAF's favoritism, the NAF directed me that I had to 
hand-write the case number on each page of a 150-page document. The NAF also directed me 
that I must spend my own money to copy and mail hard copies to the NAF and Suburban. The 
NAF had a different system in place for Suburban, however, and Suburban was permitted to 
submit its documents without numbers and via fax. I objected, without success, that the NAF 
should require Suburban to follow the same rules that I was required to follow. 
13. On at least four separate occasions, I filed motions with the NAF objecting to 
procedural irregularities. Each time, I followed the NAF rules, which, according to the AMSA 
rules, applied when the AMSA rules were silent. Pursuant to the NAF rules, my motions were 
filed with the Director of Arbitration. With each motion, as the NAF rules required, I enclosed 
the $25 filing fee. In each case, however, an NAF program administrator refused to even accept 
my motions, and the NAF clerk refused to permit me to be heard, notwithstanding the NAF rules 
that authorized these motions. The clerk said to me that "We don't hear motions like this," 
referring to motions that challenged procedural irregularities of the NAF itself. 
14. The NAF agreed to allow Suburban to pursue in arbitration issues that were 
beyond the scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate. 
15. Finally, the NAF told me that all of my correspondence with them regarding the 
procedural irregularities in the document submission process would be turned over to the 
arbitrator assigned to hear the case. I objected to this, because it was not relevant to my loss 
claim and I was concerned it would prejudice the arbitrator against me. I decided to move the 
NAF to dismiss my claim without prejudice, which it did. I then settled the claim for about 
$2750. 
16. In my opinion, it was impossible for me to get a fair result through arbitration 
before the NAF. The procedural unfairness of the process made arbitration an unworkable option 
for me. 
I, Gregory Duhl, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of North 
Carolina that the foregoing affidavit consisting of 16 paragraphs is true and correct. 
SjlJ 3- ,2005 
& = L o 4  
Gregory Duhl 
Subscribed and sworn to: 




Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-41 69 
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NOV 06 2006 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
Case No. CV-2005-36747 
Plaintiff, 
OF POST-HEARING 
VS. DUM BY MBNA 
MBNA AMERICA 




DAVID F. CAPPS, ~. . .  ; , 
- . \ 
. . 
, . " 
. . . ,  . 
,i. , .... : : . t  >* 
COMES ~o,~. ,Mir iarn I-c  , - .  , G. ~a>id i l~$ob , 
.. . .  
_ _ :,.., ' 
., .. ;,: ,!i; 
Delaware choice:of~lav\i provisions, ahdc:felated matters, as follows: 
, ,  . . , >..) !.,:< .\.:.;<qqj 3 
u ' . ~ \ 
.. . .,. . < ~ > ' c . .  > , . ? , i , Y  :.".;:: * '3 .<; , ,z \ : ; . ' . , : .?: . :  
REBUTTAL OF ~OSP-~EARI~G ME)dqPA BNA ~g I of 7 
07/14/2015 07:35 FAX 
: , , 
[\, ,) 
MBNA states, "tlie:DefeDdpnt . .. , ~. ,~ , . . ,  as.$&& .. .,, that,.,@~s6iMy, .under Delaware law 
. ,  .. . ,,, , ., ..$, . . 
-. ., < #  
: . : . ,  , , . , .  . , .  . . . . .  . . .. . . 
there is a $100,1)0~~~uoun~ . ..., , \>. L - . . ,  mi i~~m'bef~$e/g:bahk ,, :,., .a::.... 
. : . $  . ..; .. 
is enabled to amend an 
. . I!.' 
.;.;:; :,. ! ,.<. . ' , ! , . \ , ,; , >,?, . , . . : l. < ,<.-.." i..~;,;~::,~~, .r.,y<~(! ,,.,:. {.,; >,,.,,,,,,:, -;, <:,..,: ,.\.!< ":. .; 
agreement." ~ h a t ~ s l ~ i j q r y ~ ~  : .  . . . . .  \.. ; . .  !s not:tyu@. . ,, , , . .  . f[tl~.$':D6l. . . , .  , .  C. §2708(c) states, "This 
. . ,. ..: . . . : .  : . ., 
section shall nqt .. qppl$t~kny . , . . . : ~oip'ti.act;:,~~i:~~rnent . , .,, ,,., .-'. i or other undertaking, 
. . .  
. . . . . .  
... (ii) involving ~ ~ . s , s ~ ~ h a ~ $ 1 0 0 , ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ( ~ m p , h h ~ s i $  ,, , . . . , : , .~ , ..  - .  , . :  added). As such, the
Delaware choice-of-law provision in, the MBN,A~ credit card agreement is void 
. , . . i > , . ,  
ab ir~ifio. Since the Delaware . :  . , ,. c~ojce-o l - la~:&~the . . . .. . . . . . basis of this court's 
. , , , ; , , . ; ". '. ., , . J 6 '  
decision, Capps and Carroll h$Ge.w8'vi$d tN!co'~ourt to reconsider its decision 
, .  . : ,. . . , ,<-,?~ :: ; .;, ,; ,,,, :.;.;<:,:r!;, >' '  , T:;,<:r ,;,:. ; 
in iight of $2708 of th$ Delaware code; above. 
. , 
. . 
;,<,<!.;. ;. . ,  . 
The positi ti@b&hthe MBNA card agreement 
. . . . . . . . : , _  i .  
: " ' , . > _  ,.. . 
and  ela aware law, ~itie'$§9+2(a):whi2li ~taf&ht.he bank may amend the card 
. , , ,.'.j : i"". ' '  .~ . " . . .  .. , ,  , ,.,2. ;>", .,' L*<,:.,:- " , ' . a " .  ' 
agreement, does sounde'r the concept that theagreement . . is a contract of 
adhesion, where only't'ke struct the terms of the 
contract. This doe amend. There must be a 
consciously agree to the 
terms before th aware law. It must be clear, 
s not been, a willing 
Informafioro,., Systerns v. 
Bd. Of Trustees, 489. , "Arbitration under the Act 
. It should also be clear 
nsent to arbitration and the 
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entire rce arbitration which 
lacks any reasona 
MBNA also statesth wquestions whether 5 Delaware 
Code §952(a) permitting sll ccomplished is 
. , , . .  
somehow limited to accou ,000." That statement 
IS also not true First of all, the $TOO,000 threshold applies to a Delaware choice- 
of-law provision in contracts, not an amendment , . Zp a contract. Second, the 
statemept indicates that MBNA has. a'ccomplished awamendment to the 
. . . . . , . . . .  
: >;.: ;,' )(,: i:, :*;.: ,:,;-,7Jj.?-.!;4. .; ;i, ;.:.,<:2: . !(; ;,,; :: 
agreement. Shouldn't the proper procedure be to obtain an agreement rather 
ent of the cardholder? 
pps and Carroll, since 
' there is no con ed under both Idaho and 
. . ~ ~ ~ 
Delaware law. 
:.:$( :;>:: ;, 6: 2: .  ;:> ;.: L.': 
provision. This position is illogical, as "any 
BNA's argument that 
n contracts less than 
es that a Delaware 
than $100,000. The 
Delaware choice-o is void ab inifio. 
MBNA's assertion be honored because it 
is in the contract 
. . . , . .  
. - >  <>.<! ... :::;..,;.i:;,y''' ..:, ' , . , 5 ~  
,,. ,: L.,, b ,.,.: ~. , :, .,.:, ~.,,l :i:! ;: i,?!zb,;::>i,i!t ! 
I >  . i . :, # . .  ..? : 
I , ,  . . : .  . . .  . ' . ~  .. . . . .  . . .  . . r i  . . . . .f,.J@: .q ;. , : ,,:,* . *  , 2 ,~ :.. :!;<:?,",?' .: .,i;.: !,,, , f::T$ (!, ,,* .:> !.:?:;.; ~: 
, , :  ,:,; [ ,.>$ 'tyu((&'[;;L$:: c;l;~l.t.;~:-,~~ .; $ .>;&/;::;,<);,f; 
1:. ,.: .: ,.,? .:;. 
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choice-of-law provisiori~,:is , ..,. lili~voi$e~~wi'~Kout . : . , . .  , .. ,... rn tract provision lacks 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  ; ;  ..... .,,:2,:j::,,,, . :  
legality, it is void. No. , . state . . . . .  wil~:&$~~giiize, .:.. ..... %. ... a contract . . .  provision prohibited by law. 
. . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  
. . CQMMON LAW 
;;. ..'..>?>. $.! >:::.,<::! , . :' .. . .  
8 r ,  . ', , .~.3?*t:. u.,.s . , 8 . , , : , r  \ ' ,  
MBNA states, "That a . . cqntrgctrequires , . . ~ ,  . ,  . . an .,,. offer, . .  acceptance, etc. has 
, . 
never been in issue." This s~F:fem~j-it!is.~also .... ~ : , , ,  a,::. fi tttue I , . . ~ ~ ~ c i ~  !J$S has been the issue 
. . 
from the beginning. MBWA se&ms:~o: ., . , ,  , ,  htitd itself above-the ,%,,<;.: . '  law, asserting that it 
. , ... 
can urlilaterally ameh~a,co,ntractwit~:any~terms , , . , , : ,  . it wishes . , .  , .. without expressed 
consent of the cardhdlder: , %  . . The reason .... . . .  we. have . acotkmon . , ,  . law of contracts is to 
. . . .  .: . . .  , .  . . . . .  
act as a barrier to suc s6naQJe,;unethical and immoral acts 
. . . .  . .  . . ; .. :.. , . ,  : , . . . l , j  > i . ....?.. * 
in which MBNA currentlyindulges. MBNAs statkmgnvhat "General common 
law principles are also ina ch as statutes and cases 
cited above) addresses t uous. 
. . . . .  
: .,:~.,.. , '  
This Court has be 'rwbf'i$t'6$retk1tions of the clause 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  : . , . t ;.tp,..t,>,,. . , ,> -.. . :  . .  :;, , . $  . . .  
allowing amendments in the cardholder agreenient. MBNA argues tbat the 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
greement, even though 
such right is n e. Capps and Carroll 
argue that the amend, but rather, is 
consistent with a contract' uires a "meeting of the 
minds" for acceptance, ly lacking in this case. 
Thesc? two arguments in use is ambiguous. An 
ambiguous clause in a lved in favor of the 
consumer, rather t g position, who also 
constructed the co 
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This Court hasalso ith Delaware statute Title 5 §952(a). 
. . . , 
MBNA also argues that this statute provides a unilateral right to amend the 
agreement, even though such right is not specifically stated in the statute. Capps 
< .  ' , , 
, , . , . . . 
and Carroll argue that thestQti& is;ikd:$ '~tatuteili''$h6~ation of the common 
. .  , . , , , . .  
. . , . 
law, but rather, is also consistentwith .. a . contract . of adhesion, which still requires 
: . .. . .. . 
, .  , . , / : , 
~ . ,  
a "meeting of the minds" for acceptan*, . .  , .  , .  a requirement which is also obviously 
,: . . 
:i ,.  , . . , ,  . . .  
lacking in this case. These two arguments indicate that the wording of the 
statute is also ambigu o to be construed in favor 
. .. 
i ,: ( ' 2  
of' the consumer. 
As pointed Capps and Carroll was 
timely filed and soughtto' fulfils the basic 
, . 
, !;;.;;:r;:;lc7:j ,,,., $ , :.,, ;.L ; '.: ... t i " ,  Y . l i ' . .  .. ., ... 
requirements of the Idahr, stsitutes. MBNA's ck of a motion to vacate 
. . . . .,:, ;(,,; ::;!,<,,.>;.':;::,r ;.:,, . . . , . . , \(. ,., 
is disingenuous. MBNA @a.itednior;e than9 the time of notification of 
,~ .: . :i.$:>$:;, . j.,f~:<,, l'3;..l:'., c.. 
the award letter to file for confirmat~on of tfje ng any motion to vacate 
. . ..:,'.';:,;i>;;8:s .c,(';!#,\;;'.;':.;:i:- :. 
time barred. The only choice Capps'and Ca 
:::! ".', , , ..! ,. ', 
to file suit within the 90 
, , . . C  : 
day limit, which was done. 
that Plaintiff ad nts do not contest this; 
are patent lies. Capps 
and Carroll hav 
07/14/2016 07:37 PAX - -- 
Delaware statute and improperly attempted to amend the cardholder agreement 
to incl~lde an arbitration provi,s&fil.:.T,Qere . , is no agre.ernent . . . . .  that MBNA added an 
, . 
arbitration provi anner'provided by:Delaware law. That is the 
. . . .  .. , .  .:. 
very substance &$$sand ~ a v ~ o j ~ f ~ h i c h  is before this court, 
. . 
Capps and Carroll also assert'tbat a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the 
contract is not valid by Delaware statute T~tle 6 §2708(c). 
CONCLUSION 
MBNA has improperly attempted to add an arbitration provision to its 
cardholder agreement in such a way as to avoid having to secure the knowing 
....... . . : . , . . < . .  L. ..... 
and actual consent of its c&dhoiders.' Such an attempt should not be validated 
.... . . , .  . 
by this court. MB f-law provision in its 
contract when it eit t such a provision was 
. . 
prohibited by ~e la i f a i e  1s;. MBNA has then attempted to convince this court 
. .  ;,\?./.... <. : e I . .  : 
that it should honor the very same Delaware choice-of-law provision that is 
clearly prohibited by Delaware law. MBNA has repeatedly lied and misstated 
, . " . s : , .  
facts hafore this court in anapparent effort to validate 'its improper actions and 
. . . .  . . . . . .  
false assertions. MBNA s it from its lies, improper 
actions and false assertions. that this court will 
reconsider its deci ositi~n . ,  $ttie .., agreement , to arbitrate, arid 
subsequently vac gaini.t"th&. 
, . .  , . , '. ;', a. ,. . . . . . .  
. , .  . ., , .  . . ,.. ,; . :,:, . ' :  :\...: ... . ,  
Dated this 6 'rfldai'ofrNove&er, 2 0 6 .  
. .. .:: . . .  , >  . . 
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P.O. Box 1544 ~ . . :.. 
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PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ). 
1 Case No. CV-36747 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs . ) POST-HEARING 
) MEMORAMDUM 










DAVID F. CAPPS, 1 
) 
Defendant, ) 
COMES NOW Miriam G. Carroll and David F. Capps, respectfully 
submitting this POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM for the Court's consideration. 
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WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS 
The alleged arbitration clause which MBNA America Bank, N.A 
(hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) attempted to add to their cardholder 
agreement has significance beyond the context of contractual additions or 
modifications. The alleged arbitration clause also waives a constitutionally 
protected right, specifically the Seventh Amendment right to a Trial by Jury 
Judicial decisions regarding waiver of substantive rights clearly establish 
that such waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Arbitration 
agreements in medical clinic practice are routinely signed by the patient, and yet, 
as the Supreme Court of Nevada held in Obstetrics and Gynecologisfs Wixted, 
Flanagan and Robinson v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 
"The contents of both affidavits are perfectly consistent with the conclusion 
that the agreement was never explained to respondent. On these facts 
the district court may well have found that respondent did not give an 
informed consent to the agreement and that no meeting of the minds 
occurred." 
The court decided that the arbitration clause, even though signed by the patient, 
was not valid due to the lack of a clear understanding of the arbitration provision 
where there was no "meeting of the minds" 
In a similar case, Broemmer V. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 
P.2d 1013, the Supreme Court of Arizona also held that the signed arbitration 
agreement was not valid by stating, 
"The facts in the instant case present an even stronger argument in favor 
of holding the agreement unenforceable that do the facts in Pepper. In 
both cases, plaintiffs stated that they did not recall signing the agreement 
to arbitrate or having it explained to them." 
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"Clearly, there was no conspicuous or explicit waiver of the fundamental 
right to a jury trial or any evidence that such rights were knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived." 
Even in the dissenting opinion, the justices clearly stated, 
"The dissent is concerned that our decision today sends a 'mixed 
message.' It is, however, our intent to send a clear message. That 
message is: Contracts of adhesion will not be enforced unless they are 
conscionable and within the reasonable expectations of the parties. This 
is a well-established principle of contract law; today we merely apply it to 
the undisputed facts of the case before us." 
In Hooters of America, lnc., v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, 
"The agreement to arbitrate was subject to rescission by defendant 
employee because plaintiff employer had breached its duty to establish 
fair rules governing the arbitration proceedings by establishing completely 
one-sided and biased rules which could not be called arbitration." 
"The rules established by defendant were entirely one-sided and were 
calculated to produce a biased proceeding and result. The court noted 
especially the fact that plaintiff employer was entitled to select not just its 
own arbitrator, but the entire panel from which the employee's arbitrator 
would be chosen and from which the third, neutral, arbitrator would be 
selected. The court said that the adoption of biased rules was a breach of 
the implied duty of good faith in exercising the power to establish 
arbitration rules." 
"Contractual discretion is presumptively bridled by the law of contracts - 
by the covenant of good faith implied in every contract." "Good faith 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency 
with the justified expectations of the other party. Bad faith includes the 
evasion of the spirit of the bargain and an abuse of a power to specify 
terms." 
In Hooters, the employee had signed the arbitration agreement on two separate 
occasions. But because of bias in the arbitration procedure, the employee was 
allowed to rescind the arbitration agreement. 
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Capps and Carroll have not signed an agreement to arbitrate, have no 
conscious knowledge of an agreement to arbitrate, have not volunteered 
knowingly, and have not intelligently given assent to any kind of agreement to 
arbitrate. MBNA has sent the alleged notice of arbitration in such a manner so 
as to obscure the existence of an agreement to arbitrate from the vast majority of 
its cardholders. This leaves the bulk of MBNA cardholders without voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of their constitutionally protected Seventh 
Amendment rights. Without that higher level of consent, the alleged arbitration 
agreement is not valid. 
In addition, Capps and Carroll had no expectation that MBNA would 
attempt to remove their constitutionally protected rights by a unilateral 
amendment to the cardholder agreement. Such a move on the part of MBNA is 
clearly in bad faith to the original agreement between the parties, making the 
attempted arbitration agreement invalid. Businesses seeking to require 
employees or customers to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment or 
conducting business obtain the signature of the individual on an arbitration 
agreement. Instead, MBNA has opted to include its notice as a bill stuffer, 
knowing that a large majority of cardholders would never see the notice. In this 
day of sophisticated communications, and with the resources of MBNA, there is 
no excuse for this deceptive and ineffective approach. 
The National Arbitration Forum (NAF), a private corporation, selected by 
MBNA for all disputes, is biased in favor of MBNA, making any determination by 
the NAF invalid. While the NAF has placed itself in a position to replace the court 
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and jury system, it has not held itself to any meaningful standard of fairness, 
justice or accountability. In a case in the United states District Court, Natalie 
Baron sought discovery on the alleged bias of the NAF. The NAF refused to 
comply with the requests, even when ordered to do so by the district court, 
claiming, among other things, that the NAF was a quasi-government entity which 
was immune from the discovery process. How can a private corporation which 
lied to the district court and refused to honor a court order be depended on to 
render an unbiased and fair decision? The Amicus Brief of Trial Lawyers for 
Public Justice in Natalie Baron's case concerning NAF bias is provided for your 
convenience. 
The waiver of constitutionally protected rights is a serious matter which 
stands far and above the normal constraints of contractual notice. Without a 
clear and demonstrable "meeting of the minds", the waiver of a person's seventh 
amendment right to a trial by jury cannot be validated. The evidence presented 
by MBNA falls far short of the basic requirements for a waiver of this protected 
right. No evidence has been presented of a "meeting of the minds" on 
arbitration. None exists. Without that evidence, the waiver cannot be voluntary, 
knowing or intelligent, and the alleged arbitration provision cannot be valid. 
Dated this / 3 day of November, 2005. 
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Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
this POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM to the attorney for the Defendanuplaintiff 
MBNA this _IYr2 day of November, 2006, by Certified Mail 
# 7QQS jf&? ~ Q Z  7630 1&S$i at the following address. 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise. ID 83701 
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INTEREST OF AMlCl 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice ("TLPJ") is a national public interest law firm that 
specializes in precedent setting and socially significant civil litigation and is dedicated to 
pursuing justice for the victims of corporate and governmental abuses. 
The American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP) is a non-profit organization with 
approximately 32 million members aged 50 and older. As the largest membership 
organization serving older Americans, AARP is greatly concerned about unfair and 
deceptive practices in the financial services and credit markets. AARP thus supports 
laws and public policies to protect consumers' rights and to preserve the means for 
them to seek legal redress when they are hBrmed in the marketplace. 
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA) is a national voluntary bar 
association of approximately 50,000 attorneys practicing in every state, including the 
State of Florida. ATLA members primarily represent plaintiffs in personal injury, civil 
rights, consumer rights and employment discrimination cases. ATLA believes that a 
neutral decision maker, whether it is the court or an arbitrator, is essential to the 
protection of these rights. 
The National Association of Consumer Advocates ("NACA) is a non-profit corporation 
whose members are private and public sector attorneys, legal services attorneys, and 
law professors and students whose primary practice involves the protection and 
representation of consumers. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In light of the fact that the parties to this appeal have already extensively briefed the 
facts, this amicus brief will only touch upon a few salient facts that inform the argument 
set out below. 
Plaintiff Natalie Baron filed this case as a putative class action under the Truth in 
Lending Act ("TILA) against Best Buy Co. ("Best Buy"), Beneficial National Bank USA, 
Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co. and Virginia Surety Company, Inc. ("the insurers"). 
The defendants moved to compel arbitration, alleging that Baron had agreed to submit 
all claims that she might have against the defendants to mandatory arbitration before 
the National Arbitration Forum ("NAP). Defendants' motion was supported by an 
affidavit from NAF's Curtis Brown, Vice President and General Counsel. 
Baron sought discovery from NAF, requesting documents relating to the factual 
underpinnings of Brown's affidavit and to potential bias by NAF. NAF refused to answer 
Baron's discovery requests, and refused to comply with Baron's subpoena alleging, 
among other things, that it was a quasi-governmental entity that was "immune" from the 
discovery process. NAF petitioned the U.S. District Court in Minnesota to quash Baron's 
subpoena. A Magistrate Judge in that court denied NAF's motion and ordered it to 
produce the requested information. NAF still refused to answer Baron's discovery 
queries, and appealed the Magistrate's ruling to the District Court in Minnesota. That 
court also ordered NAF to comply with the subpoena. Because the District Court in this 
case had already taken the motion to compel arbitration under advisement, however, 
NAF never responded to discovery requests. 
Despite this refusal, Baron placed some evidence relating to NAF's neutrality before the 
trial court. This evidence included a letter dated January 14, 1999, from Brown to a 
prospective financial industry client to solicit business ("the Brown letter"). This letter 
states in the first sentence that "A number of courts around the country have held that a 
properly-drafted arbitration clause in credit applications and agreements eliminates 
class actions and ensures that credit-related lawsuits will be directed to arbitration, not a 
jury trial." (emphasis in original). The Brown Letter promises that NAF arbitration "a 
make a positive impact on the bottom line." (emphasis in original). 
Baron also placed into evidence a 1999 deposition of Clinton Walker, General Counsel 
of First USA Bank, reflecting upon NAF's relationship with that bank. The deposition 
reveals, at 98-99, that lawyers at First USA communicate with NAF "from time to time"; 
and at 102-103, that First USA has initiated more than 40,000 arbitrations against 
consumers with NAF in collection matters, but that fewer than 10 consumers have 
initiated arbitrations against First USA with NAF. First USA has paid NAF at least $2 
million in fees. Id. at 108. 
The U.S. District Court hearing this case decided that it could resolve the defendants' 
motion to compel arbitration without waiting for the NAF to respond to Baron's discovery 
requests. The District Court denied the motion to compel arbitration, citing (among other 
things), concerns with the neutrality of the NAF, and holding that Best Buy's arbitration 
clause is unconscionable. 
In our capacity as amici, we attach as Exhibits to this brief several similar letters, 
excerpts from depositions and other materials that have surfaced in other lawsuits 
around the country that provide further support for the District Court's concerns about 
NAF's neutrality. Amici suggest that this material is illustrative of the sort of information 
that might have been developed if discovery had not been resisted and delayed in this 
case. 
Exhibit 1 hereto is an attachment to the Brown Letter that was not in the record below. 
This attachment, on NAF letterhead, compares NAF with the American Arbitration 
Association ("AAA"). Among the differences noted is that NAF limits awards to the 
amount of the claim, that NAF only permits consolidation with the agreement of all 
parties, that it is easier to get a default under NAF's rules than with the AAA's rules, and 
that NAF's Uniform Rules give less power to individual arbitrators than do AAA's rules. 
Exhibit 2 hereto is a letter dated April 16, 1998, from Roger Haydock, Director of 
Arbitration at NAF, to Alan Kaplinskyl ("the Haydock Letter"). The Haydock Letter 
warns that the "class action bar" is threatening to bring lawsuits involving the Y2K issue, 
and states that the "only thing" (emphasis in original) that will "prevent" such suits is the 
adoption of an NAF arbitration clause "in every contract, note and security agreement." 
In an attachment to the Haydock Letter, NAF lists numerous officials of lenders and 
lawyers who specialize in defending lenders as "lnformation Resources" whom new 
prospective clients should contact for endorsements. One of these "Resources" is 
Kaplinsky, who is counsel on the amicus brief filed in support of defendants in this case 
by the American Bankers Association, the American Financial Services Association and 
the Consumer Bankers Association ("The Bankers' Amicus Br ief ' ) .  Another "Resource" 
is Christopher Lipsett of the law firm of Wilmer'Cutler & Pickering. Lipsett is counsel on 
the amicus brief filed in support of defendants in this case by Thomas Lambros and 
William Sessions. Taken together, ail of the amicus briefs in support of defendants in 
this case are either written by paid counsel for the NAF itself or for persons who serve 
as "lnformation Resources" for NAF. No consumer advocates or consumer attorneys 
are listed as an "lnformation Resource." 
This attachment to the Haydock Letter also states that NAF provides arbitration services 
for nearly 20 lenders, including Banc One, Beneficial Financial Bank, First North 
American National Bank, and TMI Financial. 
Another attachment to the Haydock Letter urges companies to reduce their "collection 
costs" by hiring the NAF and "[slaving the money you've been spending on court costs, 
attorney fees, and discovery." 
Exhibit 4 hereto is a letter dated October 20, 1997 from Edward Anderson of NAF to a 
prospective client (hereafter "The Anderson LetterU).3 Documents taken from the 1994 
Bankruptcy Petition of NAF's corporate parent, Equilaw, Inc., Exhibit 5 hereto, indicate 
that Mr. Anderson was then a Director, officer, and major shareholder of Equilaw. (He 
then owned 4,500 of the 10,000 total shares in Equilaw.) A deposition of Mr. Anderson 
taken in1994 indicates that prior to coming to NAF, he was Assistant General Counsel 
to ITT Consumer Financial Corporation.4Anderson Deposition Excerpt, Exh. 6, at 12. 
Mr. Anderson first learned of Equilaw and NAF when ITT was considering hiring these 
companies to provide arbitration services for it. Id. at 19. ITT did, in fact, hire NAF and 
Equilaw. Id. at 44. 
The Anderson Letter states that "major American companies are moving all of their 
contracts to an arbitration basis as fast as possible. There is no reason for your clients 
to be exposed to the costs and risks of the jury system." It goes on to state "Every 
award is limited to the amount claimed!" (emphasis in original). Attached to the 
Anderson Letteris a "Legal Memorandum" from "Forum Counsel" on the subject of 
"Arbitration & Class Actions in Financing." The memo advises that "In the court system, 
financing transactions are always at risk for Class Action treatment. . . ." It further 
advises that "Most often, the claims of class action plaintiffs' lawyers are based on 
printed or computer-generated documents or standard procedure manuals, which leave 
little room to argue against 'commonality' and 'typicality."' The memo states that "no ;g"-~~3<<..;4c"*&;~,><;g;',$*,.2? ,>'~w,; >,.. ~ Erg*. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT NAF IS LIKELY TO BE BIASED IN 
FAVOR OF CORPORATIONS IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, SUCH AS 
DEFENDANTS. 
A. NAF HAS MADE INAPPROPRIATE PROMISES TO COMPANIES IN THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY. 
NAF has evidenced a likely bias in favor of financial services companies by engaging in 
inappropriate ex parte contacts soliciting business from financial institutions. Instead of 
communicating with these companies as a truly neutral decision maker, NAF's 
solicitations to financial services companies and their defense counsel communicate a 
strong sympathy for those companies. NAF's solicitations suggest that consumer 
lawsuits are a battle between the companies and their customers, and that NAF will be 
taking the companies' side in "improving their bottom line" in that battle. The letters 
described above establish that NAF officials solicit new business by promising 
prospective business clients and their counsel that its procedures will favor their 
interests relative to those of their consumers in adjudicating any future dispute. 
1. The "No Class Action" Promise. 
As set forth above, the Brown Letter promises in its first sentence that NAF will 
"eliminate" class actions. The Haydock Letter promises that the NAF will "prevent" Y2K 
class actions. The attachment to the Anderson Letter coaches businesses in how to 
avoid class actions by hiring NAF. 
Why does NAF keep hammering this theme? Why does the Brown Letter put the "no 
class action" promise in the first sentence, underscored, emphasizing its importance? 
The answer is simple: NAF is promising would-be banking clients that it will protect 
them from significant potential liabilities by "preventing" (the language of the Anderson 
Letter) consumers with small claims from having any meaningful means of relief. NAF is 
effectively promising lenders that its procedures will insulate them from a broad 
category of potential liabilities. 
The well-recognized realrty is that it is not economically feasible for consumers to 
pursue relatively small claims on an indiv~dual basis against a large bank. Very few, if 
any, consumer attorneys are financially able to pursue individual claims for modest 
sums (such as the TlLA claim at issue here) against large, powerful companies such as 
defendants. And, when a consumer's individual claims are small, it is economically 
infeasible for them to hire an attorney to represent their interests on a billable hour 
basis. 
Consumer attorneys are, however, often able and willing to pursue such claims on a 
class action basis. When similar claims are aggregated, the amount in controversy 
becomes sufficiently large to enable consumers to locate counsel who will represent 
them and defend their interests. Indeed, there have been several cases across the 
nation in recent years where charge card companies were held accountable for 
widespread wrongdoing through consumer class actions. 
If plaintiffs are denied a class action remedy, then they will likely be denied any 
meaningful remedy for most wrongs that defendants might commit against them 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem 
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action 
prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an 
attorney's) labor. 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, the arbitration clause here does not offer consumers just another forum for 
resolving disputes; rather it immunizes defendants from meaningful legal accountability. 
It is impossible to imagine a state or federal court sending out a letter to consumer 
attorneys noting that class actions often lead to big recoveries, and then guaranteeing 
that it would certify any case as a class action (even if individual issues predominated 
over common issues in the consumers' cases) if only the consumer attorneys would 
bring their cases in and pay fees to that court. The result would be public outrage, 
banner media headlines, ethical inquiries and possibly even impeachment. The NAF 
has essentially done just this, however, with the one difference that it has made its 
promises of preferential treatment to the likely defendants of class actions. 
2. Other Promises of Preferential Treatment. 
The Brown and Anderson Letters prominently promote NAF's rule limiting awards to the 
amount of the original claim as a principle advantage to the companies of choosing the 
NAF as arbitrator. The strong suggestion is that this provision favors the companies 
being solicited and disfavors their consumers. Under this rule, no matter what 
information the plaintiff develops in discovery, his or her claim is capped at the initial 
demand. The nature of financial services litigation, however, is that the full extent of a 
company's wrongdoing (and thus the damages that would be appropriate to award the 
plaintiff) often cannot be known until the plaintiff has had an opportunity to pursue 
reasonable discovery. Complex fraud schemes, for example, can generally only be 
identified after layers of deceit and obfuscation are peeled away and the true facts are 
made known. NAF's rule capping awards at the amount of the original claim is 
particularly pernicious because NAF's rules pressure consumers to reduce the amount 
of their claim at the outset of a case. NAF's rule achieves this end by tying its fee 
schedule to the amount of the claim and increasing the fees levied rapidly as the 
amount of the claim increases. 
An attachment to the Haydock Letter also urges potential financial services clients to 
hire the NAF to "sav[e] the money you've been spending on . . . discovery." Why does 
NAF promise lenders that it will restrict discovery? Because NAF (and the lenders) 
know that most plaintiffs in significant banking litigation cannot prove their cases without 
access to full and fair discovery. Consumers have the burden of proof, but few 
borrowers with valid legal claims have independent access to a lender's documents 
Sharp limits on discovery will mean that many consumers will have little chance to 
effectively pursue their claims. 
Finally, as noted above, the Brown Letter promises that NAF arbitrators will not decide 
cases on "equity," unlike "some other arbitration providers." The plaintiff in this case has 
asserted equitable claims as well as claims at law for damages, however, as she is 
entitled to do under TILA. NAF's promise not to consider equity appears to undermine a 
fundamental purpose of many consumer lawsuits and most consumer statutes to use 
the tools of equitable relief to require wrongdoers to correct their illegal practices. 
3. NAF'S Solicitations Make General Promises to Business Clients of Preferential 
Treatment. 
Several of NAF's solicitations suggest that it is likely to favor lenders in their disputes 
with their consumers. The Anderson Letter, for example, urges would-be clients not to 
expose themselves "to the costs and risks of the jury system." The attachment to that 
letter offers free legal advice on how lenders can defeat class actions where common 
questions predominate and the class representatives' claims are typical. The approach 
of the Anderson Letter is not that of an entity committed to even-handed judging of 
disputes, but instead that of a for-profit vendor soliciting lucrative work by advising 
lenders how it can help them reduce their liabilities (avoid the "risks of the jury system"). 
This suggestion is of a piece with the Brown Letter's promise to improve a client's 
"bottom line." 
The Haydock Letter similarly characterizes the prospect of Y2K lawsuits as a battle 
between "the class action bar" and lenders. The letter suggests that NAF takes the 
lenders' side in that battle, urging defense counsel for lenders to use the NAF as a 
means of foiling "the class action bar."5 
B. NAF HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH LENDERS. 
It may be true, as defendants' amici argue, that all for-profit arbitrators compete for 
business. Nonetheless, it is clear here that NAF is particularly dependent upon one 
group of businesses the financial services companies and that it's fervor for that 
business has led it to make inappropriate promises to those businesses. 
The attachment to the Haydock Letter boasts that NAF provides arbitration services for 
numerous lenders and financial institutions, and it relies upon lenders and their defense 
counsel for referrals t o  new clients. NAF knows that there are numerous other providers 
of arbitration services (indeed, the Brown Letter reflects its competition with AAA). NAF 
also knows that if its arbitrators were to rule for consumers too often by the standards of 
the financial sewices industries and its defense lawyers, or enter awards for consumers 
that were too large by those standards, these companies would cancel their lucrative 
contracts with and refuse to further endorse NAF. A few pro-consumer rulings, and NAF 
could go from its current multi-million dollar business tight back to the bankruptcy court 
where it languished in 1994. 
Nor do NAF's relationships with persons self-identified as defense counsel for lenders 
appear to be mere coincidence. In the letters described above, NAF appears to reflect 
the published attitudes of its sponsor and "information Resource" Alan Kaplinsky. In an 
article entitled "Excuse me, but who's the predator: Banks can use arbitration clauses 
as a defense," Bus. Law. 24 (MayIJune 1998), attached as Exhibit 7 hereto, Kaplinsky 
wrote that "Consumers have been ganging up on banks. But now the institutions have 
found a way to defend themselves." Id. at 24. The article makes clear that mandatory 
arbitration is this "defense" for financial institutions against consumer claims, and notes 
that "Arbitration is a powerful deterrent to class action lawsuits. . . ." Id. 24-26. See also 
Kaplinsky, "Alternative to Litigation Attracting Consumer Financial Services 
Companies," Consumer Financial Services L. Report (1 997) (Exhibit 8 hereto) ("[iln an 
attempt to eliminate the risks inherent in litigation and discourage future lawsuits, many 
consumer financial services companies have implemented arbitration programs." 
(emphasis added) Consumers looking for truly neutral, independent decisionmakers 
might well ask if Kaplinsky would recommend NAF to clients such as First USA, write 
briefs (as here) for banking trade associations "applauding" NAF and lend his name to 
NAF promotion as an "Information Resource," if he did not feel that NAF would serve 
his twice-published objective of serving as a "defense" for lenders against consumer 
lawsuits. 
The facts set forth above relating to NAF's relationship with ITT Consumer Financial 
("ITT") also suggest that NAF views its role as one to help defend lenders rather than to 
neutrally judge consumer disputes. Shortly after ITT hired NAF to handle its disputes, 
Anderson left his job of defending ITT against consumer suits and became one of NAF's 
three principal officers and a 45% shareholder. Despite his prior role with ITT and his 
prominence within NAF, however, NAF continued to handle ITT disputes, albeit in a 
manner which suggests that it was not remarkably attentive to matters of conflict of 
interest.5 Similarly, Anderson testified that he saw no problem in having an arbitration 
company in which he owned 45% of the stock hear disputes involving another company 
of which he was president. Exhibit 6 at 58. NAF's friendly handling of ITT cases is 
further illustrated by Patterson v. ITT ConsumerFinancial Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 
(1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176 (1994). In that case, a California court refused to 
enforce ITT's arbitration clause where it found that NAF's rules would have required the 
consumer plaintiffs to travel from California to Minnesota to have their claims heard, and 
would require a consumer with a dispute over a $2,000 loan to pay a minimum fee of 
$850. The court noted that "the procedure seems designed to discourage borrowers 
from responding at all." 
Taken as a whole, these facts are not suggestive of a scrupulous attention to 
independence, neutrality, or the appearance of propriety. 
C. NAF'S CONDUCT IN THIS LITIGATION FURTHER SUGGESTS A 
PREDISPOSITION TOWARDS THESE DEFENDANTS. 
NAF's cooperation with the defendants in this case further illustrates its close 
relationship with the financial services industry. While NAF refused to answer any of the 
plaintiff's discovery requests in this case, asserting sweeping and novel privileges 
(including a supposed "quasi-governmental entity" privilege),' at the same time it was 
communicating ex parte with defense counsel to provide them with an affidavit 
supporting their position. NAF's notion that it can testify for defendants but not answer 
any questions about its testimony suggests not only a favoritism towards the 
defendants, but also a disregard for rudimentary due process that can only be described 
as troubling in a body that seeks to displace the civil justice system 
Imagine an analogous setting, if defendants had filed a motion asking the chief judge of 
a court to order a judge recused. Then, imagine, in this hypothetical, the trial judge and 
the plaintiff's counsel talking and working together to create a coordinated response 
opposing that motion. No one would doubt that such ex parte cooperation would be 
improper. Yet the NAF which seeks to put itself in the place of the American civil justice 
system has apparently engaged in just such contacts here. 
D. THE ISSUE OF NAF LIKELY BIAS IS NOT MOOTED BY THE ASSERTED 
INDEPENDENCE OF ITS ARBITRATORS. 
Several of the defendants (and their amic) argue that it does not matter whether the 
director and officials running the NAF are biased. Even if the principals of the NAF are 
substantially biased in favor of financial services companies, these parties argue, it is of 
no moment because the actual arbitrators are independent and neutral. 
These remarkable arguments have no merit. The facts set forth above suggest that at 
least three of NAF's principals and highest ranking officers (Anderson, Haydock, and 
Brown) have effectively expressed a likely favoritism towards NAF's corporate clients 
and against their customers. The record here demonstrates that these persons will have 
ample ability to act upon those impulses. 
For one thing, NAF's Director of Arbitration selects the arbitrator to hear a given dispute, 
a power wh~ch contains enormous potential for abuse. Suppose that the local rules of 
some court allowed plaintiff's counsel (but not defense counsel) to exercise the sole 
power to select which judge of that court (or more appropriately, which member of that 
court's bar) would hear a given case. Would anyone imagine that these defendants and 
their banker amici would term such a procedure "neutral?" Of course not. In fact, the 
case law discussed below establishes that any system allowing a biased party the sole 
power to select an arbitrator is not fair or neutral, and cannot be allowed. 
In addition to the power to select the arbitrator, the current version of the NAF rules (as 
reviewed on NAF's website on January 20, 2000) extend all sorts of other crucial 
powers to NAF's director and staff, refuting the claim that NAF bias "does not matter." 
The Rules give the Director the ability to grant extensions (9.D), hear motions (18), alter 
fees for intervention and hearings (19.B, 19.C), select arbitrators (21), decide requests 
to disqualify arbitrators (23), set the length of hearings (26), issue orders, including at 
his own initiative (38), request involuntary dismissal of a claim (41), waive fees (45), 
request sanctions (46), interpret the code (48.A), and change the code (48.F). 
II.WHERE THERE IS EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT A PARTICULAR 
ARBITRATION SERVICE PROVIDER IS LIKELY TO BE BIASED IN FAVOR OF ONE 
PARTY TO A DISPUTE, A CLAUSE REQUIRING THAT THE DISPUTE BE HANDLED 
BY THAT PROVIDER IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
A. UNCONSCIONABLE ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE'UNENFORCEABLE. 
The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is to "place arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 24 (1991). The FAA provides that a written arbitration provision covering a 
contract involving commerce "shall be valid . . .save upon any grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2. Accordingly, the FAA provides 
that arbitration agreements may be challenged and invalidated on any generally 
applicable contract principle. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that state 
contract law defenses such as unconscionability are available to a party challenging an 
arbitration agreement. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 51 7 U.S. 681, 687 
(1996). Also, courts, not arbitrators, decide the validity of an arbitration provision. 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. 
The proposition that courts shall not enforce arbitration clauses that are unconscionable 
under a state's general law of contracts is not controversial, and courts regularly refuse 
to enforce such arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165 
(Cal. 1990); Powertel v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. App. 1999); lwen v. U.S. West 
Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999); Williams v. Aefna Finance Co., 700 N.E.2d 859 
(Ohio 1998), cert. denied, 11 9 S. Ct. 1357 (1 999); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 
1996); Arnold v. United Companies Lending Co., 51 1 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998). 
Appellants and their amici argue that the District Court did not articulate sufficient 
evidence to support its finding that the contract here was unconscionable. The District 
Court's failure to explicitly identify various pieces of evidence is of little moment, 
however, as "reversal is inappropriate if the ruling of the district court can be affirmed on 
any grounds, regardless of whether those grounds were used by the district court." 
Matter of Locklin, 101 F.3d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1996). 
B. A CLAUSE SENDING A DISPUTE TO A BIASED ARBITRATION SERVICE 
PROVIDER IS UNCONSCIONABLE. 
It is clear that arbitration clauses that require arbitration by non-neutral arbitrators are 
unconscionable, and hence unenforceable.8 In Graham, for example, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that "a contractual party may not act in the capacity of 
arbitrator and a contractual provision which designates him to serve in that capacity is to 
be denied enforcement on grounds of unconscionability." Graham, 623 P.2d at 177. 
This is so because "irrespective of any proof of actual bias or prejudice, the law 
presumes that a party to a dispute cannot have that disinterestedness and impartiality 
necessary to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity regarding that controversy." Id. at 
175 (citation omitted). Similarly, the court went on, a person cannot serve as arbitrator 
if, even though he is not a party to the contract, his "interests are so allied with those of 
[a] party [to the contract] that, for all practical purposes, he is subject to the same 
disabilities which prevent the party himself from serving." Id. at 177. Concluding that the 
designated arbitrator was in a position where it could not be expected to arbitrate with 
the required degree of "disinterestedness and impartiality," the court declined to enforce 
the arbitration provision before it. Id. at 178. 
The California Supreme Court is by no means alone in refusing to compel arbitration in 
settings where the arbitrators' neutrality were compromised.' In Hooters of America, lnc. 
v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit refused to compel arbitration 
in a case where an employer's arbitration rules were "crafted to ensure a biased 
decisionmaker." Id. at 938. Noting that the employer had complete control over the 
selection of two of the three arbitrators on a panel, to the point where even managers of 
the employer could be on the list of arbitrators, the court noted that "the selection of an 
impartial decisionmaker would be a surprising result." Id. at 939. Accordingly, the court 
(which in general expressed fervent admiration for arbitration) held that the employer 
had created "a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration," and thus held 
that the employer had breached its contractual obligation to provide an impartial arbitral 
forum. See also Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. I ,  743 F.2d 1187 (7th 
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (arbitrator not independent where she or he was 
to be picked by and paid by union); Cheng-Canindan v. Renaissance HotelAssocs., 57 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied, 1997 Cal. LEXlS 817 (1997) (procedure 
was so dominated by an employer that it did not even qualify as arbitration and would 
not be compelled); Ditto v. Re/Max PreferredProperties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1993) (where only one party had a voice in selection of arbitrator, clause would not 
be enforced); in re Cross & Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (App. Div. 1957) (not 
enforcing an arbitration agreement between a real estate broker and his employer 
because it appointed the employer's Board of Directors as arbitrator. This contravened 
the "well-recognized principle of 'natural justice' that a man may not be a judge in his 
own cause."); Board of Educ. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439,443 (W. Va. 
1977) (finding exclusive control over selection of arbitrators by one party inherently 
inequitable). In these cases, courts presumed bias from connections between one party 
and the arbitrators, but this case is even clearer, as the arbitrator has effective promised 
certain results to one party. 
C. THE QUESTION OF UNCONSClONABlLlTY IS TO BE DETERMINED BEFORE 
AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCED.2 
As set forth above, unconscionable arbitration clauses are not enforced. The proper and 
common practice is for a court to determine the unconscionability of the arbitration 
clause at the time it is challenged, which is typically before the parties submit to 
arbitration. 
Defendants and their amici argue that this Court should hold that the neutrality of an 
arbitrator may not be considered before the parties are forced to arbitrati0n.u E.g. 
Insurers' Brief at 30-21, Bankers' Brief at 15. They support this proposition by drawing 
upon a number of cases where a party seeks to have one arbitrator removed (so 
another might take their place), a situation totally unlike this one, or cases taken from 
the context of claims under 3 10 of the FAA, which provides that arbitration awards may 
be vacated where the arbitrator displayed "evident partiality," or with cases from other 
settings where the parties did not dispute the presence of an enforceable agreement.u 
Since § 10 provides for judicial review of decisions that arbitrators have rendered, it is 
not surprising that some courts identified by defendants and their amici have refused to 
entertain § 10 challenges to an award until after the award has been entered. This fact 
has nothing to do with the situation here, however, where a District Court refused to 
enforce an arbitration clause that it deemed unconscionable, and where the District 
Court questioned the neutrality of the arbitrator. 
Where the existence of an enforceable agreement is challenged, courts have no trouble 
prospectively refusing to enforce arbitration clauses where there are grounds to suspect 
the neutrality of the arbitrator. In Hoofers, for example, the Fourth Circuit had no trouble 
refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that (among other things) allowed one party 
excessive control over the selection of the arbitrator Under the theory of defendants 
and their amici, the Fourth Circuit erred, and should have waited until the arbitrators 
selected by Hooters (even if they had been Hooters' managers) had ruled against the 
waitress before considering whether those arbitrators might be biased in some way. 
Ill. IF THIS COURT DOES NOT AGREE THAT THE ABOVE EVIDENCE 
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES NAF'S BIAS, AND DOES NOT DENY THE MOTION 
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION ON SOME OTHER BASIS, IT SHOULD REMAND FOR 
FURTHER DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF BIAS. 
As noted above, the plaintiff in this case sought discovery directed at questions of NAPS 
bias. There was nothing remarkable about these requests, as courts have recognized 
the right of plaintiffs to take discovery relating to factual issues posed by motions to 
compel arbitration. See Berger v. Canfor Fitzgerald Securities, 942 F. Supp. 963 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); and Wrightson v. ITTFinancial Sews., 617 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1993), rev. denied, 632 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1994). 
Unfortunately, NAF stonewalled plaintiff's discovery requests, producing not one page of 
documents and even refusing to identify its arbitrators. (Imagine the uproar if this Court 
were to insist that the identity of its judges must be kept secret). NAF delayed its 
responses until the discovery requests were moot. 
The delay tactics succeeded only because the District Court determined that these 
answers were unnecessary the motion to compel arbitration could be denied on the 
basis of the existing record. If the District Court erred in that judgment, Baron and the 
other class members should be glven an opportunity to complete their discovery. NAF 
should not be permitted to benefit from its stonewalling. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are entitled to have their claims heard by an impartial decisionmaker. NAF has 
made plain that it does not fit that description. The District Court's concerns about NAF's 
neutrality, and the unconscionability of defendants' arbitration clause, were well 
founded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. Paul Bland, Jr. 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 
1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. # 800 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 797-8600 
Dated: January 24, 2000 
Of counsel: 
Deborah M. Zuckerman 
Stacy J. Canan 
Michael Schuster 
AARP Foundation 
601 E Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20049 
Phone (202) 434-6045 
Fax (202) 434-6424 
Jeffrey White 
ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS 
OF AMERICA 
1050 31st Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20007 
Phone (202) 965-3500 
Fax (202) 965-0920 
Patricia Sturdevant 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER 
ADVOCATES 
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 704 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Phone (202) 332-2500 
Fax (202) 332-4152 
ENDNOTES 
1 Kaplinsky is the "Partner-in-charge" of the Consumer Financial Services Group with 
the law firm Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll. According to this firm's website, its 
"Consumer Financial Services Group has developed one of the pre-eminent and largest 
consumer financial services litigation . . . defense practices in the country, defending 
banks and other financial institutions throughout the United States in class actions and 
other complex litigation." He apparently has supported NAPS business for some time. 
According to the 1998 deposition testimony of Clinton Walker, General Counsel of First 
USA Bank, Kaplinsky was the person who convinced First USA to hire NAF as its 
arbitration service provider. Walker Deposition, Exhibit 3 hereto, at 220-21. 
2 The Bankers' Amicus Brief states at 13 that "[iln the experience of Amici, the NAF is a 
nationally respected independent administrator of arbitrations"; "applaud[s]" NAF's 
services and expresses "confiden[ceIN in NAF's abilities. 
3 The addressee of the letter was deleted when it was received by counsel for amici. 
4 The Haydock Letter lists Randy Decker of ITT Consumer Financial as another of 
NAF's "Information Resources." 
5 NAF's amicus brief in this case boasts at 5-7 that a host of technology companies 
have hired it to resolve disputes related to the Y2K issue. These statements take on a 
very different tilt when viewed in the light of the Haydock Letter. Imagine a group of 
similarly situated claimants with a legally sound, valid claim against a financial institution 
arising from some negligence or error related to the Y2K issue. What confidence could 
they have that NAF would fairly hear their claim, if they learned that NAF officials have 
been telling defense counsel for lenders that NAF will guard lenders against the 
consumer "class action bar" and will "prevent" the lenders from facing significant 
liabilities in this setting? 
6 We refer to two documents from the bankruptcy of Equilaw (NAF's corporate parent 
as of 1994). In Exhibit 9 hereto, an Equilaw official proposes an arbitrator for an ITT 
Commercial Finance Corp. case despite the fact that the arbitrator's law firm 
represented three other ITT corporations. In Exhibit 10 hereto, this Equilaw official 
proposed an arbitrator for another ITT case, even though the arbitrator then represented 
in an "unrelated" case the law firm representing ITT in that case. 
7 NAF's resistence of discovery is only part of its secretive ways. Rule 4 of the NAF 
Code provides "Arbitration proceedings are confidential, unless the Parties agree 
otherwise." This rule also provides that "A Party who improperly discloses confidential 
information shall be subject to sanctions," which can include dismissal of a claim or 
being required to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. NAF's rules also provide that no 
person may attend a "Participatory Hearing Proceeding" who is not a party or their 
attorneys or representatives, thus excluding the public and media from these hearings 
no matter how important the subject matter may be to the public interest. As a result of 
this secrecy, there is little realistic check against potential NAF abuses of discretion. 
NAF could rule for banks in every single case it arbitrates (and thus give them a strong 
incentive to continue to patronize NAF), but so long as the banks exercised their 
unlimited right to confidentiality under NAF's rules, this fact would forever remain 
"confidential" from consumers and the public. 
8 In light of the fact that constitutional due process entitles parties to unbiased decision- 
makers, see Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986); Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471,485-86 (1972), it should come as absolutely no surprise that courts would 
find unconscionable arbitration clauses that designate arbitrators who are biased. In 
fact, courts have not hesitated to impose prophylactic measures to assure arbitrator 
neutrality, including the requirement that arbitrators disclose in advance any possible 
conflicts to the parties. See Sanko S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Cook Industries, Inc., 495 F.2d 
1260, 1264 (2d Cir. 1973); Barcon Assoc., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 
214, 220 (N.J. 1981). 
Insisting that arbitrators be neutral is consistent with, and implicit in, the cases cited by 
appellant and their amicifor the proposition that arbitration is favored, for the U.S. 
Supreme Court has conditioned its preference for arbitration on the requirement that 
arbitration offers remedies that are equal to those available in court. See Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 26 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.") See also Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 105 F.3d 
1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmerrequires, at an 
absolute minimum, that parties raising claims under Title VII be. provided with "a neutral 
forum.") Surely the same is true for consumers with TlLA claims. Where (as here) the 
neutrality of an arbitration service provider is likely compromised, arbitration is not just 
another forum. 
9 Amici do not concede the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement where 
the terms were communicated to the consumer after the transaction was concluded. 
10 No doubt it has struck defendants and their industry amicithat very few consumer 
plaintiffs would be sufficiently resilient and financially well grounded to take their cases 
all the way through a pointless proceeding before a biased arbitrator, only then to bring 
a court challenge under § 10 of the FAA. 
11 The cases cited by defendants are generally distinguishable from this setting. In 
Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., I 10 F.3d 892 (2d Cir. 1997), for example, plaintiffs 
challenged a particular arbitrator. After holding that § 10 "does not provide for pre-award 
removal of an arbitrator," the court acknowledged that "an agreement to arbitrate before 
a particular arbitrator may not be disturbed, unless the agreement is subject to attack 
under general contract principles 'as exist at law or in equity."' Id. at 895 (citation 
omitted, emphasis supplied). See also Foles v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 
56 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff did "not dispute either that the arbitration 
agreement is valid, or that his claims fall within it"); Diemaco v. Colt's Mfg. Co., Inc., 11 
F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D. Conn. 1998) (party merely sought to have the "party- 
designated arbitrator [removed] on the grounds that he is biased," but did not challenge 
the arbitration agreement itself.) 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Thursday, the 25th day of January 
2007, at the hour of 12:00 p.m., is hereby set as the time for Oral 
argument on the issue of whether or not 5 Delaware Code Section 956 
should not apply to this dispute. It provides a revolving credit 
plan between a bank and an individual borrower shall be governed by 
the laws of this state. Argument is to be heard before the 
Honorable John Bradbury, District Judge, in the District Courtroom 
of the Idaho County Courthouse, Grangeville, Idaho. The court will 
place the call. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
Dated this 11th day of January 2007. 
ROSE E . ] GEHRING, CLERK 
BY: 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the following persons on 
January 11, 2007: 
David Capps 
Miriam Carroll 
HC 11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID F. CAPPS ) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL 1 Case No. CV-05-36747 
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1 PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON 
vs. ) APPLICABILITY OF 
) 5 DEL. CODE 5 956 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW the plaintiffs, David F. Capps, and Miriam G. Carroll 
(hereinafter "Capps and Carroll"), and submit their PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON 
APPLICABILITY OF 5 DEL. CODE § 956 to this dispute as follows: 
1. 
BACKGROUND 
Capps and Carroll have argued from the beginning of this case that the 
Laws of the State of Idaho should apply, and not the Laws of the State of 
Delaware. That MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "MBNA) has entered 
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into the State of ldaho, solicited business in the State of ldaho, and thus 
subjected itself to the Laws of the State of ldaho. The defendant, MBNA has 
argued that the Laws of the State of Delaware should apply to this dispute and 
not the Laws of the State of ldaho. Capps and Carroll have raised Delaware 
Statute 6 Del. Code § 2708 which prohibits a Delaware choice of law provision in 
contracts less than $100,000, leaving the agreements between MBNA and 
Capps and Carroll without a valid choice of law provision. The court has 
requested this hearing to take oral argument on the issue of whether or not 5 
Delaware Code Section 956 should not apply to this dispute. Capps and Carroll 
respectfully submit their brief in preparation for that hearing, and in support of 
oral arguments to be presented. 
28 IDAHO CODE 41-201 
Title 28, Commercial Transactions, Chapter 41, General Provisions and 
Definitions, Part 1, Section 102, Purposes - Rules of Construction of the ldaho 
Credit Code provides that 
"(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purpose and policies." That "(2) The underlying purposes and 
policies of this act are:" . .. "(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices 
by some suppliers of credit, having due regard for the interests of 
legitimate and scrupulous creditors;" 
The State of ldaho thus has a public policy of protecting its residents against 
unfair practices by some suppliers of credit. Pursuant to that public policy and 
the purpose of this act, Code § 28-41-106 states: 
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may not waive or 
agree to forgo rights or benefits under this act." 
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The scope and jurisdiction of the ldaho Credit Code is stated in 28-41-201 
as follows: 
"28-41-201. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION. (1) Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, this act applies to sales and loans made in this 
state and to modifications, including refinancings, consolidations, and 
deferrals, made in this state, of sales and loans, wherever made. For 
purposes of this act a sale, loan, or modification of a sale or loan is made 
in this state if: ... (b) A consumer who is a resident of this state enters into 
the transaction with a creditor who has solicited or advertised in this state 
by any means including, but not limited to, mail, brochure, telephone, print, 
radio, television, internet or any other electronic means." 
Capps and Carroll were residents of the State of ldaho during the time 
MBNA claims to have modified the cardholder agreement. MBWA has 
participated in advertising by mail and television in this state, at the very least, 
thus subjecting MBNA, under 28-41-201, to the Laws of the State of Idaho. 28- 
41-201(8) states: 
"(8) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the following 
agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated 
credit sales, regulated loads, or modifications thereof, to which this act 
applies: 
(a) That the law of another state shall apply; 
(b) That the buyer or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another 
state; and 
(c) That fixes venue." 
Subsection (7) provides that this act does not apply if the buyer or debtor 
is not a resident of the state of ldaho and the parties then agree that the law of 
his residence applies. 28-41-201 provides that a modification to an agreement 
with a resident of the State of ldaho will be controlled by the Laws of the State of 
Idaho, and that any statement that the laws of another state apply, even if by 
agreement or consent, are invalid. The venue shall be the State of ldaho 
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The ldaho Credit Code (28-41-202) excludes the extension of credit to 
government or governmental agencies or instrumentalities, the sale of insurance, 
or transactions under public utility or common carrier tariffs if the U.S. regulates 
the service, and licensed pawnbrokers. None of these exclusions apply to 
MBNA 
The laws of the State of ldaho apply and this court has jurisdiction under: 
"28-41-203. JURISDICTION. The courts of this state may exercise 
jurisdiction over any creditor with respect to any conduct of the creditor 
subject to this act or with respect to any claim arising from a transaction 
subject to this act." 
Section 28-41-204 states: 
"28-41-204. APPLICABILITY. This act shall apply only to credit 
transactions for a consumer purpose, except for the following parts, 
chapters and sections, which shall apply to credit transactions for any and 
all purposes: 
(1) Part 1, chapter 41, title 28, ldaho Code; 
(2) ..." 
Part 1, chapter 41, title 28, ldaho Code (28-41-107) provides that the act 
applies to all creditors extending credit as a regular business which includes 
MBNA. This act applies both because the transactions were for a consumer 
purpose and because it applies to all credit transactions of creditors extending 
credit as a regular business 
THE DELAWARE STATUTES 
If Delaware law applied, which it clearly does not, the two statutes in 
question, 5 Del. Code 956 and 6 Del Code 2708 appear to be in conflict with 
each other. 5 Del. Code 956 is specific in that it applies to revolving credit plans. 
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6 Del. Code 2708 is specific in that it applies to contracts under a specific dollar 
amount. So the rule of resolving such conflicts where the specific has 
precedence over the general may be difficult to apply. On the other hand, newer 
statutes have precedence over older statutes. 5 Del. Code 956 was enacted 
during the 134'h General Assembly of the Delaware Legislature (1987 - 1988). 6 
Del. Code 2708 was enacted during the 137'~ General Assembly of the Delaware 
Legislature (1993 - 1994), approximately six years after 5 Del Code 956. Under 




The State of ldaho has a public policy of protecting the residents of ldaho 
from the unfair business practices of some creditors by bringing the transactions 
and modifications to these agreements under the laws of this state. MBNA's 
approach of mailing out a notice of amendment to its agreement in its periodic 
statement, knowing that 7 out of 8 consumers would not see the notice, and then 
claiming that MBNA had a unilateral right to amend its cardholder agreement, is 
just the kind of unfair practice that the ldaho Credit Code was created to combat. 
ldaho courts do not recognize a unilateral right to amend any agreement for good 
cause. This court should render its decision in this case based on ldaho law and 
the rulings of the ldaho State Supreme Court, and not the laws of the State of 
Delaware 
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Dated this /$71Fday of January, 2007. 
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
my PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF 5 DEL. CODE 956 to the 
the defendant by certified mail # 30QT (I 0082 7630 3J?%9 
day of January. 2007, at the following addr fz :  
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
Wilson & McColl 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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COMES NOW David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter "Capps 
and Carroll"), and submit their BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE 
LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE and related matters as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is under reconsideration of the court's decision rendered on an 
evidentiary hearing on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The court's 
decision was based on Delaware law and MBNA America Bank's (hereinafter 
"MBNA) unilateral amendment to its cardholder agreement. Subsequent to the 
court's decision, the applicability of Delaware law was challenged by Capps and 
Carroll citing 6 Del. Code § 2708. During a joint hearing held on January 25th, 
2007 on the above cases, Capps and Carroll presented an additional challenge 
to the Delaware choice of law provision based on the ldaho Credit Code. The 
court requested additional briefing on the issue of 1) Idaho's ability to apply 
Delaware law, and 2) to the applicability of the ldaho Credit Code to the facts in 
these cases. 
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS 
It is uncontested that there is a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the 
MBNA cardholder agreement. The question is two-fold: 1) is the Delaware 
choice of law provision valid under Delaware law, and 2) is the Delaware choice- 
of-law provision valid under ldaho law. The court posed the first question in its 
notice of hearing on January 25th, 2007 where it asked if 5 Del. Code § 956 
should apply to this case. The answer is no. 6 Del. Code S2708, passed by the 
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Delaware legislature 5 to 6 years after 5 Del. Code 3 956, prohibits contracts less 
than $100,000 from containing a Delaware choice-of-law provision, Thus, the 
Delaware choice-of-law provision is not valid under Delaware law. More 
importantly, the second question is answered by 28 ldaho Code 3 41-201(8)(a) 
where the law of any other state is invalid under the ldaho Credit Code, and 28 
ldaho Code $41-201(8)(b), which invalidates the buyer or debtor's consent to the 
jurisdiction of another state. Thus the Delaware choice-of-law provision is also 
invalid under ldaho law. The invalidation of the buyer or debtor's consent to the 
jurisdiction of another state is reinforced in $ 28-41-106 which states: 
" (1 )  Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may not waive or 
agree to forgo rights or benefits under this act." 
MBNA argues that "The ldaho Supreme Court in Ward v. PureGro Co. 
expressly authorized contractual choice-of-law provisions similar to that 
contained in the original credit card agreement between MBNA and the 
Defendants." See Ward v. PureGro Co., 128 ldaho 366, 913 P.2d 582 (1996). 
The choice-of-law provisions may be similar, but the contracts are not. The 
contract in Ward v. PureGro was a "commercial" or "business" based contract, 
primarily for a service (it was actually a settlement agreement reached as a result 
of a business contract for services rendered). This type of contract is not 
regulated by the State of ldaho, and does not fall under the ldaho Credit Code. 
Thus the California choice-of-law provision was valid and enforceable. The 
contract with MBNA is not a "business" contract, but a "consumer" contract which 
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is clearly and strictly regulated by the State of ldaho under the ldaho Credit 
Code. 
The contract with MBNA falls under the ldaho Credit Code for the 
following reasons: 
1. "28-41-204. APPLICABILITY. This act shall apply only to credit 
transactions for a consumer purpose, except for the following parts, 
chapters and sections, which shall apply to credit transactions for any and 
all purposes: 
(1) Part 1, Chapter 41, Title 28, ldaho Code; 
(2) ..." 
2. "28-41-107. EFFECT OF ACT ON POWERS OF ORGANIZATIONS. 
(1) This act prescribes maximum charges for all creditors, except those 
excluded under section 28-41-202, ldaho Code, extendina credit as a 
reqular business, including regulated credit sales, subsection (34) 
[subsection (35)] of section 28-41-301, ldaho Code, and regulated loans, 
subsection (37) [subsection (38)] of section 28-41-301, ldaho Code, and 
displaces existing limitations on the powers of these creditors based on 
maximum charges, except in insurance matters as prescribed by rule or 
regulation of the department of insurance." 
3. "28-41-201. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION. (1) Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, this act applies to sales and loans made in this 
state and to modifications, including refinancing, consolidations, and 
deferrals, made in this state, of sales and loans, wherever made. For 
purposes of this act a sale, loan, or modification of a sale or loan is made 
in this state if: ... (b) A consumer who is a resident of this state enters into 
the transaction with a creditor who has solicited or advertised in this state 
by any means including, but not limited to, mail, brochure, telephone, print, 
radio, television, internet or any other electronic means." (emphasis 
added). 
MBNA extends credit as a regular business, advertises through television and 
mail in the State of ldaho, makes regulated loans and regulated credit sales to 
residents of the State of ldaho such as Capps and Carroll who were (and still 
are) residents of the State of ldaho at the time MBNA attempted to amend its 
cardholder agreement to include arbitration. The ldaho Credit Code clearly 
applies in this case. 
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO 
CREDIT CODE Pg4 of 15. - 204 
MBNA argues that cases such as Johnson v. Chase Manhaftan Bank USA, 
N.A. 784 N.Y.S2d 921,2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 133, Edelisf v. MBNA America 
Bank, 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. 2001), Pick v. Discover Financial services, lnc., 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777,2001 WL 1180278 (D Del 2001), and Joseph v. MBNA 
America Bank, N.A., 148 Ohio App. 3d 4090,775 N.E.2d 550 (2002) provide the 
precedence for this court to base its decision on Delaware law and MBNA's claim 
of the right to unilaterally amend its cardholder agreement. As established 
above, both Delaware law and ldaho law invalidate the Delaware choice-of-law 
provision in MBNA's agreement. ldaho law controls based on the ldaho Credit 
Code, specifically: 
"28-41-201(8) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the 
followinq aareements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to 
regulated credit sales, requlated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this 
act applies: 
(a) That the law of another state shall apply; 
(b) That the buyer or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another state; 
and 
(c) That fixes venue." (emphasis added). 
CREDITORS REGULATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The ldaho Credit Code'provides that: 
"28-41-102. PURPOSES - RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. (1) This act 
shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purpose 
and policies." That "(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act 
are:" ... "(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices by some suppliers 
of credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous 
creditors;" (emphasis added). 
MBNA argues that "The ldaho Credit Code was thereby not intended to be 
applied universally to all creditors who transact business with ldaho residents. 
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The ldaho credit Code is arguably intended to supplement the rights and 
protections of ldaho debtors in situations where creditors are not those already 
strictly regulated by the Federal Government." The implication is that regulated 
lenders should be excluded from the ldaho Credit Code, yet regulated lenders 
are specifically included under the ldaho Credit Code in 28-41-301(37), as are all 
of their transactions in 28-41-301(36). 
MBNA's argument closely parallels the argument of AT&T in Ting v. 
AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902 (N.D.Cal. 2002) in the U.S. District Court and the 
appeal in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (gth Cir. 2003). AT&T argued that it was 
not subject to the California consumer protection laws because it was regulated 
under the Federal Communications Act. This argument was soundly rejected by 
the court. Contract related complaints are the purview of the state, not the 
Federal Government. Contracts are not regulated by the Federal Government 
but by the individual states. The State has both the power and the responsibility 
to protect its residents. 
Other states have been protecting their residents from the unfair business 
practices of MBNA. In an April 28'h, 2006 decision, MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. 
Lorefta K Credit (No. 94,380), attached as EXHIBIT A, the Kansas Supreme 
Court struck down an arbitration award after MBNA failed to provide any proof of 
an agreement to arbitrate. The Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] Title 9 U.S.C. § 13 
requires that any motion or request for confirmation of an arbitration award 
include the arbitration agreement. Specifically: 
"9 U.S.C. § 13. Papers filed with order on motions; judgment; docketing; 
force and effect; enforcement. 
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The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an 
award shall, at the time such order is filed with the clerk for the entry of 
judgment thereon, also file the following papers with the clerk: 
(a) The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional 
arbitrator or umpire; and each written extension of the time, if any, 
within which to make the award. 
(b) The award. 
(c) Each notice, affidavit or other paper used upon an application to 
confirm, modify, or correct the award and a copy of each order of the 
court upon such an application." (emphasis added). 
The agreement was not present in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Credit when 
MBNA filed for confirmation, and was a major factor in the court's rejection of the 
arbitration award. This is a condition which is also present in this case. MBNA 
did not file the arbitration agreement with its request for confirmation of the award 
letter against Capps or Carroll. 
Other states have protected their residents from MBNA in a similar 
manner. Ohio also dismissed MBNA's application to confirm an arbitration award 
letter for the very same reason in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Berlin, 2005 WL 
3193850 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.). Texas also denied MBNA's application to confirm 
an arbitration award letter in MBNA America Bank v. Perese, 2006 WL 398188 
(Tex.App.-San Antonio). Indiana dismissed MBNA's application to confirm an 
arbitration award letter because MBNA waited more than one year to file for 
confirmation in MBNA America Bank, N.A., 838 N.E.2d 475, 2005 lnd. App. 
LEXlS 2261. 
Capps and Carroll's case is also closely paralleled by a case in 
Connecticut, where MBNA filed an arbitration action in the National Arbitration 
Forum [NAF]. Teofil Boata, the Defendant, filed an objection to arbitration with 
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the NAF and refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings based on no 
agreement to arbitrate. The NAF issued the award letter anyway. When MBNA 
came into Connecticut to confirm the award, the alleged arbitration agreement 
was challenged. The trial court confirmed the award and the appellate court 
reversed and remanded in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Boata, 893 A.2d 479, 
2006 Conn. App. LEXlS 137. The appellate court's decision was based on a lack 
of jurisdiction due to subject matter. The arbitrator did not have jurisdiction 
without a court order confirming an agreement to arbitrate, an argument raised 
by Capps and Carroll during reconsideration. 
EFFECTIVE NOTICE AND THE NEGATIVE OPTION 
MBNA argues that "MBNA properly amended its agreement pursuant to 
Idaho Code §28-42-203." MBNA used what is referred to as a "negative option" 
in its notification of the proposed arbitration clause in its cardholder agreement. 
The "negative option" means that a cardholder does not have to actually do 
something to "agree" to changes in the contract, but has to actively opt-out or 
reject the proposed changes. AT&T used the same scheme in notifying 
California residents of its new contract terms. The court in Ting (supra) found 
that the Legal Remedies Provision (arbitration) as a "negative option" process 
was unenforceable for several reasons. Prime among them was the method of 
notification. AT&T mailed the new contract terms in its monthly billing envelope 
as a bill stuffer. AT&T's own research revealed that only 30% of its customers 
would actually read the new contract terms. The Plaintiff in the Ting (supra) case 
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commissioned its own study, referred to as the "Lake-Snell" survey where they 
found only 10% to 13% of the respondents read the new contract terms. AT&T's 
Legal Remedies Provision (arbitration) was similar to MBNA's arbitration clause. 
The court decided that the lack of proper notification, the negative option, and the 
lack of reasonable options for the consumer rendered the arbitration clause in the 
contract unconscionable and unenforceable. The gih Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Legal Remedies Provision (arbitration) was unconscionable and 
unenforceable. 
MBNA has used the same process. MBNA sent their proposed arbitration 
agreement as a bill stuffer when they either knew, or should have known, that 7 
out of 8 customers would not see the notification. The "acceptance" of the 
arbitration provision was structured as a "negative option" and credit card 
customers are left without a reasonable option, as almost all credit card 
companies have incorporated arbitration clauses in their agreements. This 
cannot be considered effective notice, or knowledgeable consent, rendering the 
alleged arbitration agreement unenforceable. 
Under ldaho case law, an agreement must represent a "meeting of the 
minds" and both parties must agree as to the terms and conditions, or there is no 
agreement. See Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 
ldaho 890, 693 P.2d 1092 (1984), 131 "No enforceable contract exists unless it 
reflects a meeting of the minds and embodies a distinct understanding common 
to both parties." The "negative option" does not fulfill the "meeting of the minds" 
requirement, and there is no demonstrable common understanding or agreement 
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on the terms and conditions with a "negative option". Under ldaho case law, the 
MBNA arbitration agreement fails from ineffective notice and no "meeting of the 
minds" and must be rendered unenforceable. 
The ldaho Credit Code specifically authorizes a change in terms in open- 
ended consumer credit accounts (28-43-203 ldaho Code). This does not 
authorize a unilateral amendment to the agreement, which is not allowed in 
Idaho, (see Yellowpine Wafer User's Association v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349, 670 
P.2d 54 (1983), [3] "One party cannot unilaterally change terms of a contract, and 
attempts to add terms without consent of all parties are ineffectual.") nor does the 
ldaho Credit Code authorize the addition of new terms to the agreement. All 
agreements, and all modifications to existing agreements, require a "meeting of 
the minds" and a common understanding of the terms by both parties. This 
requirement is not present in MBNA's alleged arbitration agreement. This is 
another example of the unfair business practices employed by MBNA. 
MBNA's selection of the NAF is also an unfair business practice. In 
Toppings, v. Meritech Mortgage Services, 569 S.E.2d 149 (W.Va. 2002) 
numerous examples of NAF bias were submitted to the Circuit Court in Lincoln 
County (a sample of which was submitted to this court in Capps and Carroll's 
motion for reconsideration). That court invalidated the arbitration clause as it 
stated: 
"A compulsory arbitration clause or rider in a lender's form for consumer 
transactions impinges on neutrality and fundamental fairness and is 
unconscionable and unenforceable, where the lender-designated decision 
maker is compensated through a case-volume fee system and the 
decision maker's income as an arbitrator depends on continued referrals 
from the creditor." 
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This is also a condition which is present in this case. MBNA selected the NAF as 
the arbitral forum for all of its disputes when it either knew, or should have 
known, that the NAF was biased in favor of the corporate creditor. The 
consumer had no input in the selection of the arbitration organization or the 
arbitrator. 
The "negative option" does not function to waive 7'h Amendment 
protection of the right to a trial by jury. Since the right to a trial by jury is highly 
favored, a waiver of the right to a jury trial will be strictly construed and will not be 
lightly inferred or extended. See Nafional Acceptance Co. v. Myca Products, 
inc., 381 F.Supp. 269 (1974) [ I ]  "Right to trial by jury is a fundamental one and 
courts will narrowly construe any waiver of the right and will indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 7." 
Accordingly, a party seeking to enforce such a provision must demonstrate that 
consent is both knowing and voluntary. See Howard v. Bank South, H.A., 433 
S.E.2d 625 (Ga.App. 1993) [5] "Jury trial waiver which was contained in guaranty 
agreement was not enforceable as consent to trial without jury; waiver could not 
have demonstrated full understanding of all circumstances surrounding 
relinquishment of known right when it was executed before facts and 
circumstances underlying request for jury trial arose." Where the waiver clause 
is buried inconspicuously in a contract such that the party's waiver could neither 
be knowing or intentional, the waiver is deemed invalid. See Gaylord Dept. 
Stores ofAlabama v. Stephens, 404 So.2d 586 (1981) [I] "Where contract 
between pharmacist and department store appeared to be a New Jersey form 
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO 
CREDIT CODE - Pg11 of15. 
-- 2 4:;
contract with boiler plate provisions, where the jury waiver provision was buried 
in paragraph 34 in a contract containing 46 paragraphs, where the equality of the 
bargaining power of the parties was questionable, and where it did not appear 
that waiver by pharmacist was intelligently or knowingly made, provision waiving 
jury trial in a prospective action between the parties did not constitute a proper 
waiver of the right to trial by jury. Rules of Civil procedure, Rule 38(a); Const. § 
11 ." 
While MBNA's notice of arbitration may, on the face of it, appear to 
constitute proper notice, the method of delivery of that notice had the same effect 
as the notice being buried inconspicuously in a contract. With 7 out of 8 
consumers not likely to see the notice, it cannot constitute a valid waiver of the 
consumer's 7'h Amendment protection of the right to a trial by jury. MBNA cannot 
demonstrate that the waiver of the right to a trial by jury in the alleged arbitration 
agreement was knowing and voluntary. The "negative option" by its very nature 
fails to demonstrate either a knowing or a voluntary waiver of the right to a trial by 
jury, and as such the alleged arbitration agreement must also fail. 
The court may find it instructive that New Jersey has had experience with 
the same schemes used by MBNA. In this case the bank is Discover. In 
DiscoverBank v. Shea, Clearinghouse No. 53,553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Division, 
Oct. 26, 2001), unpublished (attached as EXHIBIT B), Discover claimed a 
unilateral right to amend the cardholder agreement to include arbitration under 
Delaware law Title 5 § 952, just as MBNA has done. Notification was done in the 
same manner as MBNA, via the periodic statement as a "bill stuffer." The New 
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Jersey court rejected Discover's demand to compel arbitration on several 
grounds. New Jersey, like ldaho, does not allow unilateral amendments to 
existing agreements. The New Jersey court, following California's lead, just as 
Capps and Carroll have argued for ldaho, rejected the notion that a consumer's 
silence can constitute a waiver of the substantive right to a jury trial, in effect 
nullifying the "negative option" described above. The New Jersey court stated, 
"Both New Jersey and California, rely on basic contract principles in interpreting 
arbitration clauses; both hold only a mutual agreement to arbitrate can be 
enforced. 
The New Jersey court also stated, "While Discover's credit card 
agreement provides that Delaware law applies, the Delaware law clearly violates 
New Jersey Public policy and under New Jersey law that choice of law provision 
cannot be given effect." This is the same effect the ldaho Credit Code has in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Through the above examples, it should become clear to the court that 
MBNA is employing precisely the type of unfair practices the ldaho Credit Code 
is intended to curtail. ldaho has a strong public policy of protecting its residents 
from the type of unfair practices MBNA is using. State after state is realizing that 
the imposition of unfair arbitration through ineffective "negative option" notices 
and unilateral amendments to agreements, where the cardholder has little, if any, 
options, is not acceptable. State after state is striking down MBNA's and other 
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bank's attempts to unfairly modify their cardholder agreements to gradually erode 
and eliminate the rights of their cardholders, moving them into a system of unfair 
arbitration (as with the NAF) effectively controlled by the banks through the 
promise of a wealth of repeat business. Capps and Carroil therefore urge this 
court to change its previous decision regarding an agreement to arbitrate to 
determine that there is no valid agreement to arbitrate, and subsequently vacate 
the two NAF award letters against Capps and Carroll. 
Dated this L s+k day of February, 2007. 
h 6- c--t\ 
Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of this BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO 
CREDIT CODE to the attorneys for the DefendantsIPlaintiffs by Certified Mail # 
7006215000034551 1057(Wilson)and#7006215000034551 1064(Bishop) 
this 1 s+h day of February, 2007 at the following addresses: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
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Boise, ID 83701 
William L. Bishop 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 11 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle. WA 98101 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
No. 94,380 
MBNA AMERICA BANK. N.A. 
Appellant: 
LORETTA K. CREDIT 
Appellee, 
SYLLABUS BY TI-IE COURT 
1. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration award may be challenged through a motion to vacate 
filed within 3 months after the award was filed or delivered. The federal act is silent on the proper 
methods for filing or delivery. The Kansas version of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides that the 
arbitrators shall deliver a copy of the award to each party personally or by registered mail, or as 
provided in the parties' arbitration agreement. Any application to vacate the award must be made within 
90 days after delivery of the award to the applicant. 
2. The Federal Arbitration Act requires a party moving to confirm an arbitration award to attach a copy 
of the agreement to arbitrate to the motion. 
3. An appellant must designate a record on appeal regarding an arbitration award that is adequate to 
substantiate contentions made to the reviewing court. Without an adequate record, any claim of alleged 
error fails. 
4. On the record in this case, the district court was empowered to vacate the asbitration award 
Appeal from Butler district court; CHARLES M. HART, judge. Opinion filed April 28, 2006. Affirmed. 
DavidJ. Weirner, ofKramer & Frank, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Jason J 
Lundt, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant. 
Loretta K. Credit, appellee, argued the cause and was on the brief pro se 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
BEIER, J.: This appeal arises out of a district court's decision vacating an arbitration award and its ruling 
that no arbitration agreement existed between plaintiff MBNA America Bank (MBNA) and defendant 
Loretta K. Credit. 
MBNA submitted a dispute regarding what it alleged to be defendant Credit's credit card debt in excess 
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" of $21,000 to arbitration. Credit's pariicipation in the arbitration was limited to sending a letter to the 
arbitrator, objecting to the proceeding because she believed there was 110 agreement to arbitrate. There is 
no copy of this letter in the record on appeal or ally information about how, if at all, Credit's objection 
was considered in the arbitration. 
Tile record does reflect that, on September 7,2004, an arbitration award in the amount of $21,094.74 
was entered in favor of MBNA. The award, which states "the Parties entered into an agreement 
providing that this matter shall be resolvcd through binding arbitration," was signed by arbitrator Henry 
Cox and by Ilarold Kalina, Director of Arbitration for the National Arbitration Forum in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. The fact that the same date appears on the document near each signature, when Cox and 
Kalina would have been in two states distant from one another is unexplained. 
The award also contains the followi~lg language above the signature of Kalina: 
"ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby certifies that a copy of this Award was sent by first 
class mail postage prepaid to the parties at the above referenced addresses on this date." 
Other than this language, there is nothing in the record 011 appeal tending to show that Credit received a 
copy of the award or, if so, when. Credit acknowledged at oral argument before this court, however, tbat 
the address set forth for her on the award was correct at that time. She said she did not know whether she 
ever received a copy. 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, Credit would have had 3 months after the award was "filed or 
delivered" in which to challeilge it. 9 U.S.C. 5 12 (2000). The federal act is silent on the proper metllods 
for filing or delivery of the award. The Kansas version of the Uniform Arbitration Act is somewhat more 
specific. "The arbitrators shall deliver" a copy of the award "to each party personally or by registered 
mail, or as provided in the agreement." K.S.A. 5-408(a). Any application to the court to vacate a11 award 
"shall be made within ninety (90) days after dclivery of a copy of the award to the applicant." 1C.S.A. 5- 
412(b). 
It 1s undisputed that Credit did uothing to respond to the award at issue in this case until MBNA filed a 
motion to confirm it in late December 2004 in the district court in Butler County. When notified of 
MBNAts motion to confirm, Credit filed several pro se pleadings, which, MBNA concedes, may be read 
together to constitute a motion to vacate the award. In these pleadings, Credit again asserted that there 
was no arbitration agreement between her and MBNA. In an affidavit filed with the district court, she 
specifically said that MBNA had not provided her with a copy of the alleged agreement. MBNA had not 
attached a copy of any agreement to its motion to confirm the award, although the Federal Arbitration 
Act requires a copy to be attached. No copy of any agreement appears anywhere else in the record on 
appeal. 
Approximately 6 weeks after Credit filed her responsive pleadings, and a day after the district court 
judge resolved a discovery dispute in her favor, he vacated the arbitration award, ruliug that "there is 110 
existing agreement between the parties to arbitrate and therefore the award entered against Defendant is 
null and void." 
011 this appeal, MBNA advances various arguments on what it characterizes as three issues. We discern 
but one controlli~~g question: Did Credit's effort to thwart confirmation of the award come too late? If so, 
the district court did not have authority to vacate the award. If not, the district court had the authority it - 
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needed to enter its rulings. 
Before addressing this issue, we note that MBNA takes the position that the Federal Arbitration Act, see 
9 U.S.C. 5 1 et seq. (2000), is controlling. It nevertheless invokes the Kansas Uniform Arbitration Act, 
see K.S.A. 5-401 et seq., and Kansas cases. MBNA also acltnowledges that Kansas procedure governs 
as long as it is not in conflict with substantive federal law. See U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2; Southland Corp. 
v. Keating, 465 U.S. l , 79  L. Ed. 2d 1, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984). We have therefore evaluated both federal 
and state law as well National Arbitration Forum rules when relevant to our resolution of this case. 
The record before us is extremely sparse. MBNA's argument on the tilneliness of Credit's motion to 
vacate the award is doomed both by what it fails to contain and what it does contain. An appellant must 
designate a record onappeal regarding an arbitration award that is adequate to substantiate contentions 
made to the reviewing court. K.S.A. 5-401 et seq., 5-412(a), 5-418(a)(3), (b); Rural Water Dist. No. 6 v. 
Ziegler Corp., 9 Kan. Aplp 2d 305, Syl. 7 4,677 P.2d 573, rev. denied 235 Kan. 1042 (1984); see also 
Unrau v. Kidron Bethel Retirement Services, Inc., 271 Kan. 743,777,27 P.3d 1 (2001). Without an 
adequate record, any claim of alleged error fails. In re B.MB., 264 Kan. 417,435, 955 P.2d 1302 
( 1  998). 
We uote first that MBNA cannot rely on Credit's tardiness in challenging the award if the arbitrator 
never had jurisdiction to arbitrate and enter a1 award. An agreement to arbitrate bestows such 
jurisdiction. When the existence of the agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court 
before the arbitrator may proceed. See 9 U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. 
All we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent an apparently timely objection to the 
arbitrator, contesting the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no copy of this objection is in 
the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral argument before this court that his client "probably" has a 
copy oTt11e objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to demonstrate that t l~e  objection was 
somehow ineffective to trigger its responsibility to seek court illtervention to compel arbitration. See 9 
U.S.C. S 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a demonstration, we, like the district court, have no 
choice but to accept Credit's version of events. 
tinder both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to 
MBNA to litigate the issue of the agreement's existence. See 9 U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. Neither 
MBNA, as the party asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the arbitrator was simply free to 
go forward with the arbitration as though Credit had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do 
SO. 
" I f  there is a challenge to the arbitration, it is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to decide whether the 
agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the issue in dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate. 
"Under either t l ~ e  Federal Act or the Kansas Act, the arbitrator's power to resolve the dispute must find 
its source in the agreement between the parties. The arbitrator has no independent source ofjurisdiction 
apart froin consent of the parties. . . . Dreyer, Arbitration Under the Kansas Arbitration Act: The Role of 
the Courts, 59 J.K.B.A. 33,:s (May 1990). 
"Substantive arbitrability is concerned with the question of whether the parties have contractually agreed 
to submit a particular dispute to arbitration. The courts decide this question because no one must 
arbitrate a dispute unless he has so consented." (59 J.K.B.A. at 35 n.42 quoting Denhardt v. Trailways, 
-. . 
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The record, such as it is, also undercuts ally assertion that Credit was properly served with a copy of the 
award. Tlle Aclcnowledglnel~t and Certificate of Service signed by Kalina states oilly that the award was 
served on September 7, 2004, by first class mail, postage prepaid U~lless the parties' agreement to 
arbitrate-which, agaln, is not in the record-provided for this method of service, it did not meet the clear 
requiremeilt of K.S.A. 5-408. We are not willing, despite MBNA's urging, to apply any coinmoll law 
presumption of receipt of a docume~~t af er first class, postage prepaid mailiilg when there is a statute 
that appears to dictate specific alternate methods for service. 
The I<ansas statute also requires that Credit have been served by "the arbitrators," and it is unclear 
exactly what Kalina's personal role in the arbitration, if any, was. See K.S.A. 5-408. He may have 
qualified as one of "the arbitrators," but the ambiguity of the award itself leaves room for a contrary 
argument. 
Also, in the absence of proof in the record of proper service of a copy of the award on Credit on any 
date, it is obvious that ncither the district court judge nor we could have arrived at the conclusion that 
proper service of the award was effected on a date more than 3 months or more than 90 days before 
Credit filed her first pro se pleadings to vacate the award. A copy of the award must have been properly 
served on Credit by that time in order for MBNA's timeliness argument to have any merit. 
As mentioned above, MBNA failed to attach a copy of the arbitration agreement to its motion to confirm 
the award. This violated the Federal Arbitration Act for which MBNA intermittently expresses respect. 
See 9 U.S.C. 5 13 (2000). This alone would have justified the district court in its decisioil to deny 
MBNA's motion to confirm the award. 
Should the district court have taken the additional step of vacating the award on the scanty record before 
it? That action was proper as well. I11 addition to failing to attach a copy of the agreement to arbitrate 
when it filed its motion to confirm, MBNA filed no response to Credit's various pleadings adding up to a 
motion to vacate. Its only further pleading was a lnotioil for protective order and suggestiolls in support 
when she sought discovery. The filings on the protective order issue asserted entitlement to 
confirmation, but they did so primarily because of the tilneliiless issue, which, on this record, is without 
merit. 
In these circumstances, K.S.A. 5-412(5) permitted Credit to tile a timely motion to vacate and raise the 
argument that no arbitration agreement existed. MBNA made no legally sufficient response to her 
arguments. Approximately 6 weeks passed. The district court judge finally ruled in Credit's favor. 
MBNA's assertion that this ruling came without warning or adequate time for response also is without 
merit. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err. 
Finally, we note that a panel of our Court of Appeals has reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in 
another case involving MBNA's efforts to arbitrate a dispute. See MBNA America Bank v. Barben, No. 
92,085, unpublished opinioil filed May 20,2005. We also note that these Kansas cases appear to reflect 
a natioilal trend in which consumers are questioning MBNA and whether arbitration agreements exist. 
See e.g., MBNA America Bank, N A .  v. Boata, 94 Conn. App. 559, 893 A.2d 479 (2006); MBNA 
America Bank, N.A. v. Rogers, 838 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. App. 2005); MBNA America Bank, N A .  v. Hart, 
710 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 2006); MBNA Am. Bank, MA. v. Terry, 2006 WL 513952 (Ohio); MBNA 
America Bank, N.A. v. Berlin, 2005 WI, 3193850 (Ohio App.); MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Perese, 
2006 WI, 398 188 (Texas App.). Given MBNA's casual approach to this litigation, we are not surprised 
that the trend may be growing. 
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Affirmed. 
END 
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- + EXANDER D. L E W R ,  J.S.C. 
Defendant, James B. Shea, is a plaintiff in a class action 
filed in California on behalf of Discover's credit card customers 
who were allegedly charged improper overlimit fees by Discover. 
Mr. Shears individual claim is less than $100, but the class claims 
are alleged to be in the tens of millions. Mr. Shea alleges two 
types of wrongful conduct by Discover in the California Action: 
1. Incorrect identification of "available creditN on the 
credit cardholders' monthly statements which results in cardholders 
seten incurring improper overlimit fees. 
2, Incorsect ''minimum payment due" figures on card holders' 
nonthly statements which, is often not sufficient, even if timely 
.?aid, to avoid the imposition of an overlhit fee. 
Based on these allegations, #r. Shea asserts claims in the 
c:alifocnia Class Action for breach of contract, tortious breach 02 
the implied covenant of good f&ith and fair dealihg, fraudulent or 
negligent misrepresentation, and deceptive business practices. 
The New Jersey action was institutedby Discover by way of an 
Clrder to Show Cause seeking relief that would effectively block the 
C:alifornia Class Action. Discover seeks to force James B. Shea to 
qndlvidually arbitrate his $100 claim. m e  original agreement 
for arbitration. 
Discover seeks to compel arbitration based on an "amendment" 
its credit card agreements which it purported to make 
which abrogates Mr. 
Shea's right to trial and right to bring a class action. Mr. Shea . I '  
I claims, by way o f  certification that he never noticed the "bill 
stuffex" amendment; had he been aware of the acbitration provision, 
he would not have agreed to it. 
UNDER NEW JERSEY LbrW THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL CANNOT BE 
J?AmD BY UNfLATERAI, "BILL STWFER" AMENRMEN1: 
The courts in New Jersey rely on basic contract principles in 
interpreting arbitration clauses; only those disputes Eor which 
here is a ~ t u a 1  agreement to arbitrate can be compelied to 
rbit~ation. See Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Gal.arza, 306 N. J. 
uper. 384, (App.Div. 1997) . Sea also prick towns hi^ Municiual 
.J. Super. 397, (App.Div. 1979); PilLs v. J, Daunoraa 
, 278 N. J. Super, 373, 377 (App-Div. 1995); & 
0 N.J. 221, (1979) r and Rasserman v. Kovatch, 261 N.J. Super. 277, 
84, (App.Div. 1993). 
New Jersey Courts also do not pernit unilateral amendments to 
xlsting agreements to change material terms. In Countv o f  Morris 
153 N.J. 80, (1998) the court held that unilateral 
tatements or actions made after an agreement has been reached or 
ded to a completed agreement clearly do not serve to modify the 
iginal terms of a contract, especial.1~ where the other party does . . 
t have knowledge of the changes} knowledge and assent are 
sential to an effective modificatioh. see also New Jersw 
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jPlvficlllEQCS Y. 0;Connsll. 300 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1991). 
I In Harchak v.  C1arid.e Commons. Inc., 134 N . J .  275, (1993) the 
I court held a contractual provision in which a consumer elects 
arbitration as the exc2t1sive remedy, must be read in light of its 
effect on the' consumer's right to sue, clause depriving a 
citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose. 
The point is to assure that the parties know that in electing 
arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time- 
2 
onored right to sue. ' 
No New Jersey case has directly decided the issues of validity 
f a unilateral "bill stuffer" change to a credit card agreement; 
owever, California courts have in the well reasoned decision of 
, 79 Cal.Rptr 2d 273 (1998). Bank of 
erica sought to add an arbitration clause to its existing account 
greements by sending its customers a "bill stuffer" with their 
onthly account statements, notifying them of a new arbitration 
lause, just as Discover: sought to do here. Bank of America 
urported to do so under the "change of terms" provision in its 
ciginal agreement, which provided that Bank of America could 
ange any 'term, condition, service or feature'' of a customer1$ 
ccoun t . 
The court held that Bank of Amesica could npt unilaterally add 
e arbitration clause to existing account agreements, and 
the clause was not enforceable. The court acknowledged 
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements (which is 
[ually applicable under California law as it is under New Jersey 
w ) ,  but: noted that in order to be enforceable, both must have 
nsented to arbitrate. The court stated at page 790: 
"That: poLicy Ct'avoring alternative depute resoluttonf, 
whose existence we readily acknowledge, doee not even 
come into play unlasa it is first determined that the 
Bank's cuatamers agreed to use so- form of AllR to 
resoLve didputes regarding their deposit and credit cazd 
aocounts, and that: determination, in turn, requires 
analysis of the account agreements in light of ordinary 
litate law principles that govern the formation and 
intawretation of contracts." 
The court went on to hold that the change of terms provision 
the original customer agreements, which did not address how 
sputes were to be resolved, did not contemplate that an 
bitration clause could be added. The &&& court, at page 800, 
ted that, "[ilmportankly, no 'term, condition, st?rvi~@, or 
aturer in the original credit account agreement addressed the 
thod or forum for resolving legal claims related to customer 
;aunts." In interpreting this contract language which the court 
m d  to be anbiguous, the court held at page 801: 
\!bur focus is on whether the wards of the original 
acabunt agreements tnean that the Bank's customere, by 
agreeing to a unilateral change of terns provision, 
intended to give the Bank the power in the future to 
terminate its austomersl existing right to have disputes 
resalved in the civil justice system, including their 
consCitutionally based right to a jury trial. In our 
view, the obgect, nature and subject matter of these 
agregments strongly support the conclusion that the 
customers did not so intend, and that they, as promisors 
with respect to the change of this proviaion, had no 
inkling that the Bsnk understood the provision 
differently. 
The court in &+&&@ also found it significant that in order to 
nd that the original account agreements authorized the addition 
the arbitration clause, khe court would have to assume that the 
stomers "intended to permit a modification that would amount to 
iver of their constitutio~aLly based right to a j u r y  trial." Id. 
803-04. The court rejected this contention, finding "no 
ambiguous and unequivocal waiver of the right: to a jury trial 
ther in the language of tha change of terms provision or in any 
her past of the original account agreements." Idrat 805. The 
u r t  also found nQ waiver of the right to a 3ury trial in 
$tomersr failure to close their accounts or in continuing to use 
e i r  accounts after receipt of the bill stuffer announcing the 
endment. The court held at page 806: 
%3ecause we find no unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of 
that right hexe, and beCauee the right to select a 
judiaial forum, whether a bench trial or a jury trial, as 
distinguiehed frotn arbitration or scam other nethod of 
dispute resolution, is a substantial right not lightLy to 
be deemed waitred (aibtions omikted), the Bank's 
interpretation of the change of terms provision must: ha 
rejected." 
The &&& court was ale0 concerned with  the Bank's claim that 
had the WilateraL attd nonnegotiable right to vary every aspect 
the perfomance required by the parties to the account 
eementa. The Court suggested that the Bank's interpretation Of 
r broadly it could exercise its rights, with no limitation on the 
mtantive nature of the changes it could make, would virtually 
iminate the good faith and fair deaiing tequirement from the 
Bank's re la t ionship  with i t s  credi t  account customers, and would 
open the door t o  a Claim tha t  the agreements are  i l lusory.  
/ applving the  persuasive reasoning of the &&g case, 
( ~ i s c o v e r ~ s  un i l a t e r a l  attempt t o  amend i t s  or ig inal  cardholder 
I agreement t o  include an a rb i t r a t i on  clause i s  ineffect ive.  The 
(original agreement here, i i ke  the agreement i n  B B b g ,  contains no 
I relevant provisions about how disputes a r e  t o  be resolved. There 
\is no arguable language tha t  i n  any way suggests the agreement 
auld allow a fundamental change, as  the  waiver of t r i a l  bys jury ,  1 .  
bithout t h e  express consent of both pa r t i e s .  The change of terms 
brovision i n  the  o r ig ina l  agreement s t a t o r  Discover may "chanqg any 
I ern  or pa r t  of ttbis Agreement," but goes on t o  c l a r i f y  exactly 
., b a t  types o f  chaniJes it: can make by spec i f i c  Language. , 
I New Jersey law is  similar t o  ~ a l i f o r n i a  law w i t h  respect t o  
911 of the f ac to r s  r e l i e d  upon by the  court  i n  a. Both New 
P ersey and California r e ly  on bas ic  contract principles i n  
k e r p r e t i n g  a rb i t r a t i on  clavaes; both hold only a mutual agreement 
10 a rb i t r a t e  can be enforced. See plamo Rent. A Car, 1nc. V-. 
Ia larza,  Super. As the  court i n  Brick Township Mln i~ iva l  I J r i l i t i eq  
thor i tv  v. Divessified R. 8 .  & T.  Construction Co., 171 N.J. 
eper.397. 402 A p i  1979) s ta ted:  
\\While publia poliay favors the arbitration psoceae, and 
contracts should be read liberally to find arbitrability 
i f  reasonably possible, there survives the prinaipls that 
the authoriw of the a rb i t r a to r  i s  derived from the 
mutual aSSBnt of the partie8 to the terms of submiasion; 
the pa r t i ea  are bound only t o  the extent ,  and i n  the 
manner, and under the circumstanaes pointed out i n  their 
/ aq~errunt, and no further." 
See also Mills v. J. Daworas Construction, X%, 278 N.J. Super. 
373, 377 (App.Div. 1998) ; In the Matter of Grover and Universal, 
Underwriters Ihsurance ComDanv, 80 N.Y. 221 (1979) ("In the absence 
o f  a consensual understanding, neither party is entitled to force 
the other to arbitrate their dispute."); Wasserstein v. Kovatch, * 
261 N.J. Super. 277, 284, (App-Div. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that a 
person cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute with another 
.?arson unless there is a mutual agreement to do so.") and Fairfield, 
ina Corvora~ion. ,;eas v. Techni-Graahics. Inc., 256 N.J. Super. 538 
(Law Div. 1992) the court held a non-negotiated jury waiver clause 
.:hat appears inconspicuously in a standardized form contract 
bntered into without assistance of counsel, should not be enforced. 
/ These principles of law as set forth by the New Jersey courts 
dre the same principles relied upon by the California courr in the 
'e decision. Therefore, this Court finds the &,,@& reasoning + 
dervasive and applicable. 
I ~issoverarternprs to avoid &&Us and the similar . . principles of 
aw Jersey law by arguing that, under Dekware law (namely, 5 pel. 
..H. - .;+ 





While Discover's credit card agreement provides that Delaware 
." 
Delaware law clearly violates New Jersey Public 
licy and under New Jersey law that choice of law provision cannot 
given effect. Ib New Jersey, the unilateral addition of an 
:bi t rat ion agreement ink0 a contract. of adhesion cannot be given 
!gal e f f ec t ,  
I n  Fa i r f ie ld  Leasina Corporation v. Techni-Graohlcs, Inc., 
lpra, the court refused t o  apply a New York law provision on the 
;sue of jury waiver. The court a t  page 544 quoted Professor 
~bert: A. Leflar:  
"Even an express pzovision i n  a aontxaot s t a t i n g  an 
inkent t h a t  it be governed by the laws of a named s t a t e  
may  be held not  t o  axpxess the real i n t e n t  of the 
par t fes .  Such a stated i n t en t  should be dieregarded when 
it i s  contained i n  an adhesion oontract auah as the f i n e  
p r i n t  i n  an insurance policy prepared by one o f  the 
pa r t i e s  pr imari ly f o r  h i s  own advantage and inserted 
without the actuas  knowledge of the o ther  party.  A t  
l e a a t  air) is t r u e  i f  the  court i s  Looking Eo'or the  ac tual  
i n t an t ,  i f  any, of  both the part iee.  ff the s t a t ed  
i n t e n t  is a purposeful atatembnt joined i n  by both 
par t i e s ,  ao that: they aan know i n  advance what law w i l l  
govern their t ransact ion  and effec tuate  it, there  is much 
good sense i n  a rule w h j i o h  make8 such a genuine 'mutual 
i n t an t  contkolling. This good sense is, hornwar, l imited 
to the cases where the staked intent: i a  a r e a l  one. 
Leflar, American Conflicts Law, p. 302 (JR' ed. 1977). 
To deviate from the law as described by Professor Leflar 
would be i n  v io l a t i on  of the  publla pol icy  of t h i s  State 
a s  t h a t  concept has b&n a r t i cu la ted  i n  Kenningsen, 
supra, 32 N. J. at  403-404, 161 A.2d 69, and its progeny." 
The court wenk on t o  void the choice of law provision i n  p a r t  
cause it: was no t  conspicuous ahd stated a t  256 N.J. Super.. 538, 
"Although the Code does not expressly reqire t h a t  choiae 
of law provisions be conspicuous, i t  seems t o  m e  that a 
contractual d o i c e  of l a w  provision raise6 a unique 
problem i n  c o n k a o t  l a w .  The meaning of the rest o f  the, . 
contkact may be gleaned simply be ca re fu l  reading. 
However, t he  incorporation i n  a contracrt of another 
s t a te1s  e n k i r a  body of l a w  af fec t ing  the r igh t s  and 
liabilities of the parties may have serious conaequencas 
which are eesentially unknowable to the layman, It is 
euxely a minimal imposition, if any, on the freedom of 
contraat to construe the Code ao as to require that 
choiae of law provisions be 'consgiauoust as that conaept 
is defined in N.J.S.A. 1ZA:l-201.(10) , The Code 
specifically requires conspicuousness for warxant-y 
disclaimere, and, as not&, the Appellate Division in 
Herdaman v. Eaabnm X(ad8.k Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439, 330 
A,2d 384 (App. DSv. 1974) ,  extended that requirement to 
limitations of remedy under N.3.S.A. 12ar2-719. In my 
view, choice o f  law provisions are at least as important 
as provision limiting remedies, and ahould be similarly 
treated in centracts of adhesion. Consequently, Z find 
the choice of law provision in t h i s  contract to be void.# 
The choice of law provision in Discover's agreement is far 
om conspicuous. It is contained in the final paragraph of the 
iginal cred~t card agreement (paragraph 2 4 ) ,  and it is in the 
me font and print as the body of the agreement (some other 
svisions are more conspicuously in bold). Clearly, Delaware Law, 
5er the holding of Fairfield, should not be enforced. 
An ordinary choice of law analysls mandates the same result;. 
d Jersey courts apply the "most significant relationship t e s t r  of 
; Restatement (Second} Conflict of Lawq §§ 6 and 188 to determine 
ich state's laws apply, See Gilbert Svrwance Comoanv v. 
vlsvlvania ManuIacturersr As~ociation Insurance Comaanv, 134 N. J. 
, 102-03 (1993). The relevant considerations include: the 
[ties domiciles or residences; the places of incorporation and 
nces of business of the parties; the place of contractingr the 
nee of perfomahce; the relevant policies of the form: the 
i.evant policies of other interested states and the relative 
:crests of those states with respect to the particular issue: the 
lproteotion of justified expectations; and the ease in the 
Ibstemminalion and application of the law to be applied. An 
analysis o;E these factors mandates an application of New Jersey 
law. 
1. Mr. Shea is a New Jersey resident who entered into his 
contract with Discover in New Jersey; the contract was accepted in 
New Jersey; Mr. Shea receives'his bills and makes his payments in 
ew Jersey and therefore performs his part of the contract: in New 
ersey; 
2. The subject matter of the contract (the credit card) is 
P ocated in New Jersey; 3. New Jersey has strong policy interests in protecting its 
kitizensr rights to sue in court as well as their rights to jury 
:rials. The waiver of rights must be clear, knowing, informed, 
rrithout coercion and unequivocal. Delaware has no legitimate 
:.aterests in having its law in this regard applied: 
4 .  While Discover i s  located in Delaware, Delaware has a much 
:.ess significant relationship to Mr. Shea's claims than does New 
i.erBey. 
Clearly, New Jersey law applies with tespect to the issue of 
ktiether Discover could unilaterally add an arbitratioh C L ~ U S ~  to 
r Shea's agreement. Under New Jersey Law, which is in all 
elevant respects identical to California law, Mr. Shea should not 
j e  forced to arbitrate his claims. 
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Discover has argued tha t ,  while Mr. Shea did not aff irmatively 
waive h i s  r i g h t  t o  a jury  t r i a l ,  he "consenteti" t o  the amendment by 
f a i l i n g  t o  Close h i s  .account and f a i l i ng  t o  infofm Discover that  he 
d id  not want t o  be bound by the  a rb i t ra t ion  provision and by 
h t ,  which was rejected by the 
court i n  &&4, i s  also re jec ted  by th.is court as without merit. 
The amendment t o  the  agreement was included with a monthly 
tatemen'c, as a " b i l l  ~ctuffer"  and not seen by M r .  Shea. M r .  Shea 
i d  not have an unconditional. "rightf'  t o  opt out of the arbi t ra t ion  
lause since Discover adrnits tha t  it wouuL have closed M r .  Shea's 
ccount i f  he had not agreed t o  be bound by t he  a rb i t ra t ion  clause. 
M r .  Shea has a substant ia l  investment i n  the c red i t  he has 
eveloped with Discover. f f M r .  Sheaf s cred i t  with Discover was 
enninated, he would have had t o  apply fo r  new czedit ,  which may 
o t  have been possible t o  ob ta in .   he' potent ia l  loss  of credi t  
hich would have accompanied a re jec t ion of the  a rb i t ra t ion  clause, 
f fec t ive ly  created a ba r r i e r  t o  such reject ion,  making the  issue 
. . 
f p rope rno t i ce  and consent t h a t  much inore important. M r .  Shea 
ompleted no affirmative a c t  t o  be bound by the  arfditration clausel 
e.never "consented" t o  it, and .it cannot be enforced against him. 
he a rb i t r a t i on  clause cannot be applied i n  t h i s  case. 
N. J.S.A. 2A:24-1 p~ov ides  ' t h a t  a rb i t ra t ion  clauses are  not ' 
forceable i f  there a re  "grounds.. .at: law or  i n  equity fo r  the 
onabi l i ty  is  such a ground. In 
, 195 N.J.  Super.. 435 (App.Div. 
84), the court relied upon the reasoning of the California 
preme Court and held that an alternative dispute resolution 
ovision in a contract was unconscionable and ugenforceable. The. 
urt noted that "[olut Supreme Court has granted relief from 
ovisions in contracts that are against public policy and arcs not 
eeLy negotiated becauae of unequal bargaining power of the 
rtfes." Id. at 442. 
Xa the instant matter, the arbitration clause is contained in 
conklcact of adhesion. There is clearly unequal bargaining power 
tween the partXes and the only purpose of the provision . 
rporting to prevent class-wide litigation i s  to effectively 
nove the only legitimate remedy for cardholders with small 
N.J.S.X. 17:3B-41 does not support Discover's position. 
st statute firovides in relevant: part: 
"A bank may, if the agreement governing a rwolving 
credit plan so provides, at. any time, or from time to 
time, amend the terms of the agreement, including without 
limitation, th ta  terms governing the periodic pe~centage 
rate or rates used to calculate intereat, the metnoa af 
computing We outstanding unpaid indebtedness fa  which 
the rate or zates are applxed, the amount of other 
uhargbas and the applicable inetallment repayment 
sahedule, in aacoxdance with the furth6l: provisions of 
this seation. " 
This statute does not apply under the circumstances presented. 
?re is a clear distinctioh between amending the finahcia1 terms 
1 rates of a credit: card agreement and the unilateral addition of 
provision not contemplated at the time of the original 
MOSS & INGLEF 
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agreement. Such distinction is persuasively discussed and decided 1 .  
[in supra. 
( N.J.S.A. 17:3B-41 applies only when the original crrdmenbsr 
kgreement specifically provides that the particular type of 
/amendment can be made; here it does not. The statute provides only 
/that the agreement c a n  be "amended", not materially altered with 
kew terms that by New Jersey case law require notice and mutual 
188eII~. The statute does not specifically refer to arbitration 
blauses. The examples in the statute cleerly lndicaee the only 
arnendmenks permitted are to changes relating to charges on the 
kccount. Discover is not permitted to unilaterally amend it 
I greement to add an arbitration clause. Additionally, the statute 
{hoUld not be cead to authorize the addition of a provision which 
1 ould be unconscionable. 
UNDER THE LAW OP ANY JURXSDICTION, mCLUDING BOTH NEY 
JERSEY AND DELPIPW, THZ CLAUSE IN THE ARBXTRATION 
E 4nce MZNT mfRPORTINp TO PRECLUDE CIJW-2 REZZEF XB 
~ N S C L O N A B Z E  AND UNENMRCEABLE 
I The law relating to unconscionability is universal. Under 
th New Jersey and Delaware law, unconscionable contract 
7 
ovisions are unenforceable. See N.J.S.R. 2A:24-1 and Chimes v.. 
itani &tor HoteL. Inc . ,  Supra, where the Court stated at page 
H[o]ur  Supreme Court: has granted reliafl Eram provisions 
' 
i n  conkracta that are against publia policy and ate not 
freely negotiated because of unequal bargainibg power oP 
I the parties. 
( The arbitration clause at issue ia contained in a contract of 
(adhesion, the parties are of unewsl bargaining power, and clcariy, 
lthe only plupose of the provision purporting to prevent class-vide 
, arbitration is to benefit Discover. Under New Je~sey Law, the I 
Jcourt finds the term precluding .class wide arbitration 
unconscionable and as such unenforceable. I I Delaware law also mandates the same result. In Delaware, 
I- conscionable contract provisions, including unconscionable 
pitration clauses, are yenforceable. The Uniforn Arbitration 
bet, 10 Delaware Code BS 5701. et. se., acknowledges that an 
jlbitration clause ie enforceable 'save upon such grounds as exist 
/t law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.. . .". 
~ c l o n a b i l l t y  is such a ground for revocation of a contract. 6 
+elaware Code S 2-302 provides in relevant part as follows: 
"Unconsaianabls contract or clause, 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the 
contraat or,any cLau8e of the aantract to have been 
unaoneaionabrs at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the aontraat, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the. contraat: without khe unconscionable 
clause, or it may SO limit the application of any 
unconsaionable clwuusa as to avoid any unaonaciohabie 
result, a 
In Graham v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 
891,  the Delaware Supreme Court stated that an arbitration 
chanism could be unconscionable i f  it was contained in a contract 
adhesion and unfairly structured. See also Worldwide Ins, Grour, 
F . 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992). 
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/ The provision preventing class actions and the consolldatlon 
of claims is contained in. a contract of adhesion under either body 
lo£ law. The provisiorl against class-wide relief in Discover's 
I amendment benetits only DiscoveE, at the expense of individual 
,cardholders. While Discover can use the provision to preclude I 
lass actions and therefore, effectively immunize itself completely 
from small claims, individual cardholders gain nothing, and in t 
Fact, $re effectively deprived of their a l l  individual claims. 
biscover can completely avoid accountability whenever the harm to 
ach class member i s  small. enough. Such a provision preventing I 
1la.a actions and the consolidation of claims is unconscionable 
kder Delaware and New Jersey law.. 
The persuasive reasoning of Bolter v. Sunerior Court, 87 Gal+ 
4Ch 900, modified 88 Cal. App. 4th 238 A (2001),. dictates the 
I/mviLiion at issue i s  both piocedurally and substantively 
~anscio*sble . in Bolter, the arbitration agreement contained, the 
fllowing provision quoted at page 894: 
~*[Franchieeeal agree that at1 arbitration ahax1 be 
conducted on an individual, not class-wide, basis and 
that an arbitration proceeding between [franchisor] and 
[franchisee] shall. not be consolidated w i t h  any other 
arbitration pmceeciing involving [franchisor] and any 
other natural pere9n.. .* 
I The court acknowledged the arbbitration agreement's 
u conscionability with regard to the foreclosure of a class-wide b 
p oceeding. The court. recognized that plaintiffs were individuals 1 
w th little financial means, therefore, the court: held the t 
prohibition against: consolidation had no justification other .than I 
Ias a mans of maximiring an advantage over the plaintifis. 
I In this matter, Discover's arbitration agreement includes the 
"Neither you nor w e  s h a l l  be e n t i t l a d  t o  join o r  
consolidate claim in a rb i t r a t i on  by QE against  other 
aardmembers with respect  t o  t he i r  acaounts, o r  arb i t rake  
any claims ae a zepresentativa o r  membtP'r of a a lass  o r  i n  
a private attorney general capacity." 
f enforced, the provision against class actions and consolidations 
1 ould allow Discover to create an economic advantage over each 
F v i d u a l  cardholder 60 great that none would reaeofiabiy be able 
10 proceed. By depriving cardmembers of any farun in which they 
t ould reasonably vindicate their rights, Discover seeks to leave 
I t s e l f  in a position where it could completely amid 
icmuntability- This type of power cannot be the purpose of 
Jrbltration. In Powertel, k c .  v. Bexlev, 743 $0.26570. (Ct. App. 
i l a .  1999) the court stetad in a similar context at page 574-516: 
ndlthouqh not disposat ive of thie point,  it: is 
s ign i f i s an t  that t h e  arbi txa t ion  clause is an adhesion 
contract...Powertdl prepargd the  a x b i b a t i o n  clause 
u n i l a t e r a l l y  and s e n t  it: along to i t s  customeca as an 
i n e e s t  to t h e i r  monthly telephone biT1. The cusromexe 
did not  bargain fsr t h e  a rb i t ra t ion  alause, nor did they 
have the powes to reject it. One of t h e  hallmarks' of 
procedural Unaonsoionability is the  absence of any 
meaningful choice on the part o f  t he  coneumer. See 
BeXcher; Kohl. Hers, We customers had no choice but t o  
agree t o  We new akb i t ra t ion  clause i f  they wished to 
continue b U s e  the c e l l u l a r  telephone plans they had 
puEchapre f rcan Powertel . 
**** 
"It ie true, as Powe.rte1 argues, t h a t  custaners can avoid I 
the  effect of t h e  a rb i t ra t ion  c lause  by canceling t h e i r  
phone service  and signing an agreement wi th  another 
provider. The f a l l a cy  of that argument, however, ia t h a t  
switching provider8 would r e e u l t  i n  a loss  of the 
investment tho customers have f n the  agreements they mgde 
with Powertel. They purahased equipment: t h a t  works only 
with the  Powertel service and f&ey have obtained 
telephone numbers than cannot be transferred t o  a new 
provider. I t  i a  reaeonable t o  assume t h a t  soma customcars 
may s u f f e r  a g r ea t  deal  of inaonvenience and expense t o  
obtain and publish a new teLephone number, Hence, it i s  
no answer to say t h a t  the custoaeref can simply awitah 
providers. Many customers may have continued t h e i r  
service with Powextel deepi ts  their objection t o  the 
a rb i t r a t i on  olause simply because they had no 
I economFcally feasible a l ternat ive ."  
"The a rb i t r a t i on  clause a l s o  ef fec t ive ly  removetl 
Powertells exposure t o  any remedy that could be pursued 
on behalf of a a l a s s  of conewn2are.. .Class l i t i g a t i o n  
provides the most economically feasible remedy f o r  the 
kind o f  claim t h a t  has been asserted hers. The po ten t i a l  
claims a r e  too amall t o  litigate individually, bu t  
oolleotrively they might amount t o  a large. sum of money. 
The prospect of c l a s s  l i t i g a t i o n  o rd inar i ly  has some 
deterrent: effect on a manufacturer o r  sewice provider, 
but that is absent here. By requir ing  a rb i t ra t ion  oE all 
claims, Powertel has precluded tAe poss ib i l i ty  t h a t  a 
group of i t a  customers mSght jo in  together t o  seek relief 
that would be impractical f o r  any of them t o  obta in  
alone. Again, t h i s  is  an advantage that inures only t;o 
Powertel . The a rb i t ra t ion  olause precludes class 
l i t 5ga t i on  by e i t h e r  party,  bu t  it is di.fficvlt to 
envision a scenario i n  which that would work to 
Powertelrs detrhmnt."  
ee also Lozada v. Dale Baker ~ ldsmobi le .  Inc., 9 1  F. Supp. 2d 1087 
Mich. 2000) (refusing to enforce an arb i t ra t ion  clause 
c ntaining a 'no class action" clause on the  ground t h a t  the I' 
a b i t r a t i on  agreement w a s  unconscionable). I. 
Banks such as Discover have immeme power over t h e i r  c r ed i t  
I card customers, 'Discover can effectively destroy the cardholder's 
credit standlng and ability to obtain future credit by mailing 
negative credit comments about: the cardholder to the major 
Ireporting agencies. The refusal of a cardlaamber to pay an improper 
even if that refusal is justified, could result in making it 
irtually impossible for the cardholder to' refinance a home or 
ease a car. This huge leverage gives a bank like Discover an all 
i 
owarful mechanism to entorce its rights without: ever having to 
enture into a court or meaningful arbitration proceeding. Without 
he potential of some classwide relief, the cardmember has no 
evecage at all. The threat of the cardholder filing for 
1.ndivi.dual arbitration of a $25 or $50 claim is meaningless 
(:ompared to class wide multimillion dollar litigation to redress 
the alleged wrong to hundreds! of thousands of cardholders. 
The requirement for a cardmember to pursue a claim against 
ciscover on an "individual" basis, in the current context, is an 
unconscionable restriction that should not be enforced. 
Ms. Shea had no market alternatives. This is not a situation 
wnere a consumer can simply purchase an identical product from a 
d.fferent source. Mr. Shea would have had to cancel his Discover 
c..-edit oasd and apply for new credit with-another bank for which he 
m y or may not have been approved. This is a process that takes 1 
t me and there is no guarantee of receiving credit: with equivalent i 
limits and interest rates. The mere act of applying for new credit 
c n itself damage consumers by inpacting on a consumer's FICA i 
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/score,  which then imparts the ava i l ab i l i t y  of  cred i t  and the ra tes  
a t  which c r ed i t  i s  offered, i f  it is offered a t  a l l .  
Here, the California c lass  act ion is brought on behalf of 
Discover c r ed i t  cardholders who ware al legedly improperly charged 
overlimit fees a s  a resu l t  of Discoverfs conduct. By defini t ion,  
c lass  members a r e  consumers who are  o r  have been a t  t h e i r  credit: 
l i m i t s .  These a r e  the types of consumers who cannot simply apply 
for  and obtain another cretil t  card from another bank, pa r t i cu la r ly  
I. t the  same c red i t  Z i m l t  and the same ' i n te res t  r a t e  they have b u i l t  
over a period of t h e  with.Discover. 
For the  reasons skated above the p l a i n t i f f ' s  demand t o  compel 
brbi trat ion is denied and the complaint dismissed. 
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ORDER DISMLSSING COMPLAINT 
ab ve matter is herewith dismissed. i. 
A. 
R ly papers submitted by: 4 
This matter having been brought before the Court on April 12,2001 by Glen 
Ranis, Esq., ofthe firm of Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & ingexsoI1, LLP on behalf of the 
PIaintZf and Samuel C. Inglese, Esq., o f  the firm of Moss and Inglese, attorneys for the 
D~?fendant, aad papers being submitted and for good cause shown: 
. . d 
~t is on this;tz;Y;Yay of O&&H 2001 ORDEW that tbe complaint in the 
